Abuse of process

The United States requested the extradition of the respondent for an alleged false tax refund scheme.

The respondent was arrested at the airport on a provisional arrest warrant while attempting to board a flight to Russia.

The respondent applied for a stay of proceedings, arguing that the affidavit supporting the warrant contained material omissions and misrepresentations that falsely portrayed him as a flight risk, amounting to an abuse of process.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application, finding that the omitted facts were not material to the issuing judge's decision and that the authorities did not attempt to mislead the court.

The court concluded that the conduct did not rise to the level of an abuse of process.

Following the dismissal of an application for an accounting of an estate as an abuse of process, the successful respondents sought costs on a full indemnity basis.

The applicants argued for partial indemnity costs.

The court found that the respondents, as estate trustees defending an application related to their administration of the estate, were entitled to full indemnity.

Applying the principle of proportionality, the court fixed the costs payable by the applicants at $100,000.

The respondent mother brought a motion for leave to re-litigate the children's school enrollment, despite a previous order barring her from bringing further motions until she complied with existing orders.

The court dismissed the motion, finding she remained in breach of numerous orders and was attempting to re-litigate a decided issue.

To ensure compliance with the prior order regarding school enrollment, the court granted the applicant father temporary sole decision-making responsibility for education and ordered costs against the respondent.

The applicants, charged with drug and gun offences following a police investigation, challenged the search warrants that led to their charges under ss. 7 and 8 of the Charter.

They argued that the police failed to preserve relevant CCTV footage and that the Information to Obtain (ITO) lacked reasonable and probable grounds.

The court found that a police officer deliberately misled the affiant and the issuing justice, and intentionally failed to seize relevant CCTV video, violating s. 7.

The court also found that the search warrants lacked reasonable and probable grounds, violating s. 8.

Applying the Grant test under s. 24(2), the court concluded that the police misconduct was egregious and subverted the search warrant process, warranting the exclusion of the seized evidence.

The plaintiff brought a motion for leave to add the Port Hope Police Services Board as a defendant and to amend his statement of claim.

The proposed amendments alleged that Port Hope Police provided an unredacted report to the Canadian Human Rights Commission, leading to the dismissal of his complaint, and that police were involved in his termination from employment.

The court dismissed the motion to add Port Hope Police, finding the proposed claims were an abuse of process as they sought to relitigate findings already made in previous Federal Court and wrongful dismissal proceedings.

Unopposed amendments to increase damages and add a Charter claim against the existing defendant were permitted.

The plaintiff father brought an action against the Children's Aid Society of Ottawa (CAS) for negligence, Charter breaches, and misfeasance in public office, alleging improper conduct during child protection and adoption proceedings that occurred while he was facing a murder charge for which he was ultimately acquitted.

The CAS moved to strike the action.

The court granted the motion, finding the action was an abuse of process as a collateral attack on valid Family Court orders.

The court also held that the claims disclosed no reasonable cause of action, as the CAS owes a duty of care only to the children, not the parents, and the Charter and misfeasance claims were bound to fail.

The moving party sought leave to bring a motion to discharge a construction lien and dismiss or stay the action based on the plaintiff's delayed disclosure of an assignment agreement, arguing it constituted an abuse of process.

The court held that leave is not required to bring a motion under s. 47 of the Construction Lien Act, as the merits of whether the ground is 'proper' should be determined on the motion itself.

However, the court found that seeking relief under Rule 21.01(3)(d) of the Rules of Civil Procedure and s. 106 of the Courts of Justice Act constitutes an 'interlocutory step' requiring leave under s. 67(2) of the CLA, even if the relief sought is final.

The court granted leave, concluding that the proposed motion would expedite the resolution of the issues in dispute in the lien action.

The plaintiff commenced an action against the Family Responsibility Office (FRO), his former spouse, and her lawyer, seeking damages for alleged errors in enforcing child support arrears.

The defendants moved to dismiss the action as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The court found that the plaintiff was attempting to relitigate issues regarding the accuracy of support arrears that had already been determined in multiple family law proceedings.

The court granted the defendants' motions and dismissed the action as an abuse of process.

The plaintiffs commenced a third separate action in Toronto against neonatal care professionals and a hospital for injuries sustained by a newborn, having already commenced two actions in Brampton for the same injuries arising from a car accident and birthing care.

The defendants moved to dismiss the Toronto action as an abuse of process, arguing the plaintiffs should have sought leave to add them to the existing Brampton actions.

The court agreed, finding the separate action was a tactical maneuver to avoid the leave requirement and potential limitation period defences.

The court stayed the Toronto action pending a motion to amend in Brampton, while strongly criticizing the parties for engaging in costly and delaying procedural disputes contrary to the culture shift mandated by Hryniak.

The accused was found guilty of 18 counts of firearms trafficking following an undercover police operation.

He brought applications for a stay of proceedings, alleging entrapment and an abuse of process under s. 7 of the Charter.

He argued that the police exploited his vulnerability as a stateless person and that the use of a volatile police agent in public areas shocked the community.

The court dismissed the applications, finding that the police merely provided an opportunity to commit the offences and did not induce the accused.

The court also held that the police conduct, including the monitoring of the agent and the locations of the transactions, did not amount to an abuse of process.

The plaintiffs brought an action to rescind a settlement agreement, alleging the defendant fraudulently inflated the company's revenue prior to the plaintiff purchasing the defendant's shares.

The defendants moved to strike the action as an abuse of process based on a full and final release signed during the settlement.

The plaintiffs moved for an interlocutory injunction to prevent the defendants from enforcing the settlement agreement's default provisions.

The court dismissed the motion to strike, finding a strong prima facie case of fraud that was not contemplated by the release.

The court granted the interlocutory injunction, finding the plaintiffs would suffer irreparable harm if the defendant returned to the business.

The moving party was successful on a motion to strike the responding party's application.

The court found that the application was duplicitous of an existing action and constituted an abuse of process.

As a result of this finding, the court awarded the moving party costs on a substantial indemnity scale, fixed at $10,000 plus HST.

The defendants brought motions to strike the self-represented plaintiff's statements of claim in two actions without leave to amend.

The claims arose from a failed transaction for the purchase of dental practices and sought a total of $90 million in damages against various professional advisors, family members, and employers of the intended purchasers.

The court found the pleadings to be scandalous, frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process, noting they were replete with irrelevant historical facts, inappropriate definitions, and inflammatory allegations.

The court concluded the actions were commenced for the improper purpose of harassing the defendants and struck the claims without leave to amend, awarding substantial indemnity costs to the defendants.

The self-represented plaintiff brought a motion regarding roof leaks and parking lot issues against the defendant condominium corporation and property management.

The defendants brought a cross-motion.

The plaintiff sought an adjournment because she had not received the defendants' responding materials in an accessible format.

The court granted the adjournment and set a timetable for service.

The court also summarily dismissed the plaintiff's motion under Rule 37.14 to set aside a previous order denying the appointment of amicus, finding it to be an abuse of process as the rule does not permit re-arguing a decided matter.

The applicants, the brother and father of the respondent, applied for a declaration that the respondent is a vexatious litigant under s. 140(1) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The respondent, who has a schizophrenia diagnosis, had commenced five unsuccessful Small Claims Court actions against the applicants and his former psychiatrist, and initiated complaints against the deputy judges and the applicants' lawyers.

The court found that the respondent's conduct in commencing claims without any prospect of success, initiating unmeritorious complaints, and threatening further legal action was persistent, without reasonable grounds, and vexatious.

The application was granted, and the respondent was prohibited from instituting further proceedings without leave.

The plaintiff, a former investment and retirement planner, sued the defendants for constructive dismissal.

In his statement of claim, he pleaded details of two prior settlements between the defendants and the Ontario Securities Commission (OSC).

The defendants brought a motion under Rule 25.11 to strike these paragraphs as irrelevant, prejudicial, and an abuse of process.

The court agreed that the paragraphs lacked a pleaded nexus to the plaintiff's cause of action and struck them, but granted the plaintiff leave to amend the claim to properly plead how the regulatory history impacted his treatment by the defendants.

The defendant in a $195 million procurement dispute served summonses on three non-party witnesses for examination prior to a summary judgment motion.

The non-parties and plaintiffs moved to quash the summonses, arguing they were an abuse of process due to short notice, failure to provide relevant pleadings, and overly broad document requests.

The court agreed, finding the defendant's conduct in serving the summonses and refusing a brief postponement constituted an abuse of process.

The summonses were quashed, and the defendant's motion to compel answers to refusals was dismissed.

The plaintiff, a suspended lawyer, brought an action against the vendor's lawyer and real estate agent after they filed complaints with the Law Society of Ontario regarding his attempt to purchase a property.

The defendants moved to strike the statement of claim under Rule 21.01(1)(b) for disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The court granted the motion, finding that the doctrine of absolute privilege provides a complete defence to all claims arising from complaints made to a quasi-judicial regulatory body.

The statement of claim was struck without leave to amend, and costs were awarded to the defendants.

The respondent law firm brought a motion to dismiss its former client's application to void a contingency fee agreement, arguing the application was commenced without her informed consent and constituted an abuse of process.

The former client, who suffered from a cognitive disorder following a motor vehicle accident, admitted during cross-examination that she did not understand portions of her affidavits.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that her inability to articulate detailed reasons did not vitiate her informed consent to commence the proceeding, and her evidence did not rise to the level of an abuse of process.

The defendants submitted a requisition to dismiss the plaintiff's action under Rule 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The plaintiff claimed defamation and intentional infliction of mental suffering arising from a television broadcast about mental health, seeking $11.1 million and a public broadcast of her own.

The court found the statement of claim lacked material facts, failed to identify how the plaintiff was harmed or named in the broadcast, and was an abuse of process.

The action was dismissed as frivolous and vexatious.