R. Pillay

During a criminal proceeding, the defendants applied to exclude recordings of intercepted conversations.

The Crown sought to admit sessions 381 and 842.

The court found that portions of session 381 were sufficiently audible and contextualized to be admitted, while prejudicial portions regarding personal drug use were excluded.

The court ruled that session 842 was inadmissible hearsay, as the statements had no evidentiary value unless admitted for the truth of their contents.

In a voir dire during a criminal proceeding, the Crown sought to admit evidence of web-browsing intercepts and MMS messages allegedly captured from the accused's cell phone using novel police interception software.

The court reviewed the requirements for authenticating electronic documents under sections 31.1 to 31.3 of the Canada Evidence Act.

The court found that the police witness lacked the necessary expertise and actual knowledge to confirm that the intercepted data accurately reflected what was accessed or displayed on the accused's device.

As the technology was novel and untested by the police, and no expert evidence or corroborating data was provided, the Crown failed to authenticate the electronic documents.

The evidence was ruled inadmissible.

The accused, charged with fraud over $5,000 for allegedly defrauding the government of customs duties, brought a pre-trial motion to adduce alternate suspect evidence implicating five employees.

The Crown conceded for three employees but opposed for two.

The court granted the accused's application, finding sufficient connection between the employees and the crime.

The Crown also brought a motion to admit the videotaped statement of a deceased employee.

The court dismissed the Crown's application as premature, without prejudice to renew it before the close of its case.

The accused was charged with the first degree murder of his father, who died from a gunshot wound to the eye while sleeping.

The Crown's case relied entirely on circumstantial evidence, including the accused's purchase of the murder weapon, his presence near the scene at the time of death, and his fabrication of a false alibi.

The court rejected the defence theory of suicide, finding that the cumulative effect of the circumstantial evidence led to the inescapable conclusion that the accused planned and deliberated the intentional killing of his father.

The accused was found guilty of first degree murder.

The accused was charged with perjury for allegedly falsely testifying during a previous trial that he did not speak to a co-accused in a courthouse washroom.

The Crown relied on the eyewitness identification evidence of two jurors from the previous trial.

The court found significant frailties in the eyewitness identification evidence, including the fleeting nature of the observation, cross-racial identification issues, and inconsistencies.

The court also found that the statutory corroboration requirement under s. 133 of the Criminal Code was not met.

The accused was found not guilty.

The appellant appealed his conviction for failing to comply with a demand to provide a breath sample.

He argued the trial judge made several errors, including shifting the burden of proof on a section 8 Charter application, misapprehending evidence regarding the officer's grounds for the demand, misapplying the W.(D.) test for credibility, relying on hearsay, and failing to prove he operated a vehicle within the preceding three hours.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge made no palpable and overriding errors, properly assessed credibility, and reasonably concluded that the officer had the requisite grounds to make the demand.

During a joint trial, counsel for one of the co-accused sought directions on the appropriate timing to introduce propensity or bad character evidence against the other co-accused through cross-examination of a Crown witness (a 'Pollock & Morrisson' application).

The court ruled that to maintain full answer and defence and procedural fairness, notice of such an application must be provided at the conclusion of the Crown's examination-in-chief, prior to the commencement of cross-examination by the co-accused's counsel.

During a criminal jury trial, the accused objected to the Crown's expert witnesses using PowerPoint presentations that included conclusions and opinions, arguing they would unfairly emphasize the Crown's case and act as written reports.

The trial judge ruled that the PowerPoint presentations were admissible as exhibits to assist the jury in understanding complex technical evidence, provided that certain bald conclusions or opinions were redacted.

The judge found that such demonstrative aids are reasonably necessary in modern trials to enhance juror comprehension, subject to proper limiting instructions.

During a murder trial, the accused applied for a mistrial after a Crown witness provided undisclosed opinion evidence suggesting an incinerator had been used more than once.

The accused argued this prejudiced them by implying involvement in other uncharged murders.

The trial judge dismissed the application, finding that a mistrial is a remedy of last resort and that a sharp instruction to the jury to disregard the unfounded opinion evidence was sufficient to cure any potential prejudice.

During a murder trial, the Crown brought a motion arguing that one of the co-accused had placed his good character in issue through the cross-examination of a Crown witness.

The co-accused's counsel had elicited testimony from the witness that the co-accused seemed like a 'nice fellow' who could not be imagined to be involved in the victim's disappearance.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the cross-examination was intended to repudiate the Crown's theory of the case and attack the reliability of the witness's testimony, rather than to introduce evidence of general reputation or good character.

The applicants, facing three separate first-degree murder trials, sought an unprecedented publication ban on all evidence to be adduced at their first trial (the Bosma murder) until the completion of their subsequent trials, arguing that pre-trial publicity would prejudice future juries.

Alternatively, they sought to extend the statutory publication ban on pre-trial motions.

The court dismissed the request for a blanket ban on trial evidence, finding that the applicants failed to demonstrate a serious risk to trial fairness and that jury safeguards would be sufficient.

However, the court granted the alternative request, extending the publication ban on pre-trial motions until the conclusion of the subsequent Babcock trial due to the high risk of prejudice from overlapping inadmissible evidence.

The accused brought an application under s. 591(3) of the Criminal Code seeking severance from a co-accused in a joint first-degree murder prosecution.

The moving party argued that the co‑accused intended to advance a cut‑throat defence, introduce bad character and propensity evidence, rely on out‑of‑court statements implicating the moving party, and conduct aggressive cross‑examination, all of which would create overwhelming prejudice.

The Crown and co‑accused opposed the motion, arguing that limiting instructions could address any prejudice and that joint trials are strongly preferred where accused are alleged to have acted in concert.

The court held that the applicant had not demonstrated that a joint trial would cause injustice or undermine the right to a fair trial.

Potential prejudice could be mitigated through evidentiary rulings and careful jury instructions, and policy considerations strongly favoured a joint trial.

The accused applied to quash search warrants issued on May 11 and May 12, 2013 and to exclude evidence under ss. 8 and 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court reviewed whether the Information to Obtain provided reasonable grounds and whether police conduct during searches of multiple properties was constitutional.

The court found that a warrantless search of the accused’s aircraft hangar violated s. 8 and that evidence seized from the hangar should be excluded.

However, the court upheld the validity of the search of the accused’s residence and admitted evidence relating to an incineration device and associated forensic evidence discovered on rural property.

Applying the Grant framework, the court concluded that admission of the latter evidence would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The Crown brought an application to introduce evidence of prior discreditable conduct against the co-accused in a first-degree murder trial.

The Crown sought to admit evidence of the co-accused's prior criminal collaboration, access to firearms, and use of an animal incinerator to establish their relationship, motive, and the actus reus of the offence.

The court applied the test for admitting discreditable conduct, balancing probative value against moral and reasoning prejudice.

The court granted the application in part, finding that certain evidence was highly probative to understanding the co-accused's relationship and rebutting anticipated defences, while excluding other evidence that posed an insurmountable risk of propensity reasoning.

The accused brought an application to exclude evidence obtained through a telewarrant authorizing the search of his vehicle, arguing the police improperly relied on the telewarrant procedure contrary to s. 487.1 of the Criminal Code and thereby violated s. 8 of the Charter.

The accused submitted the Information to Obtain did not adequately establish impracticability for personal attendance before a justice and that the delay between seizure, issuance, and execution of the warrant undermined the justification for a telewarrant.

The court held that the impracticability threshold under s. 487.1 is relatively low and that the circumstances of a complex and urgent missing person investigation with limited resources justified use of the telewarrant procedure.

The court concluded that the issuing justice had sufficient grounds to issue the telewarrant and that no Charter breach occurred.

In any event, the court held the evidence would be admissible under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The accused brought an application to exclude statements made to police and observations obtained during a police visit to his aviation business hangar during a missing-person investigation.

The court considered alleged breaches of ss. 7, 8, and 10 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms arising from police questioning and a warrantless walk-through of the hangar.

The court held that the accused was not detained while speaking with police in the public reception area and that statements made there were admissible.

However, once police moved into the secure hangar area, the accused was psychologically detained and the police conducted a warrantless search without valid consent.

The resulting observations and related utterances were obtained in breach of the accused’s Charter rights and were excluded under s. 24(2).

The accused applied to exclude cellular phone subscriber and tower location records obtained by police from a telecommunications provider through an emergency disclosure request without a warrant.

The court held that police had sufficient grounds earlier in the day to obtain a production order and that exigent circumstances under s. 487.11 of the Criminal Code were not established, resulting in a breach of s. 8 of the Charter.

However, applying the framework in Grant, the breach was characterized as technical and conducted in good faith, with minimal impact on the accused’s privacy interests given the narrow scope of the records sought.

Considering the seriousness of the offence and the reliability and importance of the evidence, the court concluded that exclusion would bring the administration of justice into greater disrepute.

The cellular records were therefore admitted pursuant to s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The applicant brought a pre-trial motion to exclude both sworn and unsworn jurors from the courtroom during the 'rotating triers' challenge for cause process.

The Crown and co-accused supported the application.

The court considered conflicting jurisprudence on whether the 2008 amendments to section 640 of the Criminal Code ousted the court's inherent jurisdiction to exclude jurors absent a specific application for 'static triers' under section 640(2.1).

The court concluded that the legislative amendments did not limit its inherent jurisdiction to control its process and ensure an impartial jury under section 11(d) of the Charter.

The application was granted, and all jurors were ordered excluded during the challenge process.

A media coalition applied for an order allowing the publication of certain pre-trial motions in a high-profile first-degree murder case, arguing that the statutory publication ban under s. 648(1) of the Criminal Code should not apply to all pre-trial motions.

The Crown and the accused opposed the application, arguing that s. 648(1) provides a blanket statutory ban on all reporting of any information concerning pre-trial applications brought before the designated trial judge.

The court dismissed the media's application, holding that the statutory ban under s. 648(1) is mandatory and applies to all pre-trial motions adjudicated by the trial judge, whether litigated before or after a jury is selected.

In a first‑degree murder prosecution, the Crown sought to introduce post‑offence conduct evidence relating to the accused’s handling of a toolbox and the use of an incinerator following the alleged killing.

The defence argued the evidence was speculative, highly prejudicial, and equally consistent with non‑culpable explanations.

The court reviewed the governing principles on post‑offence conduct evidence, including the Supreme Court’s guidance that such evidence is a form of circumstantial evidence whose weight is ordinarily for the jury.

The court held that both the toolbox evidence and the incinerator evidence were relevant and capable of supporting reasonable inferences regarding involvement in a culpable homicide.

Any risk of prejudice could be addressed through careful jury instructions.