Impaired driving

The defendant was charged with exceeding 80 mg of alcohol in blood following a motor vehicle stop at 2:40 a.m. outside a drinking establishment.

The Crown proved the charge through roadside screening device and qualified technician breath samples.

The defendant challenged the lawfulness of the initial demand and alleged violations of his right to counsel under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court rejected both challenges, finding reasonable grounds for the initial demand and that police made reasonable efforts to facilitate contact with counsel of choice before offering duty counsel.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and operating a motor vehicle with excess blood alcohol following a collision in a parking lot.

The Crown brought a Charter application regarding the timing of the right to counsel notification.

The court found a technical breach of section 10(b) of the Charter but admitted the evidence under section 24(2), finding the breach was minor and the impact on the accused's Charter-protected interests was minimal.

The court found the first breath sample was taken within the required two-hour period and that the accused's ability to operate a motor vehicle was impaired by alcohol to at least a slight degree.

The accused was convicted on both counts, with the over 80 count conditionally stayed.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle with an excess blood alcohol concentration following a multi-vehicle collision.

The Crown alleged the defendant caused a chain-reaction rear-end collision involving four vehicles.

The central issue was whether the Crown had proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was the driver of the vehicle involved in the collision.

The court found that while the defendant was present at the scene and possessed a key to the vehicle, the identification evidence was weak due to its generality, cross-racial nature, and discrepancies in the witness's description of the driver's age.

The court concluded that the evidence fell short of the requisite standard of proof and acquitted the defendant.

The accused pleaded guilty to impaired driving causing death and two offences under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.

On November 24, 2016, the 23-year-old accused, while extremely intoxicated with a blood-alcohol concentration between 185-240 mg/100mL, drove a rental SUV at 188 km/h through a red light in a 60 km/h residential zone and struck a stationary vehicle, killing the 60-year-old driver.

The accused also fraudulently obtained a work permit and attempted to establish a business while on a student visa.

The court imposed a sentence of six years for impaired driving causing death, plus one year consecutive for the immigration offence under section 122, and one year concurrent for the offence under section 127, with a 10-year driving prohibition.

The accused was charged with impaired driving following a traffic stop on October 23, 2016, in Perth, Ontario.

An approved screening device (ASD) test resulted in a fail reading.

The defence argued that the officer failed to follow a November 26, 2013 memorandum from the Ontario Provincial Police Deputy Commissioner regarding the potential effects of food, drink, and hand sanitizer on ASD readings, which required a 15-minute waiting period before testing.

The court rejected the defence argument and distinguished the case from R v. Wong, finding that the memorandum lacked proper evidentiary foundation and that an officer cannot be bound to follow a directive of which they were unaware.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood-alcohol level exceeding 80 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood, following a rear-end collision on October 31, 2015 in Toronto.

The trial addressed two main issues: whether the defendant's section 10(b) Charter rights were breached due to delay in breath testing, and whether the breath testing on an approved screening device was conducted "forthwith" as required by the Criminal Code.

The court found no Charter breach, finding that the defendant was adequately informed of her right to counsel despite the delay.

The court also found that the "forthwith" requirement was satisfied given the unusual circumstances, including the off-duty status of the initial officer and the heavy police workload on Halloween night.

The defendant was found guilty.

The accused was charged with being in care and control of a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and while having a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80mg per 100ml of blood.

The accused was found asleep in his vehicle with the engine running in a parking lot at Exhibition Place.

The Crown alleged the accused was in care and control; the accused argued he had no intention to drive and was waiting for a friend to pick him up.

The court found no breach of Charter rights regarding the arrest and breath demand.

On the care and control issue, the court found the accused successfully rebutted the presumption of intention to drive and that there was no realistic risk of danger in the particular circumstances, resulting in an acquittal.

The defendant brought a section 11(b) Charter application seeking a stay of charges for impaired driving and exceeding the legal blood alcohol limit, alleging unreasonable delay in trial.

The defendant was charged on February 21, 2015, and the application was heard on November 2, 2016, representing a 16-month delay.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the delay was not unreasonable under both the pre-Jordan and post-Jordan frameworks.

The court attributed significant delay to the defendant's counsel's actions, including the decision to insist on a one-day trial slot rather than accepting a two-day slot or seeking an earlier date.

The court found no prejudice to the defendant and emphasized the societal interest in trying drinking and driving cases on their merits.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving and driving with excess blood alcohol (over 80 mg).

She brought three Charter applications challenging the lawfulness of her detention and access to counsel.

The court found no breach of section 10(b) regarding delayed access to duty counsel, as the delay was explained by technical difficulties with a newly installed telephone system and the officers made diligent efforts to contact counsel.

The court found no breach of section 8 regarding the timing of breath samples, holding that the "as soon as practicable" requirement is not a precondition to admissibility when the Crown does not rely on the statutory presumption of identity and instead calls expert evidence to establish the readings at the time of driving.

The court found a breach of section 9 regarding arbitrary detention, specifically a three-hour period of overholding after 11:30 AM when the defendant should have been released, but declined to exclude the breath evidence under section 24(2), finding the breach was not sufficiently serious and that society's interest in adjudication on the merits favoured inclusion.

On the merits, the court found the defendant guilty of both impaired driving and over 80, rejecting her evidence regarding her pattern of alcohol consumption and her bolus drinking defence as lacking credibility and defying common sense.

The accused was charged with care or control of a motor vehicle while over 80 milligrams of alcohol per 100 millilitres of blood, contrary to the Criminal Code.

Police received a tip that a woman had been drinking all day and was driving to a beer store.

Officers located the vehicle at the beer store and stopped the accused as she reversed out of a parking spot.

The accused failed an approved screening device test and later approved instrument tests at the station.

The defence challenged the lawfulness of the detention under Charter sections 8 and 9, and raised issues regarding compliance with the two-hour requirement under section 258 of the Criminal Code.

The court found that the police had authority to detain and investigate the accused based on the specific information received and the common law ancillary powers doctrine.

The court also found that the Crown proved compliance with the two-hour requirement and that the officer had reasonable grounds for the approved instrument demand.

The accused was found guilty.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle with excess blood alcohol on September 28, 2014.

The defence raised two Charter issues challenging whether the arresting officer had reasonable and probable grounds for the approved screening device demand, alleging breaches of sections 8 and 9 of the Charter.

The court found that the officer had both subjective and objective grounds to stop the vehicle based on speeding and mounting a curb, and that the approved screening device was in proper working order despite being calibrated on the 14th day prior to use.

The defendant was found guilty.

The accused applied for relief under section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms for a breach of the right to trial within a reasonable time.

The accused was arrested on October 18, 2014 for care and control over 80 and charged on November 19, 2014.

The trial was scheduled for March 15 and 16, 2016, resulting in a total delay of 17 months from arrest and 16 months from the swearing of the information.

The delay was primarily caused by both parties awaiting disclosure of an in-car camera video that did not exist, despite both parties having information indicating its non-existence as early as January 19, 2015.

The court found a breach of section 11(b) rights and stayed the proceedings.

The defendant was charged with Over 80 mgs. contrary to s.253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

He brought a pre-trial Charter application alleging breaches of ss. 7, 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b) of the Charter, seeking exclusion of breath samples and statements obtained following his detention and arrest.

The Crown sought summary dismissal of the s.8 argument and particulars of the alleged s.7 and s.8 breaches.

The court dismissed both the Crown's application for summary dismissal and its request for particulars, finding that where a warrantless seizure is alleged, the Crown bears the burden of establishing lawful preconditions, and the defendant need not provide detailed particulars beyond putting the Crown on notice of the issue.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg/100 mL following a motor vehicle collision on September 8, 2012.

The Crown withdrew the Over 80 charge after brief evidence.

At trial, the Crown's case rested primarily on the observations of Sergeant Crane, who noted glossy eyes and a scent of alcohol, combined with Intoxilyzer readings.

The court found the evidence insufficient to prove impairment beyond a reasonable doubt, noting the absence of contemporaneous notes regarding key observations, the lack of observable signs of impairment at the scene, and the absence of expert evidence relating the BAC readings to the accused's driving ability.

The charge was dismissed.

The accused was charged with care or control of a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The Crown sought to rely on the presumption of identity under s. 258(1)(c) of the Criminal Code.

The defence challenged whether the Crown had proven two prerequisites: that the samples were taken as soon as practicable, and that the first sample was taken within two hours of the offence.

The court found the samples were taken as soon as practicable but held that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the first sample was taken within the two-hour requirement due to insufficient evidence regarding the consistency of timepieces used.

The charge was dismissed.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level exceeding the legal limit contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code, and with two related offences under the Highway Traffic Act.

The trial proceeded by way of a blended hearing incorporating a Charter motion to exclude breath test evidence.

The accused claimed his right to counsel was violated because police refused to allow him to speak to his father.

The court found that the accused did not express a desire to contact his father to facilitate contact with counsel, but rather sought his father's general advice about the situation.

The court rejected the Charter challenge, finding the police properly discharged their duties and the accused was not diligent in exercising his right to counsel.

The accused was found guilty of all three charges.

The accused was charged with care or control of a motor vehicle with excess blood alcohol following a motor vehicle accident on November 19, 2011.

The Crown relied on Intoxilyzer breath samples showing readings of 135 mg/100mL and 127 mg/100mL, and expert evidence regarding retrograde extrapolation to establish excess blood alcohol at the time of care or control.

The defence raised multiple Charter applications challenging the lawfulness of the investigation and detention.

While the court found no breaches regarding the roadside screening demand, the right to counsel, or the initial detention conditions, the court found that the accused's reasonable expectation of privacy while using the cell toilet was breached by video monitoring and recording.

The court excluded the Intoxilyzer evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding that the seriousness of the privacy intrusion and its impact on human dignity outweighed the societal interest in adjudicating the charge on its merits.

The charge was dismissed.

The defendant was stopped at a RIDE program and charged with driving with excess alcohol.

The Crown sought to prove the defendant's blood-alcohol level exceeded 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The defendant challenged the legality of the ASD demand, the maintenance of the ASD device, and the lawfulness of his detention.

The court found no breach of sections 8 or 10(b) of the Charter regarding the ASD demand and device maintenance.

However, the court found a breach of section 9 of the Charter due to arbitrary detention, as the officers failed to explicitly consider factors other than the elevated breath readings when deciding to detain the defendant.

The court convicted the defendant but did not impose a stay of proceedings, finding that a reduced sentence was the appropriate remedy for the Charter breach.

The accused was charged with refusing to provide a suitable breath sample at a roadside stop.

The Crown alleged that while detained at the roadside, the accused failed without reasonable excuse to provide a breath sample.

The accused argued that his limited English comprehension created special circumstances requiring a Tamil interpreter, and that he did not wilfully refuse.

The court found that although the accused had limited English fluency and the officer's manner of instruction was rushed and impatient, the accused demonstrated sufficient understanding through his responses and actions.

The court applied the legal principle that wilfulness is not an essential mens rea element for this offence; knowledge or awareness of the prohibited act is sufficient.

The court found the accused guilty of failing to provide a breath sample.

The accused was charged with driving while impaired and driving with a blood alcohol level over 80 mg per 100 ml.

The Crown alleged the accused drove to a liquor store while already intoxicated, purchased vodka, and was observed by LCBO employees exhibiting signs of impairment before nearly causing an accident.

The accused contended he consumed alcohol only after arriving home and before police arrived.

The court rejected the accused's evidence as lacking credibility and not raising reasonable doubt.

The court also dismissed Charter applications regarding alleged violations of section 8 (unreasonable search) and section 10(b) (right to counsel) rights.

The accused was found guilty on both charges.