Kendra D. Coats

The plaintiff corporation purchased a 37-acre rural property from the defendant corporation, whose sole director was the individual defendant husband.

The defendant wife alleged that the husband had previously forged her signature to transfer the property into his corporation's name and that the sale to the plaintiff was a fraudulent conveyance intended to defeat her claims in their ongoing family law proceedings, contrary to a non-depletion order.

The court found that while the conveyance by the husband was fraudulent, the plaintiff was a bona fide purchaser for value without notice under s. 3 of the Fraudulent Conveyances Act.

The plaintiff paid good consideration, based on expert appraisal evidence of the property's current rural zoning, and had no actual or constructive knowledge of the husband's fraudulent intent or the family law non-depletion order.

The court also held that the plaintiff was protected by the doctrine of deferred indefeasibility under s. 78(4.2) of the Land Titles Act and the indoor management rule.

The wife was ordered to remove the non-depletion order from title.

The Crown applied to designate the offender as a dangerous offender following convictions for human trafficking, sexual assault with a weapon, and related offences against an intimate partner.

The court reviewed the offender's criminal history, institutional misconducts, and psychiatric assessments.

The court found that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the requisite pattern of repetitive or persistent aggressive behaviour, noting the offender's cognitive vulnerabilities, treatable substance use disorder, and strong community support.

The court dismissed the dangerous offender application, designated the offender a long-term offender, and imposed a total sentence of 10 years' imprisonment minus pre-sentence credit, followed by a 10-year long-term supervision order.

The defendants, two Deputy Judges of the Small Claims Court, requested the dismissal of the plaintiff's action under Rule 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The plaintiff sued the Deputy Judges over rulings they made in a Small Claims Court proceeding, alleging obstruction of justice.

The court found the action to be frivolous and an abuse of process on its face, as judicial officers have absolute immunity from civil liability for actions performed in their judicial capacity.

The action was dismissed.

The defendant brought a request under Rule 2.1 to stay or dismiss the plaintiff's action.

The plaintiff failed to file written submissions in response to the court's notice.

The court found the statement of claim to be frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process, as it contained no material facts or specifics of the relief claimed, consisting only of a list of terms and a $10 million claim.

The statement of claim was dismissed.

Sentencing for historical child sexual offences committed by a teacher against five student complainants over multiple school years.

The court held that, following the jury verdicts, it was open to accept the complainants’ evidence in full rather than make minimum findings, and applied contemporary post-Friesen sentencing principles to historical offences.

A conditional sentence order was rejected because denunciation and deterrence predominated, the offences involved multiple vulnerable child victims and a serious breach of trust, and there was no evidence that custodial medical care would be inadequate.

The offender’s advanced age, health issues, passage of time, and pro-social life justified reduction from the Crown’s proposed global sentence on totality grounds, resulting in 65 months’ imprisonment.

Retrospective s. 109 and s. 161 orders were refused under s. 11(i) of the Charter, while DNA, SOIRA, and a custodial no-contact order were imposed.

The appellant, a chiropractor, appealed a decision of the Discipline Committee finding him guilty of 11 acts of professional misconduct, imposing a 15-month suspension, and ordering costs of over $690,000.

The misconduct involved improper block fee billing, unauthorized disclosure of personal health information to a bank during a payment dispute, failing to provide a medical report in a reasonable time, and issuing false or misleading accounts.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal on liability and penalty, finding no errors in the Panel's procedural rulings, evidentiary decisions, or assessment of the evidence.

However, the Court allowed the appeal on costs, finding the Panel failed to adequately consider the principle of proportionality, and reduced the costs award to $450,000.

The appellant lawyer appealed a decision of the Law Society Tribunal Appeal Division, which upheld a finding of professional misconduct and a one-month suspension.

The misconduct involved sexual harassment of employees and uncivil correspondence to clients and a client's father.

The appellant argued procedural unfairness and that the rules of professional conduct regarding incivility did not apply to communications with a client's family member.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no procedural unfairness, confirming that the incivility rule applies to communications with 'any other person', and upholding the penalty and costs awards.

The applicant sought judicial review of decisions by a children's aid society and the Child and Family Services Review Board.

The applicant had alleged that the child was physically abused by school staff.

The society conducted a community caregiver investigation and concluded the allegations were not verified.

The Board reviewed the society's handling of the complaint and ordered the society to provide better written reasons, but otherwise dismissed the applicant's procedural complaints.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application for judicial review, finding that both the society and the Board afforded the applicant procedural fairness and that their decisions were reasonable.

The applicants, a reporter and a newspaper, sought judicial review of an Information and Privacy Commissioner (IPC) decision that upheld the refusal to disclose the names and badge numbers of police officers subject to misconduct complaints.

The applicants argued the IPC Adjudicator failed to consider their freedom of expression rights under section 2(b) of the Charter when applying the public interest override in section 23 of the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.

The Divisional Court agreed, finding the Adjudicator erred by dismissing the Charter argument solely because a formal notice of constitutional question was not filed.

The application for judicial review was granted, the IPC decision was quashed, and the matter was remitted for a new hearing before a different adjudicator.

The appellant tenant appealed a Landlord and Tenant Board (LTB) decision ordering eviction for rent arrears.

The tenant argued he was unable to pay rent due to injuries sustained when his apartment ceiling collapsed, which is the subject of a separate Superior Court of Justice (SCJ) personal injury claim.

Due to procedural errors by the tenant's counsel, the LTB did not adjudicate the merits of the rent abatement or stay request.

The Divisional Court upheld the LTB's findings on rent arrears but quashed the denial of abatement and stayed the eviction order, directing that the abatement and stay issues be determined by the SCJ alongside the personal injury claim to prevent injustice.

The moving parties brought motions for leave to appeal a decision of the lower court dated January 20, 2025.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motions for leave to appeal and awarded costs to the responding party fixed at $2,500 for each motion.

The plaintiff and the franchisee defendants brought motions for leave to appeal the decision of Glustein J. dated December 17, 2024.

The Divisional Court granted both motions for leave to appeal.

Costs of the motions were fixed at $5,000 each and reserved to the panel hearing the appeal.

The moving party sought leave to appeal a decision of the Assessment Review Board dated October 6, 2022.

The Divisional Court granted the motion for leave to appeal.

Costs were reserved to the panel hearing the appeal, subject to the quantum of costs being fixed at the agreed amount of $2,500 all inclusive.

The appellants appealed a default judgment decision that awarded them $2,260 for a breached website development contract but denied their claims for $90,000 in lost revenue, a mandatory order, and costs.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the motion judge's conclusions.

The court upheld the finding that the appellants failed to mitigate their damages by letting their website expire instead of hiring another service provider, and affirmed the discretionary denial of the mandatory order due to the disproportionate nature of the litigation.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for summary judgment against the defendant purchaser for failing to close a residential real estate transaction.

The defendant argued that the contract was frustrated and subject to force majeure because she could not transfer funds from Afghanistan due to the Taliban takeover, nor could she sell another property.

The court granted summary judgment, finding no force majeure clause in the agreement and that the doctrine of frustration did not apply because the lack of funds was not a supervening event that radically altered the contract.

The plaintiffs were awarded $280,739.28 in damages, representing the difference in sale price and carrying costs, and the deposit was ordered released to them.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal the order of Casullo J. dated December 4, 2023.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs of $5,000 to the responding party.

The moving parties sought leave to appeal an order of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal in writing.

Costs were awarded to the responding parties in the amount of $2,191.64.

The appellant condominium corporation appealed a decision of the Assessment Review Board confirming the property tax treatment of 16 shared units within a condominium hotel building.

The appellant argued the units should be assessed at a nominal value because a change in ownership revoked a prior declaration designating them as 'hotel units', and that the current assessment resulted in double taxation.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Board correctly interpreted the Regulation that a change in ownership does not constitute a 'change in status', and that the units were properly classified as part of hotel operations.

The Court also found no double taxation, as the appellant's tax burden arose from a reciprocal cost-sharing agreement rather than the assessment methodology.

The moving parties brought a motion for leave to appeal the order of Perell J. dated February 29, 2024.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs to the responding parties in the amount of $1,500.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal two previous orders.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs to the responding parties in the amount of $2,237.40.