Kendra D. Coats

The payor brought an application under the Interjurisdictional Support Orders Act seeking to terminate spousal and child support and rescind significant arrears arising from a 2004 support order.

The court found the payor voluntarily left a high‑income managerial position and failed to make reasonable efforts to obtain comparable employment or provide adequate financial disclosure, warranting imputation of income at $135,000.

While the recipient spouse had retrained, gained employment, and remarried, these changes justified only prospective termination of spousal support from the date of effective notice in 2013.

Child support arrears were not rescinded and additional post‑secondary education expenses were added to the arrears.

Spousal support was terminated effective September 1, 2013, with arrears after that date rescinded.

A self‑represented immigration detainee brought a habeas corpus application challenging the legality of his ongoing detention under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act and alleging restricted access to legal resources while held in a provincial correctional institution.

The respondents argued the matter was res judicata and that the Superior Court should decline jurisdiction because the Federal Court provides a comprehensive statutory review scheme for immigration detention decisions.

The court held the res judicata argument was not established on the record.

However, it found the evidentiary record insufficient to determine whether the applicant had a meaningful remedy available through Federal Court judicial review.

The court therefore reserved its decision on jurisdiction and the merits and adjourned the application to allow the applicant to attempt to pursue remedies in Federal Court and obtain legal resources.

On a motion to change a prior support order, the applicant sought orders requiring the respondent to contribute to the post‑secondary educational expenses of the parties’ adult children, including a master’s program in the United States.

The court held that the daughter pursuing a master’s degree remained a “child of the marriage” within the meaning of the Divorce Act, as she had not withdrawn from parental charge and her educational plan was rational and consistent with the family’s expectations regarding higher education.

The court also found no material change in circumstances justifying variation of the base child support previously agreed to by the parties.

The respondent was required to contribute proportionately to the children’s educational expenses under the existing order, including the U.S. graduate program, and base support was reduced only by the applicant’s consent.

The respondent’s request for retroactive variation of support based on alleged income changes was dismissed.

The Crown brought a motion seeking to limit defence cross‑examination of a non‑accused witness regarding prior discreditable conduct and the underlying facts of home invasion charges for which the witness had been acquitted.

The defence opposed the limitation and sought an order preventing the witness from referring to the acquittal.

The court reviewed the broad right of an accused to cross‑examine ordinary witnesses as part of the right to make full answer and defence.

Distinguishing authorities dealing with cross‑examination of an accused, the court held that limitations applicable to accused persons do not apply to ordinary witnesses.

Balancing probative value against potential prejudice, the court permitted cross‑examination on the underlying facts of the acquitted charges and declined to prohibit the witness from mentioning the acquittal if it arose naturally.

During a criminal proceeding, the defence sought to qualify a forensic odontologist as an expert on the diagnosis, causation, and assessment of oral maxillofacial trauma.

The court applied the admissibility framework for expert evidence and concluded the proposed expert possessed sufficient expertise to testify about diagnosis of mandible injuries and the mechanism and pattern of jaw fractures.

However, the court found the expert lacked specialized education, research, and practical experience regarding causation, direction of force, or magnitude of force relating to jaw fractures.

Applying the gatekeeping function for expert evidence, the court also held that permitting opinions on causation would risk intruding on the ultimate issue for the jury and could improperly influence fact‑finding.

The expert was therefore limited to opinion evidence concerning diagnosis and injury patterns.

In a family law proceeding, the court considered whether the respondent should be declared a “special party” under Rule 4 of the Family Law Rules due to incapacity to participate in the litigation.

The applicant alleged the respondent was failing to participate in proceedings involving significant matrimonial property, including a jointly owned matrimonial home.

The court applied the “understand and appreciate” test for capacity and considered evidence of the respondent’s non-participation and prior mental health history.

Finding that the respondent was unable to appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of failing to engage in the litigation and that no suitable representative was available, the court declared the respondent a special party.

The Office of the Public Guardian and Trustee was appointed as litigation guardian.

Shareholders and a director of two corporations brought an application seeking interim access to corporate books and records, including accounting records and source documents.

The respondents argued that the applicants already had sufficient financial information through electronic systems and financial statements.

The court held that under ss. 20 and 155 of the Canada Business Corporations Act and the applicable unanimous shareholders agreement, shareholders and directors have a broad and largely unconditional right to inspect corporate accounting records.

The term “adequate accounting records” includes source documents and records used to prepare financial statements, not merely the statements themselves.

The court granted the applicants immediate and unfettered access to specified corporate records but dismissed a related request for a restraining order as premature.

The offender was convicted by a jury of sexual assault and assault arising from an incident involving forced intercourse and physical violence in the complainant’s home, and later pleaded guilty to failing to comply with an undertaking prohibiting contact with the complainant.

The court considered the seriousness of non-consensual intercourse, the physical injuries inflicted, the impact on the complainant, and the intimate relationship between the parties as aggravating factors.

Mitigating factors included the offender’s lack of criminal record, some expressions of remorse, and otherwise stable personal circumstances.

Emphasizing denunciation and deterrence in intimate partner sexual violence, the court imposed a custodial sentence within the range reflected in comparable authorities.

Concurrent and consecutive sentences were structured to reflect that the breach offence occurred weeks later.

Following a jury conviction for sexual assault and assault, the defence argued the verdict was ambiguous because the jury may have relied on different factual bases ranging from touching to intercourse.

The court held that the Crown’s closing submissions created the possibility that jurors reached a unanimous verdict based on different evidentiary foundations.

In such circumstances, sentencing requires the trial judge to independently determine the relevant facts using the criminal standard of proof.

After reviewing the trial evidence, the court found beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused committed both digital penetration and sexual intercourse without consent as part of a continuous sexual assault.

These findings were adopted as the factual basis for sentencing.

The appellant appealed a default order of the Ontario Court of Justice made in a support enforcement proceeding initiated by the Director under the Family Responsibility and Support Arrears Enforcement Act.

The appellant alleged numerous procedural and jurisdictional errors, including claims that the judge abandoned the courtroom, acted with bias, lacked jurisdiction, and violated international copyright law through the use of the appellant’s name.

The court reviewed the transcript and record and found that the appellant had declined duty counsel, failed to file required financial disclosure, and made no substantive submissions at the default hearing.

The court rejected arguments asserting sovereign‑citizen style theories, including attempts to divide the appellant into a “natural man” and a separate legal debtor to avoid support obligations.

The appeal was dismissed and directions were given for submissions on costs.