Schreck

The respondents, Trillium Gift of Life Network and University Health Network, brought motions to dismiss and transfer applications challenging the constitutionality of liver transplant waitlist criteria for patients with alcohol-related liver disease.

UHN moved to dismiss the application against it, arguing the Charter did not apply to its clinical decisions.

Trillium moved to transfer the application to the Divisional Court, arguing it involved the review of a statutory power.

The Superior Court dismissed both motions, finding it was not plain and obvious that the Charter did not apply to UHN's adoption of the criteria, and affirming the Superior Court's inherent jurisdiction to grant Charter remedies without bifurcating the proceedings.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal on a charge of criminal harassment.

The trial judge had acquitted the respondent because he was not satisfied that the only reasonable inference from the circumstantial evidence was that the respondent was watching and besetting his ex-wife's house.

The Crown argued the trial judge erred by failing to identify what the other reasonable inferences were.

The Superior Court dismissed the appeal, holding that a trial judge is not required to identify specific alternative inferences to acquit, but only to determine whether the Crown has proven the actus reus beyond a reasonable doubt.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiff's action at trial, the successful defendant sought substantial indemnity costs of $112,626.70.

The defendant argued that substantial indemnity was warranted because the plaintiff made unfounded allegations of improper conduct and because the defendant made a Rule 49 offer to settle that was more favourable than the trial outcome.

The court rejected both arguments, noting that the plaintiff's allegations had some basis and that Rule 49 does not automatically grant substantial indemnity costs to a defendant whose offer is beaten by a dismissal.

The court awarded the defendant partial indemnity costs fixed at $40,000, finding the claimed amount to be grossly excessive.

During a motor vehicle accident jury trial, the defendant requested that the jury be asked to provide particulars of the defendant's negligence and list the plaintiff's injuries if liability was found.

The plaintiff opposed these questions.

The court reviewed the historical practice and case law regarding jury questions, noting both advantages and disadvantages.

The court concluded that in this case, where negligence was essentially res ipsa loquitur and the medical evidence was conflicting, asking for particulars would not assist in testing the jury's understanding and could unnecessarily confuse them.

The request to include the questions was denied.

The defendants moved for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's action for inducing breach of contract, nuisance, and trespass arising from a property line dispute.

The defendants had moved a fence onto the plaintiff's driveway shortly before the scheduled closing of the plaintiff's sale of her property, causing the purchasers to refuse to close.

The court dismissed the summary judgment motion, finding that the conflicting evidence regarding the historical location of the fence and the defendants' intent to procure a breach of contract raised genuine issues of credibility that required a trial.

The plaintiff sued the defendant for defamation over Twitter posts alleging the plaintiff made women uncomfortable at a social event.

The defendant brought a motion for summary judgment, arguing the statements were true.

Applying the Hryniak framework, the court used its fact-finding powers to assess credibility on the paper record.

The court found the defendant established the defence of truth on a balance of probabilities, noting corroborating affidavits and the plaintiff's own bizarre and derogatory affidavit evidence.

The motion for summary judgment was granted and the action dismissed.

The plaintiff purchased a commercial building from the defendant.

Prior to closing, the defendant provided a statutory declaration claiming uninterrupted use of an adjacent driveway without ever seeking permission.

The plaintiff subsequently sued the adjacent owner for a prescriptive easement but lost after discovering the defendant had previously sought permission via an unsigned 1987 agreement.

The plaintiff then sued the defendant for negligent misrepresentation to recover its legal costs from the unsuccessful easement action.

The Superior Court dismissed the action, finding that while the declaration contained false statements and the defendant owed a duty of care, the plaintiff did not detrimentally rely on the misrepresentations because it would have continued the easement litigation based on its counsel's advice regardless of the 1987 agreement.

The plaintiff commenced an action relating to a 2006 real estate transaction, which was the third proceeding initiated regarding the same transaction.

The defendant lawyer moved to strike the claim against him for disclosing no reasonable cause of action, while the other defendants moved to dismiss the action as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The court granted both motions, finding the claim against the lawyer incomprehensible and incapable of amendment, and the claim against the other defendants a clear attempt to re-litigate issues already decided in prior proceedings.

The applicants sought an order under s. 140 of the Courts of Justice Act declaring the respondent a vexatious litigant.

The respondent had engaged in a decade-long pattern of re-litigating issues related to a real estate transaction, despite numerous unsuccessful actions and appeals.

The court found that the respondent met the characteristics of a vexatious litigant, as he persistently brought proceedings to determine issues already decided and rolled forward grounds into subsequent actions.

The application was granted against the primary respondent, but dismissed against his daughter, who had not initiated the vexatious proceedings.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal on a charge of failing to comply with a recognizance.

The trial judge provided deficient reasons and erred in law regarding the elements of the offence.

However, the Superior Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the Crown failed to adduce evidence negating a specific exception to the respondent's house arrest condition (attending counselling).

Because an acquittal was the only reasonable verdict on the evidence, the trial judge's errors did not have a material bearing on the outcome.

The accused pleaded guilty to two counts of careless storage of ammunition and one count of possession of ammunition contrary to a prohibition order.

The accused had a significant criminal record, including prior convictions for firearms offences and breaches of prohibition orders.

The Crown and defence presented a joint submission for a total sentence of three years' imprisonment.

Despite expressing grave reservations about the joint submission given the accused's history, the court accepted it, applying the Anthony-Cook standard.

The court imposed the jointly recommended sentence of three years, less credit for pre-sentence custody, but added a three-year probation order.