Alexandra Tratnik

Following a successful motion for summary judgment by the plaintiff bank, the court determined the appropriate costs award.

The plaintiff sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis relying on contractual provisions in the credit agreements.

The court awarded costs to the plaintiff, fixing them at $5,500 against the primary debtor and $50 against the co-debtor whose liability was limited to a small overdraft amount.

The Royal Bank of Canada sought summary judgment against the defendants, Bibi Fehmidah Etwaree and Bye Nasrullah Etwaree, for outstanding credit card and overdraft debts, and dismissal of their counterclaim.

The defendants opposed the motion, sought dismissal of the plaintiff's action, and leave to amend their counterclaim.

The court found genuine issues requiring a trial regarding the interest rates on credit cards and the reasons for the overdrafts, citing insufficient and inconsistent evidence from the plaintiff.

The plaintiff's motion for summary judgment was dismissed.

The defendants' motion to dismiss the plaintiff's action was also dismissed, but they were granted leave to amend their counterclaim.

The plaintiff bank brought a motion for summary judgment against the self-represented defendants for outstanding debts on a line of credit, credit card, and overdraft account.

The defendants admitted to the agreements and amounts owing but argued they could withhold payment due to the plaintiff's alleged non-compliance with PIPEDA and the CBCA.

The court found no genuine issue requiring a trial, noting that PIPEDA and the CBCA do not provide a defence to liability for the debts.

The plaintiff's motion for summary judgment was granted, and the defendants' cross-motion to strike an affidavit and for disclosure was dismissed.

The plaintiff brought a motion to remove Shawna Sosnovich and Devry Smith Frank LLP as counsel for the defendant Anna Chen, alleging a conflict of interest.

The conflict arose because a partner at the firm, Lorne Shapiro, was likely to be a material witness at trial, having provided an affidavit that contradicted the plaintiff's evidence regarding key events leading to the litigation.

The court granted the motion, finding that the proper administration of justice required the removal of counsel due to the inherent conflict between a lawyer's duty of objectivity to the court and the obligation to present evidence favorably to a client, a conflict that cannot be waived.

The appellants sought an extension of time to appeal a decision by Sosna J. dismissing their motion to set aside a default judgment in a mortgage action.

The respondent bank had obtained a default judgment and a writ of possession.

The appellants' appeal to the Court of Appeal was well out of time.

Although the court found that the appellants intended to appeal within the appeal period and the delay was not long, the motion was dismissed on the merits.

The appellants had not paid the mortgage in months and were merely seeking to delay execution of the default judgment through the appeal process.

Costs were awarded to the respondent.

The plaintiff bank brought a motion for summary judgment against the defendant ex-wife, who had signed a personal guarantee for her ex-husband's corporate loan.

The defendant argued the guarantee was invalid due to undue influence and deficient independent legal advice obtained in Jamaica.

The court found no evidence of actual or presumed undue influence, and held that the bank was entitled to rely on the certificate of independent legal advice.

Summary judgment was granted for the debt, but pre-judgment interest was restricted to commence from the date the defendant actually learned of the action, as the original demand letter and statement of claim were never properly served on her.