Blood alcohol concentration

The accused was charged with driving with excess blood alcohol concentration.

Following a trial, the court dismissed Charter applications regarding the right to counsel and the lawfulness of the screening test process.

The accused was found guilty of driving with an illegal blood alcohol concentration of 130 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood, which was 50 milligrams over the legal limit.

The court imposed a sentence of a $1,200 fine plus a $360 victim surcharge (total $1,560) payable within one year, and a one-year driving prohibition.

The court noted the accused's youth, education, lack of criminal record, and strong family support as mitigating factors, but emphasized the seriousness of the offense and the high blood alcohol reading.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a legally excessive blood alcohol concentration following a minor motor vehicle collision in Toronto.

The Crown's case relied on breath samples taken at roadside via an approved screening device and subsequent Intoxilyzer readings at the police station, supported by toxicology evidence.

The defendant challenged the admissibility of all BAC evidence on Charter grounds, arguing that the officer failed to comply with the "forthwith" requirement under section 254(2) of the Criminal Code by delaying approximately 10 minutes between forming reasonable suspicion and making the formal ASD demand.

The court found a breach of the "forthwith" requirement and, applying the three-part test under section 24(2) of the Charter, excluded the BAC evidence as the admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The defendant was acquitted.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood and operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol.

The Crown's case relied on observations from truck stop employees who reported a suspected impaired driver, police observations of the accused's vehicle and physical condition, and breath analysis results.

The defence challenged the reliability of the approved screening device test on Charter grounds, arguing the officer failed to consider the possibility of mouth alcohol contamination.

The court found no Charter breach, as the officer reasonably concluded no evidence suggested recent alcohol consumption within 15 minutes of the test.

The court convicted the accused on both counts based on the totality of evidence demonstrating impairment.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration in excess of the legal limit contrary to s. 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown relied on the presumption of identity under s. 258(1)(c), which requires that breath samples be taken "as soon as practicable" after the alleged offence.

The central issue was whether the 57-minute delay between the traffic stop and the first breath sample was reasonable.

The court found that the Crown discharged its burden by establishing that the police acted reasonably throughout the chain of events, including the time spent on booking procedures, facilitating contact with duty counsel, and preparing the approved instrument.

The defendant was found guilty.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over the permissible limit.

The trial focused primarily on whether the defendant's Charter rights were violated and whether the breath test results should be excluded from evidence.

The defendant challenged the lawfulness of the approved screening device demand, alleging lack of reasonable suspicion, and argued that he was not properly informed of his right to counsel at various stages of the investigation.

The court found that the officer had reasonable suspicion to demand the screening device, that the defendant was properly informed of his rights to counsel, and that the breath samples were obtained as soon as practicable.

The defendant was found guilty.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol contrary to section 253(1)(a) of the Criminal Code and operating a motor vehicle with blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code, arising from a collision on May 18, 2015, in Ottawa.

The Crown relied on breath test results showing 168 mg% and 165 mg% at the time of testing, expert toxicological evidence regarding scientific impairment at 50 mg%, and police observations of alleged signs of impairment.

The defence raised the "last drink" doctrine, arguing the accused consumed alcohol approximately 13 minutes before driving, and challenged the applicability of general scientific impairment evidence to the specific accused.

The court found the accused not guilty on both counts.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg/100 mL following a motor vehicle collision on September 8, 2012.

The Crown withdrew the Over 80 charge after brief evidence.

At trial, the Crown's case rested primarily on the observations of Sergeant Crane, who noted glossy eyes and a scent of alcohol, combined with Intoxilyzer readings.

The court found the evidence insufficient to prove impairment beyond a reasonable doubt, noting the absence of contemporaneous notes regarding key observations, the lack of observable signs of impairment at the scene, and the absence of expert evidence relating the BAC readings to the accused's driving ability.

The charge was dismissed.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and operating a vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit.

The Crown called two witnesses: the arresting officer and the qualified breath technician.

The defence called no evidence.

The court found that the Crown failed to prove impairment beyond a reasonable doubt based on the totality of the evidence, including minimal and equivocal observations of driving conduct and inconsistent observations between officers regarding physical signs of impairment.

The court also found that the Crown failed to establish that breath samples were taken as soon as practicable due to an unexplained delay occasioned by a call to duty counsel that was neither clearly requested nor made with proper notice to the accused.

Both charges were dismissed.

The defendant was charged with dangerous driving, impaired driving, and driving with blood alcohol concentration in excess of the legal limit.

The trial addressed five key issues: whether dangerous driving was proven; whether the arrest and breath demand were lawful; whether the right to counsel was violated; whether evidence should be excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter; and whether impaired driving was proven.

The court found the defendant guilty of dangerous driving and excess blood alcohol concentration, but acquitted on the impaired driving charge due to reasonable doubt regarding whether the defendant's ability to drive was impaired by alcohol, despite a blood alcohol concentration of 2.5 times the legal limit.

The accused was charged with dangerous operation of a motor vehicle causing bodily harm, operation while impaired by alcohol, and operation with blood alcohol exceeding 80 mg/100 mL.

The trial involved a Charter application regarding the seizure of blood samples obtained for medical purposes.

The court found that continuity of the blood samples was established and that no Charter breach occurred.

However, the court determined that the Crown failed to prove the "no bolus drinking" assumption underlying the toxicologist's read-back opinions, rendering those opinions inadmissible.

The accused was acquitted of the impaired and over-80 charges but convicted of dangerous driving causing bodily harm based on evidence of excessive speeding on a residential street, loss of control, and collision with a tree.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle carelessly contrary to section 130 of the Highway Traffic Act and, as a young driver, operating with blood alcohol concentration above zero contrary to section 44.5 of the Highway Traffic Act.

The Crown presented evidence of an overturned vehicle at an accident scene, observations of impairment, and breath test results showing blood alcohol above zero.

The defendant presented no evidence.

The court found that the Crown established a prima facie case from which careless driving could be inferred, and the defendant's failure to provide an explanation resulted in conviction on both counts.

The accused was charged with care or control of a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and with having an excessive concentration of alcohol in her blood while in care or control of a motor vehicle.

The accused did not dispute that her ability to operate a motor vehicle was impaired and that her blood alcohol concentration exceeded the legal limit.

The defence argued that the Crown failed to prove the accused was in care or control of the vehicle at the time of observation.

The court applied the test from R. v. Boudreault and found that the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused created a realistic risk of danger and was therefore in care or control of the vehicle.

The court convicted on both charges.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood, contrary to Criminal Code s. 253(1)(b).

The Crown called evidence of an anonymous report of impaired driving, police observation and pursuit of the vehicle, an approved screening device test showing an "F" reading, and two breath samples taken at the police station registering 120 and 110 milligrams respectively.

The defence challenged the admissibility of the breath test results, arguing there were unexplained delays between the time of the alleged offence and the taking of the first breath sample, which would undermine the presumption of identity under Criminal Code s. 258(1)(c)(ii).

The court found the accused guilty, holding that the delays were explained and the police acted reasonably in the circumstances, particularly in ensuring the accused received access to counsel in his language of choice.

The accused was charged with care or control of a motor vehicle with excess blood alcohol following a motor vehicle accident on November 19, 2011.

The Crown relied on Intoxilyzer breath samples showing readings of 135 mg/100mL and 127 mg/100mL, and expert evidence regarding retrograde extrapolation to establish excess blood alcohol at the time of care or control.

The defence raised multiple Charter applications challenging the lawfulness of the investigation and detention.

While the court found no breaches regarding the roadside screening demand, the right to counsel, or the initial detention conditions, the court found that the accused's reasonable expectation of privacy while using the cell toilet was breached by video monitoring and recording.

The court excluded the Intoxilyzer evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding that the seriousness of the privacy intrusion and its impact on human dignity outweighed the societal interest in adjudicating the charge on its merits.

The charge was dismissed.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg per 100 mL of blood.

The Crown relied on two breath test results taken at 11:10 p.m. (146 mg/100 mL) and 11:38 p.m. (144 mg/100 mL).

The defence challenged the admissibility of the second test, arguing it was not administered as soon as practicable as required by the Criminal Code.

The court found that the 28-minute interval between tests, with 13 minutes unexplained beyond the mandatory 15-minute minimum, breached the statutory requirement.

The Crown failed to discharge its burden of proving the test was taken as soon as practicable, and the accused was acquitted.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and driving with a blood alcohol concentration over 80 mg/100 mL.

The Crown withdrew the impaired charge at trial.

The central issue was whether the Crown established that the arresting officer gave a demand under section 254(3) of the Criminal Code at the roadside.

The court found that the Crown failed to establish on a balance of probabilities that such a demand was made.

Without proof of the demand, the Crown could not rely on the statutory presumption in section 258(1)(c) to establish the accused's blood alcohol concentration at the time of driving.

The accused was acquitted.

The defendant was charged with care and control of a motor vehicle while impaired and with blood alcohol concentration above the legal limit.

He brought a Charter s. 11(b) application alleging unreasonable delay between his arrest on February 2, 2012, and his scheduled trial date of April 15, 2013—a period of approximately 14.5 months.

The court found that the delay violated the defendant's constitutional right to be tried within a reasonable time and granted a stay of proceedings pursuant to s. 24(1) of the Charter.

The accused was charged with three counts of impaired driving causing bodily harm and three counts of operating a vehicle with blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit where bodily harm was caused.

Two counts were dismissed at the close of the Crown's case due to lack of evidence of bodily harm.

The court found that the accused operated a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and with a blood alcohol concentration of approximately 180 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood, more than twice the legal limit.

The collision was caused solely by the accused's impaired driving, including tailgating, failure to stop at a yellow light, and attempting to pass other vehicles at high speed through an intersection.

The accused was convicted on all remaining counts.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration in excess of 80 milligrams of alcohol per 100 millilitres of blood.

The trial involved a combined Charter voir dire and trial.

The defence challenged whether the officer had reasonable grounds to demand breath samples under section 254(3) of the Criminal Code, arguing the approved screening device was not proven to be in proper working order.

The defence also challenged whether the breath samples were obtained as soon as practicable under section 258(1)(c)(ii) of the Criminal Code.

The court found the officer was credible and experienced, the approved screening device was functioning properly, reasonable grounds existed for the breath demand, and the samples were obtained as soon as practicable given all the circumstances.

The accused was found guilty as charged.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood, contrary to the Criminal Code.

The Crown alleged the defendant was stopped for speeding and subsequently failed an approved screening device test and provided breath samples over the legal limit.

The defendant raised Charter arguments regarding his right to counsel and advanced a bolus drinking defence.

The court found no Charter breach, rejected the bolus drinking defence based on the defendant's lack of credibility, and convicted the defendant of the over 80 charge.

The defendant also pleaded guilty to two Provincial Offences Act charges (speeding and driver having alcohol readily available), with sentencing suspended on those counts.