B. Rogers

The accused was tried for second-degree murder after stabbing her son while under the influence of crack cocaine.

The defence sought to have the defence of non-mental disorder automatism left with the jury, arguing the accused was in a state of drug-induced psychosis.

The trial judge ruled there was no air of reality to the defence, as the defence's own psychiatric expert testified the accused likely had control over her actions and understood their lethality.

The defence was not put to the jury, and the accused was convicted.

The applicants, facing three separate first-degree murder trials, sought an unprecedented publication ban on all evidence to be adduced at their first trial (the Bosma murder) until the completion of their subsequent trials, arguing that pre-trial publicity would prejudice future juries.

Alternatively, they sought to extend the statutory publication ban on pre-trial motions.

The court dismissed the request for a blanket ban on trial evidence, finding that the applicants failed to demonstrate a serious risk to trial fairness and that jury safeguards would be sufficient.

However, the court granted the alternative request, extending the publication ban on pre-trial motions until the conclusion of the subsequent Babcock trial due to the high risk of prejudice from overlapping inadmissible evidence.