I.R. Smith

The plaintiff sued his former employer's group insurer for disability benefits more than four years after leaving his employment due to alleged workplace injuries.

The insurer moved for summary judgment on the basis that the claim was out of time under both the Limitations Act, 2002 and the policy's contractual limitation period.

The plaintiff argued for relief from forfeiture.

The court granted summary judgment, finding the claim was statute-barred and that relief from forfeiture was unavailable because the plaintiff's failure to file a claim amounted to non-compliance, his delay was unexplained and unreasonable, and the insurer suffered significant prejudice.

The parties, who share equal parenting time and joint decision-making for their four-year-old daughter, could not agree on which public school she should attend.

The applicant mother sought to enroll the child at a school near her home, while the respondent father sought a school near his home.

The court determined that it was in the child's best interests to attend the school near the applicant's home, as it would allow the applicant greater flexibility to secure employment and facilitate the involvement of the child's extended maternal family in before and after-school care.

The parties separated in 2021 and entered into a separation agreement providing for equal parenting time and joint decision-making with the applicant father having final authority.

The applicant subsequently abused his decision-making authority, repeatedly withheld the children, and made unfounded allegations of physical abuse against the respondent mother to the police and CAS.

Following a trial, the court ordered that equal parenting time continue on a 2-2-3 schedule, but granted sole decision-making responsibility to the respondent mother due to the applicant's history of unilateral decision-making and creation of adult conflict.

In a pre-trial motion for a first-degree murder case, the court ruled on the admissibility of the accused's statements to police, ante-mortem statements of the deceased, and character evidence.

The court found the accused's statements were voluntary and not obtained in violation of his Charter rights.

The deceased's statement 'No, it's my brother' was admitted for state of mind but not for its truth.

The court also allowed some evidence of the deceased's prior violent acts to support the accused's self-defence claim, while permitting the Crown to lead balancing evidence of the accused's disposition for violence.

The plaintiff paving contractor sued the defendant general contractor for unpaid invoices and extras on a construction project (the Archmill project).

The plaintiff had also refused to perform work on a second, unrelated project (the Burgessville project) until it was paid for the first.

The court found that the plaintiff was entitled to payment for some, but not all, of the disputed extras on the first project.

However, the court also held that the plaintiff's refusal to work on the second project constituted an anticipatory breach of contract.

The defendant was awarded damages for the extra costs incurred to complete the second project, and the court allowed the defendant to equitably set off those damages against the amount owed to the plaintiff on the first project.

The plaintiff's claim for breach of trust under the Construction Act was dismissed.

During a criminal proceeding, the defendants applied to exclude recordings of intercepted conversations.

The Crown sought to admit sessions 381 and 842.

The court found that portions of session 381 were sufficiently audible and contextualized to be admitted, while prejudicial portions regarding personal drug use were excluded.

The court ruled that session 842 was inadmissible hearsay, as the statements had no evidentiary value unless admitted for the truth of their contents.

In a voir dire during a criminal proceeding, the Crown sought to admit evidence of web-browsing intercepts and MMS messages allegedly captured from the accused's cell phone using novel police interception software.

The court reviewed the requirements for authenticating electronic documents under sections 31.1 to 31.3 of the Canada Evidence Act.

The court found that the police witness lacked the necessary expertise and actual knowledge to confirm that the intercepted data accurately reflected what was accessed or displayed on the accused's device.

As the technology was novel and untested by the police, and no expert evidence or corroborating data was provided, the Crown failed to authenticate the electronic documents.

The evidence was ruled inadmissible.

The defendants brought a motion for leave under the Construction Act to seek security for costs against the plaintiff.

The plaintiff had sued for unpaid invoices and lost profits after the defendants terminated a construction contract due to a loss of financing.

The court found good reason to believe the plaintiff, a formerly dormant shell corporation with no apparent assets, had insufficient assets in Ontario to pay a costs award.

The plaintiff failed to demonstrate sufficient assets or that its claim had a good chance of success.

The court granted leave and ordered the plaintiff to post $201,765.54 as security for costs, staying the action until payment.

The applicant brought a motion to remove counsel representing both the individual respondent and the corporate respondent in an oppression application.

The applicant argued that counsel had a conflict of interest in jointly representing both respondents and that counsel might be called as a witness.

The court found no basis to remove counsel on the grounds of being a potential witness.

However, the court held that a conflict of interest existed because the interests of the individual respondent and the corporate respondent were not aligned in the context of a shareholder dispute.

The motion was allowed in part, and counsel was disqualified from acting for the corporate respondent.

The accused was convicted by a jury of aggravated assault against his former intimate partner.

The assault involved a sustained beating that left the victim with severe facial bruising and swelling.

The Crown sought a 3-year penitentiary sentence, while the defence sought a conditional sentence or 90 days intermittent.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence for domestic violence, finding the attack was unprovoked and sustained.

After accounting for mitigating factors, including youth, lack of related record, and credit for pre-sentence custody and strict bail conditions, the court imposed a sentence of 2.5 years in custody.

The appellant appealed his conviction for driving with a blood alcohol concentration over 80 mg.

He raised six grounds of appeal, including challenges to the admission of hearsay evidence regarding the breathalyzer's calibration, the application of the repealed presumption of identity, the reasonableness of the delay in taking breath samples, the officer's grounds for arrest, and the Crown's failure to disclose the analyst's certificate.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed all grounds, finding no errors in the trial judge's application of the law or assessment of the evidence.

The applicant trustee brought a motion for a final passing of accounts, approval of trustee compensation, approval of legal fees, and costs of prior related motions.

One of the respondent beneficiaries objected to the trustee's compensation and legal fees, and argued that the estate should bear the costs of the prior litigation.

The court approved the trustee's compensation and legal accounts, finding them reasonable given the complex and contentious nature of the estate administration.

The court ordered the objecting beneficiary to personally pay the costs of a doomed capital repairs motion and 80% of the original passing of accounts motion, but ordered the estate to bear the costs of a will interpretation motion as it raised a public policy issue regarding ambiguities in the will.

The applicant, sole beneficiary of her late father's estate, brought an application against her aunt (the respondent) and the estate of her late grandmother for misappropriated estate funds.

After the father's death, the grandmother, who was the named estate trustee, used the deceased's debit card to make unauthorized cash withdrawals and retail purchases.

The court found that while the respondent was not a trustee de son tort, she was liable for knowing assistance in the grandmother's breach of trust, as she drove the grandmother to the bank and stores, knew the debit card belonged to the deceased, and assisted in the transactions.

The respondent and the grandmother's estate were held jointly and severally liable for $12,481.42, with the estate liable for an additional amount.

The accused, a 25-year-old resident of a women's shelter, was charged with sexual assault, sexual interference, and assault against a 14-year-old boy, and sexual assault and sexual interference against his 12-year-old sister.

The court found the child witnesses and shelter staff credible, despite minor inconsistencies, and applied the W.(D.) framework to assess reasonable doubt.

The accused was found guilty of the sexual offences against both children but acquitted of the simple assault charge due to vague evidence.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge misapprehended evidence, relied on ungrounded common-sense assumptions, misapplied the W.(D.) framework, and erred in analyzing mens rea.

The appeal centered on a sexual encounter where the complainant testified she revoked consent to anal intercourse, which the appellant ignored.

The Superior Court of Justice found no error in the trial judge's credibility findings, her application of the W.(D.) test, or her conclusion that the appellant had actual knowledge of the complainant's lack of consent.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicant, the sole beneficiary of her late son's intestate estate, brought an application to remove the respondent, her other son, as estate trustee.

The respondent failed to communicate with the applicant, delayed selling the estate's primary asset because he hoped to purchase it himself, rented the property without consultation, and failed to provide an accounting.

The court found that the respondent acted in his own self-interest, ignored the wishes of the sole beneficiary, and endangered the administration of the estate.

The application was granted, the respondent was removed as estate trustee, and a replacement trustee was appointed.

The defendant moved to dismiss the plaintiff's defamation action under the anti-SLAPP provisions of the Courts of Justice Act (s. 137.1) and for summary judgment.

The plaintiff sued the defendant for allegedly making a false police report about a threatening phone call.

The court dismissed the plaintiff's cross-motion to file late evidence, finding the plaintiff had ample opportunity to prepare.

The court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss the action, holding that reporting a crime to the police is an expression in the public interest.

The plaintiff failed to show the suit had substantial merit or that the defendant lacked valid defences, as the defendant established qualified privilege and truth.

The plaintiff property owner contracted the defendant roofing company to install a new roof on an apartment building.

Following the installation, the roof experienced significant leaking and drainage issues.

The plaintiff's expert engineer concluded the roof was poorly installed, not properly secured, and posed a public safety hazard.

The plaintiff subsequently sold the building, agreeing to a $200,000 reduction in the purchase price due to the defective roof.

The court found the defendant breached the contract and was negligent in its installation, awarding the plaintiff $203,329.98 in damages for the price reduction and interim repair costs.

The defendant brought a motion to stay the enforcement of foreclosure orders respecting several properties pending his appeal to the Court of Appeal.

The defendant argued he would be rendered homeless and destitute without the stay.

The court applied the RJR-MacDonald test and found that the defendant failed to establish irreparable harm, as his harm was quantifiable in monetary terms and he owned another valuable property.

The court also found the balance of convenience favoured the plaintiffs, who risked liability and further deterioration of the properties.

The motion for a stay was dismissed.

The accused was charged with sexual assault and sexual interference involving a 15-year-old complainant.

The core issue was whether the accused knew, or was wilfully blind or reckless about, the complainant's age, and whether he took all reasonable steps to ascertain her age.

The court found that the accused failed to take all reasonable steps, ignoring 'red flags' such as a message from the complainant's mother stating her age.

The accused was found guilty of both counts.