J. Speyer

The accused, a police officer charged with breach of trust and fabricating evidence, brought a motion to compel the Crown to call a fellow officer as a witness.

The Crown refused to call the officer, citing concerns about his reliability due to inconsistencies in his statements.

The court declined to order the Crown to call the witness, affirming the Crown's discretion.

However, given the witness's materiality and allegations that his statement was improperly influenced by an investigating detective, the court exercised its exceptional discretion to call the officer as the court's own witness, permitting both parties to cross-examine him with certain restrictions.

The defendants applied under s. 24(2) of the Charter to exclude evidence, including a loaded handgun and drugs, found during a warrantless search of their vehicle following a traffic stop.

They alleged violations of their rights under ss. 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b) of the Charter, including claims of racial profiling.

The court dismissed the s. 8, s. 9, and s. 10(a) claims, finding the stop was lawful and the search was authorized under the Cannabis Control Act.

The court found moderate breaches of s. 10(b) regarding the implementation of the right to counsel.

However, applying the Grant framework, the court concluded that the evidence should not be excluded under s. 24(2), as the breaches were not causally connected to the discovery of the evidence and exclusion would undermine public confidence in the administration of justice.

The plaintiffs sued their title insurer, FCT, after being denied coverage for alleged construction deficiencies.

FCT brought a third party claim against the tort defendants (the sellers/builders and municipality) for contribution and indemnity.

The plaintiffs brought a cross-motion to strike FCT's third party claim for failing to disclose a reasonable cause of action.

The court granted the cross-motion, finding that FCT had not settled the plaintiffs' claim and therefore could not rely on the Negligence Act, common law, equity, or subrogation rights to claim contribution and indemnity.

The court also granted FCT's motion on consent to have the title insurance action and the tort action heard together or consecutively to avoid duplication.

The parties disagreed on the value of a fire loss and proceeded to an appraisal under s. 128 of the Insurance Act.

The insurer nominated a single candidate for umpire and refused to consider any alternatives proposed by the insured.

The insurer brought an application to appoint its nominee, while the insured brought a cross-application seeking an order that the parties agree on an umpire or the insurer select from her list.

The court dismissed the insurer's application, finding that its refusal to collaborate and insistence on its sole nominee created a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The court granted the insured's cross-application.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiff's action after a seven-day trial, the successful defendant sought costs of $26,010.98.

The plaintiff argued for reductions based on an unsuccessful Wagg motion, alleged duplication of work, late disclosure, and financial hardship.

The court deducted $1,500 for the unsuccessful Wagg motion but rejected the other arguments, noting the defendant's claim was already modest and hardship is not an enumerated factor under Rule 57.01.

Costs were fixed at $24,500.

The plaintiff business owner sued his commercial property insurer for failing to pay two claims for water damage to his inventory caused by a leaking roof.

The insurer denied the claims because the plaintiff failed to provide reliable proof of the value of the damaged goods, submitting invoices that were found to be inauthentic and for counterfeit products.

The court dismissed the action, finding that the first claim was barred by a valid one-year contractual limitation period.

Furthermore, the court held that the plaintiff failed to prove his losses on a balance of probabilities and was not entitled to relief from forfeiture due to his unreasonable conduct in providing fake invoices.

The defendant applied under s. 24(2) of the Charter to exclude evidence seized from his car and home pursuant to search warrants.

The defendant argued the Information to Obtain (ITO) contained misrepresentations and omitted material facts, specifically a failed undercover drug buy.

The court found the affiant's misrepresentation of surveillance events was egregious and not in good faith.

After excising the inaccurate information and amplifying the ITO with the omitted facts, the court concluded there were insufficient grounds to issue the warrants, resulting in a s. 8 Charter breach.

Applying the Grant framework, the court excluded the evidence due to the seriousness of the police conduct and the significant impact on the defendant's privacy interests.

The plaintiff was bitten by the defendant's large dog, resulting in a torn left rotator cuff and permanent impairment of her left shoulder.

Liability was not disputed under the Dog Owner's Liability Act.

The trial focused on the assessment of damages.

The court found that the dog bite caused the shoulder injury and awarded $100,000 in general damages.

The court also awarded $59,818.90 for past loss of income, but denied future loss of income as the plaintiff had reached typical retirement age and had other unrelated health issues.

Future care costs were assessed at $197,712.00, out-of-pocket expenses at $21,036.91, and OHIP's subrogated claim at $7,866.96, for a total judgment of $386,434.77.

The self-represented plaintiff brought an urgent motion seeking 18 forms of relief, primarily an interlocutory injunction to stay the power of sale of her commercial condominium unit by the defendant condominium corporation.

The corporation had registered a lien and initiated power of sale proceedings due to the plaintiff's failure to pay common element fees.

The court dismissed the motion, finding it lacked jurisdiction to grant an interlocutory injunction as no permanent injunction was sought in the underlying action.

Furthermore, the court held the plaintiff failed to establish irreparable harm or that the balance of convenience favoured an injunction, and dismissed her claims for Mareva and Mills injunctions, as well as her requests to strike the defendants' pleadings.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to strike the defendant's jury notice in a motor vehicle accident claim due to severe trial delays caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court granted leave to bring the motion after the action was set down for trial, finding the pandemic constituted a substantial change in circumstances.

The court provisionally struck the jury notice to prevent prejudice to the 83-year-old plaintiff, ordering that the trial proceed by judge alone unless civil jury trials have resumed when the case is called.

The offender, a transport truck driver, pleaded guilty to two counts of dangerous driving causing death after rear-ending a stopped vehicle in a highway construction zone, killing two young men.

The court considered the devastating impact on the victims' families, the offender's prior driving record, and his status as a Convention refugee facing potential deportation.

The court found that the proposed sentence of five months to avoid immigration consequences was entirely inadequate given the gravity of the offences.

The offender was sentenced to 3 years in the penitentiary and a 5-year driving prohibition.

The self-represented plaintiff moved under Rule 63.02 to stay a previous order denying her motion for the appointment of amicus, pending her motion for leave to appeal to the Divisional Court.

The court found that Rule 63.02 did not empower it to stay the action and that there was nothing in the previous order that needed to be stayed.

However, recognizing the plaintiff's disability and the practical difficulties of pursuing matters in two courts simultaneously, the court dismissed the motion to stay the order but directed under Rule 1.05 that no further steps be taken in the action until the Divisional Court determines the appeal.

The John Howard Society of Canada (JHSC) brought a motion for leave to intervene as an added party in three joined habeas corpus applications.

The applicants, who are inmates, challenged the denial of their requests to transfer to minimum-security institutions.

The JHSC sought to intervene on the threshold question of whether such a denial constitutes a deprivation of liberty.

The court granted the motion on terms, finding that the JHSC had a genuine interest and could make a useful contribution regarding the constitutional and practical context of transfer decisions.

However, the court restricted the JHSC from participating in the development of the evidentiary record to avoid duplication and prejudice.

The self-represented plaintiff brought a motion regarding roof leaks and parking lot issues against the defendant condominium corporation and property management.

The defendants brought a cross-motion.

The plaintiff sought an adjournment because she had not received the defendants' responding materials in an accessible format.

The court granted the adjournment and set a timetable for service.

The court also summarily dismissed the plaintiff's motion under Rule 37.14 to set aside a previous order denying the appointment of amicus, finding it to be an abuse of process as the rule does not permit re-arguing a decided matter.

The self-represented plaintiff in a condominium dispute moved for the appointment of an amicus curiae to assist her in litigating the matter, citing her mental illness.

She provided a letter from her psychiatrist stating she was capable of instructing counsel but would benefit from an amicus.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the plaintiff was not a party under a disability requiring a litigation guardian and that the role of an amicus is to assist the court, not to act as state-funded legal counsel for a party.

The court noted the plaintiff's disability would be accommodated during the proceedings.

The applicant filed a constitutional challenge to s. 163(3) of the Correctional and Conditional Release Regulations, arguing it permitted the Parole Board of Canada to indefinitely defer post-suspension hearings for provincial inmates awaiting federal transfer.

After the application was filed, the Board held the applicant's hearing, rendering the application moot.

The court exercised its discretion to hear the moot application, finding an ongoing adversarial context, strong grounds, special circumstances transcending the applicant's interest due to the COVID-19 pandemic's impact on transfers, and a need to conserve judicial resources by resolving a recurring issue evasive of review.

The applicants sought an order granting them possessory title to a half-acre strip of land adjacent to their property, which was registered to the deceased respondent.

The applicants had mistakenly believed the strip was part of their property since 1978 and had continuously posted 'no trespassing' signs.

The court found that the applicants had established open, notorious, continuous, and exclusive possession for over 10 years prior to the land's conversion to the Land Titles system in 2000.

The court applied the mutual mistake exception to the inconsistent use requirement and granted the application, vesting title in the applicants.

The offender was convicted of possession of a weapon for a dangerous purpose and breach of recognizance after stabbing a person in self-defence with a switchblade he was carrying.

The court considered the offender's mental health challenges and onerous bail conditions as mitigating factors, and his prior criminal record and the inherently dangerous nature of the concealed switchblade as aggravating factors.

The court imposed a total sentence of 9 months and 20 days imprisonment, followed by two years of probation, along with a lifetime weapons prohibition and a DNA order.

In a trial for impaired driving causing death, the defence brought a Charter application to exclude breathalyzer results, arguing the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to make an approved screening device demand.

The Crown sought to rely on the accused's statements at the crash scene to establish the officer's grounds.

The defence argued these statements were statutorily compelled under the Highway Traffic Act and inadmissible under section 7 of the Charter.

The court found the accused did not speak to police out of a sense of statutory compulsion, but rather to assist with the injured and manage his own situation.

The statements were ruled admissible on the voir dire.

The accused pleaded guilty to aggravated assault after stabbing the victim multiple times with a kitchen knife.

At the time of the offence, the accused was on parole serving a life sentence for second-degree murder.

The court considered the accused's schizophrenia as a mitigating factor, but emphasized the need for protection of the public and general deterrence given the brutal and unprovoked nature of the attack on a vulnerable victim.

The accused was sentenced to 8 years imprisonment, to be served concurrently with his existing life sentence.