Mitchell Kitagawa

The plaintiff tenant sued her landlord for injuries sustained in a slip and fall on ice on the front step of her leased row house.

The landlord counterclaimed, arguing the tenant was responsible for winter maintenance of the exclusive use area.

Both parties moved for summary judgment on the issue of responsibility for clearing the ice.

The court held that the front step was an exclusive use area, not a common area, and that the lease provision requiring the tenant to remove snow was not void under the Residential Tenancies Act.

The tenant's motion to dismiss the counterclaim was dismissed, and the landlord's motion was granted in part, declaring the tenant responsible for winter maintenance of the area.

The plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle accident when the defendant driver ran a red light and t-boned the vehicle in which the plaintiff was a passenger.

The court found the defendants 100% liable.

The plaintiff, a self-employed jewelry designer, suffered a mild traumatic brain injury, chronic pain, PTSD, and post-concussion syndrome.

The court awarded $1,101,568.55 in total damages, including $225,000 for general damages, $328,402.20 for past and future economic loss, and $489,300 for future care costs, plus a management fee and tax gross-up.

At the outset of a motor vehicle accident trial, the parties sought a ruling on whether section 12 of the Evidence Act, which limits a party to calling three expert witnesses without leave, applies to participant experts and non-party experts.

The plaintiff intended to call four litigation experts and two participating experts, and file numerous medical reports under section 52.

After reviewing the jurisprudence, including Westerhof v. Gee Estate, and the Osborne Report, the court ruled that section 12 applies only to litigation experts retained for the purpose of the proceeding, and not to participant or non-party experts.

The applicants, the brother and father of the respondent, applied for a declaration that the respondent is a vexatious litigant under s. 140(1) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The respondent, who has a schizophrenia diagnosis, had commenced five unsuccessful Small Claims Court actions against the applicants and his former psychiatrist, and initiated complaints against the deputy judges and the applicants' lawyers.

The court found that the respondent's conduct in commencing claims without any prospect of success, initiating unmeritorious complaints, and threatening further legal action was persistent, without reasonable grounds, and vexatious.

The application was granted, and the respondent was prohibited from instituting further proceedings without leave.

The defendants appealed and the plaintiffs cross-appealed a Master's decision dismissing a motion for summary judgment regarding the expiry of a limitation period in a motor vehicle accident claim.

The defendants argued the action was statute-barred, while the plaintiffs argued the limitation period had not expired due to discoverability.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed both appeals, finding no error in the Master's conclusion that the evidence on discoverability was unclear and intertwined with issues of severity, causation, and damages.

The court held that the limitation period issue could not be justly decided on a summary judgment motion and should be determined on a full evidentiary record at trial.

The plaintiff moved to set aside an administrative dismissal of a personal injury action arising from a motor vehicle accident and to extend the time to set the action down for trial.

The proceeding had been dismissed after repeated failures to meet trial‑setting deadlines under Rule 48.14 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Applying the established factors for setting aside an administrative dismissal—including explanation for delay, inadvertence, promptness of the motion, and prejudice—the court found the delay largely attributable to counsel error and that the defendant had not demonstrated actual prejudice.

The complexity of parallel accident litigation and prior defence consents to extensions rebutted any presumption of prejudice.

The dismissal order was set aside, but costs of the motion were awarded to the defendant and made payable by the plaintiff’s counsel.

A farmer sued his insurance broker alleging negligence for failing to obtain insurance coverage for collapse of a tarp barn due to snow load.

Both parties brought competing motions for summary judgment.

The court held that the broker breached its duty of care by failing to adequately advise the client about coverage and foreseeable risks.

However, the plaintiff failed to prove causation because the evidence did not establish that the collapse was more likely than not caused by snow load rather than other possible causes such as wind, design flaws, or construction defects.

As a result, the plaintiff could not establish that the broker’s breach caused the loss.

The plaintiff brought a motion to set aside a registrar's order dismissing their motor vehicle accident action for delay.

At the hearing, the plaintiff requested a brief adjournment, which the defendant opposed.

The court granted the adjournment peremptorily, set a timetable for filing additional affidavit materials, and reserved the issue of costs to the judge hearing the substantive motion.