Peter Jeffrey Wright

Timothy Barnhart, having been found guilty of Fisheries Act offences, brought a constitutional application seeking a declaration that sections 35 and 40 of the Fisheries Act infringed his Aboriginal and treaty rights, specifically a right to clean drinking water and a right to modify his land without interference.

The Crown moved to dismiss this constitutional application.

The Ontario Court of Justice dismissed Barnhart's application, finding that he failed to provide sufficient evidentiary basis to establish the existence of the claimed treaty or Aboriginal rights under the Simcoe Deed (Treaty 3 ½) or to demonstrate a prima facie breach of such rights.

The court emphasized the need for cogent evidence regarding pre-contact practices for Aboriginal rights and common intention for treaty rights, and noted the conflict between the individual's actions and the community's interests.

The Ontario Court of Justice ruled on the admissibility of Drug Recognition Evaluator (DRE) evidence in a criminal trial where the evaluating officer's certification had lapsed due to COVID-19 by the time of giving evidence.

The court determined that while the statutory shortcut for DRE evidence admissibility under s. 320.31(5) of the Criminal Code did not apply, the evidence was admissible under the common law Mohan framework.

The judge found that the Crown met the criteria for expert evidence admission, considering the officer's training, prior certification at the time of the evaluation, and the specific reason for the lapse.

The accused was charged with impaired driving.

A Charter application was brought challenging the reasonable and probable grounds for the breathalyzer test based on the possibility of residual mouth alcohol affecting the accuracy of the roadside device.

The court distinguished the case from R. v. Becker on three grounds: the presence of a passenger who admitted to drinking, the beverages being at room temperature rather than cold, and the officer's administration of a residual mouth alcohol disclaimer to which the accused responded that consumption was an hour prior.

The court found no Charter breach and entered a finding of guilt.

The accused was stopped at a RIDE program and subjected to a roadside breath test which he failed.

He was arrested and transported to the detachment for an Intoxilyzer test.

Open alcohol was discovered in his vehicle, and the accused subsequently admitted to consuming alcohol in the car.

The arresting officer, despite 18 years of experience and knowledge of mouth alcohol risks, failed to conduct a second breath test or consider the 15-minute rule.

The court found two Charter breaches: first, the failure to reassess reasonable and probable grounds after discovering open alcohol and the accused's admission of recent consumption; and second, a section 10(b) right to counsel violation.

The court excluded the Intoxilyzer readings and acquitted the accused.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and driving with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit.

The defence challenged the validity of the arrest and detention on Charter grounds, arguing that the right to counsel was not provided forthwith and that the accused was unlawfully over-held.

The court found a technical breach of section 10(b) of the Charter regarding the timing of right to counsel advice, but declined to exclude evidence.

The court also found no Charter violation regarding the continued detention, as the officer's decision to hold the accused to allow her to sober up and calm down was reasonable in the circumstances.

The Crown proved both offences beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was charged with impaired driving following a traffic stop on October 23, 2016, in Perth, Ontario.

An approved screening device (ASD) test resulted in a fail reading.

The defence argued that the officer failed to follow a November 26, 2013 memorandum from the Ontario Provincial Police Deputy Commissioner regarding the potential effects of food, drink, and hand sanitizer on ASD readings, which required a 15-minute waiting period before testing.

The court rejected the defence argument and distinguished the case from R v. Wong, finding that the memorandum lacked proper evidentiary foundation and that an officer cannot be bound to follow a directive of which they were unaware.

The defendant, a 25-year-old Aboriginal woman with no criminal record, pleaded guilty to theft of prescription medication and three counts of trafficking in controlled substances (Hydromorph Contin, Oxycocet, and Adderall).

The offences occurred while she was employed as a pharmacy technician and involved taking narcotics from the pharmacy safe for personal use and to share with her then-boyfriend.

The Crown sought a penitentiary sentence of 2.5 to 3 years, while the defence sought a suspended sentence with probation.

The court imposed a suspended sentence with 30 months probation, finding exceptional circumstances based on the defendant's genuine rehabilitation efforts, completion of drug and mental health treatment programs, stable employment, family support, and Aboriginal heritage considerations.

The applicant brought a motion to stay charges of impaired driving and "over 80" on the basis of a breach of his right to be tried within a reasonable period of time under Section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The charges were laid on June 24, 2014, with the information sworn on July 9, 2014.

The trial was scheduled for one day but was not completed until April 13, 2016, with judgment delivery delayed until February 7, 2017.

The total delay was 26 months, or 24 months after deducting defence delay.

The court found that the net delay of 24 months exceeded the 18-month presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan and that the Crown failed to establish exceptional circumstances to rebut the presumption.

The court granted the stay of proceedings.

The accused pleaded guilty to attempted theft while armed with bear spray and wearing a mask with intent to commit an indictable offence.

The offences arose from a planned armed robbery attempt on Garda Security guards making a cash delivery of approximately $200,000 to a TD Bank.

The Crown sought a penitentiary sentence of four to five years, while the defence sought a reformatory sentence of 18 months to two years less one day.

The court imposed a sentence of four years less pre-trial custody, with enhanced credit for 11 months of pre-trial custody at a rate of 1.5 months per month, resulting in a net sentence of 31.5 months.

The court also imposed a lifetime weapons prohibition, forfeiture order, no-contact order with victims, and DNA order.

The accused was charged with three counts of assault upon his wife, Jill Delima, with offence dates of March 30, 2010, December 19, 2007, and April 1 to August 1, 2001.

The trial proceeded over several months.

The Crown called the complainant, her brother, a Children's Aid Society worker, and a police officer as witnesses.

The accused denied all allegations.

The central issues were credibility and reliability.

The court found the complainant and Crown witnesses credible and reliable, and rejected the accused's denials.

The court found the accused guilty on all three counts based on the totality of the evidence, which established assault beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Crown brought an application to admit certified copies of a recognizance and court information into evidence pursuant to sections 23 and 28 of the Canada Evidence Act.

The defendant was charged with obstructing a peace officer, failing to comply with recognizance (two counts), and theft over $5,000.

The Crown served a Notice of Intention to produce the documents on April 24, 2012, more than seven days before trial.

The court found that the notice was deficient in specificity and content, failing to adequately identify the recognizance or information at issue.

The court also found no evidence that the defendant had been served with copies of the actual documents through disclosure.

The application was dismissed and none of the documents were admitted into evidence.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and driving with a blood alcohol concentration over 80 mg%.

The Crown relied on a breathalyzer certificate as evidence.

The court found that there was an unexplained delay of between 30 to 60 minutes between the accused's arrest at 1:06 and when the breathalyzer test was administered sometime after 2:15.

The delay violated the requirement that breath tests be conducted "as soon as practicable" as established in jurisprudence.

Consequently, the Crown was deprived of the statutory presumption contained in the Criminal Code and could not rely on the certificate as proof of the truth of its contents.

The Crown called no toxicologist to establish what the reading would have been at the time of driving.

The charge was dismissed.

The accused pleaded guilty to robbery while armed with a crowbar during a home invasion.

The Crown sought a four-year penitentiary sentence while the defence sought a two-year-less-one-day reformatory sentence plus probation.

The court imposed a reformatory sentence, finding this an exceptional case where restorative justice principles, rehabilitation, and the offender's remarkable post-offence conduct warranted a sentence outside the typical home invasion tariff range, despite the serious nature of the offence and its devastating impact on the victims.