Court File No.: CV-20-2539 Date: 2022-02-28 Superior Court of Justice – Ontario
Re: Royal Bank of Canada, Plaintiff/Defendant by Counterclaim And: Bibi Fehmidah Etwaree aka Bibi Etwaree and Bye Nasrullah Etwaree aka Bye Etwaree, Defendants/Plaintiffs by Counterclaim
Before: Coats J.
Counsel: Alexandra Tratnik, Counsel for the Plaintiff/Defendant by Counterclaim Robert Ruddock, Counsel for the Defendants/Plaintiffs by Counterclaim
Heard: February 4, 2022
Endorsement
Part 1 - Issues
[1] In the motion before me the Plaintiff seeks summary judgment against the Defendants, Bibi Fehmidah Etwaree aka Bibi Etwaree (“Bibi”) and Bye Nasrullah Etwaree aka Bye Etwaree (“Bye”) requiring them to pay to the Plaintiff the sums that the Plaintiff alleges are owed to the Plaintiff as set out in the Statement of Claim. The Plaintiff is also seeking a dismissal of the Defendants’ Counterclaim against the Plaintiff.
[2] The Defendants and Plaintiffs by Counterclaim seek an order dismissing the Plaintiff’s summary judgment motion and dismissing the Plaintiff’s action. They also seek leave to amend their Counterclaim.
Part 2 - Background
a) Bibi’s Visa
[3] The Plaintiff provided Bibi with a Royal Bank credit card - a Visa card. As of June 15, 2020, Bibi was indebted to the Plaintiff with respect to this account in the amount of $13,421.09. Interest continues to accrue on Bibi’s Visa from June 16, 2020 to the date of payment at the rate of 12.99 per cent per annum. It is undisputed that Bibi has not made a payment with respect to this credit card since on or about March 13, 2020.
b) Bibi’s Overdraft No. 1
[4] Bibi holds a Royal Bank of Canada bank account and as of March 17, 2020, this account had gone into overdraft in the amount of $18,249.83. Interest continues to accrue on this overdraft from March 18, 2020 to the date of payment at the rate of 22 per cent per annum.
c) Bibi’s Overdraft No. 2
[5] Bibi holds a second Royal Bank of Canada account and as of February 14, 2020, this account had gone into overdraft in the amount of $8,922.83. Interest continues to accrue on Bibi’s overdraft No. 2 from February 15, 2020 to the date of payment at the rate of 22 per cent per annum.
d) Bye’s Visa
[6] The Plaintiff provided Bye with a Royal Bank credit card - a Visa card. As of July 16, 2021, the balance owing on Bye’s Visa was $5,281.89. Interest continues to accrue on Bye’s Visa at the rate of 19.99 per cent per annum.
[7] It is undisputed that Bye has made regular payments on his Visa for nearly two years. As of January 17, 2022, the balance owing was $3,990.57. The balance owing as set out in the Statement of Claim was $9,678.54.
e) The Joint Overdraft
[8] The Defendants hold a joint Royal Bank of Canada bank account and as of February 18, 2020, this account had gone into overdraft in the amount of $2,786.32. Interest continues to accrue on this joint overdraft from February 19, 2020 to the date of payment at the rate of 22 per cent per annum.
f) Additional Background
[9] It is undisputed that the balances on all three overdrafts were caused, for the most part, by the Plaintiff debiting the Defendants’ account in or about August of 2019 for the collective amount of $28,000.
[10] The Plaintiff sent correspondence to Bibi dated August 6, 2019, which provides as follows:
During our investigation of a disputed Online Banking transaction, we have determined that your account was the recipient of fraudulently transferred funds in the amount of $28,000.00 from July 22, 2019 to July 25th, 2019.
After reviewing the file and conducting a thorough investigation, your account 5117973, 5163274 and 5345236 has been debited for $28,000.00, which represents the funds associated with this confirmed fraudulent transaction.
For your protection, we have a team of fraud specialists dedicated to prevention, detection and investigation. In addition, we make significant and ongoing investments in our fraud technology. To learn more, please visit our website at www.rbc.com/privacysecurity/ or visit your nearest branch.
Should you wish to discuss this decision further, our team may be reached at 1-833-772-3178 or 418-313-2037 when outside North America.
Part 3 - Demand and Action
[11] On July 21, 2020, the Plaintiff made demand for payment for the full outstanding indebtedness owing pursuant to the above described debts.
[12] The Defendants have not paid the full indebtedness to the Plaintiff. As noted above, Bye had continued to make payments on his Visa.
[13] The Statement of Claim was issued on October 6, 2020 and a Statement of Defence was served on or about October 26, 2020.
[14] The Statement of Defence appears to include a Counterclaim although it was not described as such. The Defendants asked at para. 4 of the Statement of Defense that the action be dismissed with costs of $500,000 on a substantial indemnity scale “due to constant psychological and moral harassments”.
[15] The Plaintiff delivered a Reply and Defence to Counterclaim on or about November 17, 2020.
[16] In their Statement of Defence, the Defendants admit owing the principal amounts claimed by the Plaintiff with respect to Bibi’s Visa and Bye’s Visa but deny the interest claims. The Defendants deny liabilities for the overdrafts.
Part 4 - Issue and the Law
[17] The issue on this summary judgment motion is whether there is a genuine issue of material fact requiring a trial with respect to whether the Defendants owe to the Plaintiff the amounts set out in the Statement of Claim.
[18] Rule 1.04(1.1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the courts are required to make orders and give directions that are proportionate to the importance and complexity of the issues, and to the amount involved, in the proceeding.
[19] I summarized on the law on summary judgment at paras. 16 - 26 of Royal Bank of Canada v. Hogarth, 2022 ONSC 959:
[16] As provided for in Rule 20.04(2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court shall grant summary judgment if it is satisfied that there is no genuine issue requiring a trial with respect to a claim or defence.
[17] Hryniak v. Mauldin, 2014 SCC 7, para. 4, provides that a trial is not required if a summary judgment motion can achieve a fair and just adjudication, if it provides a process that allows the judge to make the necessary findings of fact, apply the law to those facts, and is a proportionate, more expeditious and less expensive means to achieve a just result than going to trial.
[18] The court should first determine if there is a genuine issue requiring a trial based only on the evidence in the motion record, without using the fact finding powers set out in Rule 20. The “analysis of whether there is a genuine issue requiring a trial should be done by reviewing the factual record and granting a summary judgment if there is sufficient evidence to fairly and justly adjudicate the dispute and a summary judgment would be a timely, affordable and proportionate procedure.” (Masales v Cole, 2016 ONSC 763, at para. 49).
[19] As set out at para. 50 of Masales, if there appears to be a genuine issue requiring a trial, then the court should determine if the need for a trial can be avoided by using the powers under Rules 20.04(2.1) and (2.2) provided that use of these Rules will lead to a fair and just result and will serve the goals of timeliness, affordability, and proportionality in light of the litigation as a whole.
[20] Paragraphs 52 and 53 of Masales provides as follows:
[52] At para. 22 of her judgment in the companion case of Bruno Appliance and Furniture, Inc. v. Hryniak, supra, Justice Karakatsanis summarized the approach to determining when a summary judgment may or may not be granted; she stated:
Summary judgment may not be granted under Rule 20 where there is a genuine issue requiring a trial. As outlined in the companion Mauldin appeal, the motion judge should ask whether the matter can be resolved in a fair and just manner on a summary judgment motion. This will be the case when the process (1) allows the judge to make the necessary findings of fact, (2) allows the judge to apply the law to the facts, and (3) is a proportionate, more expeditious and less expensive means to achieve a just result. If there appears to be a genuine issue requiring a trial, based only on the record before her, the judge should then ask if the need for a trial can be avoided by using the new powers provided under Rules 20.04(2.1) and (2.2). She may, at her discretion, use those powers, provided that their use is not against the interest of justice.
[53] Justice Corbett provided a useful summary of the Hryniak v. Mauldin approach in Sweda Farms Ltd. v. Egg Farmers of Ontario, 2014 ONSC 1200, where he stated at paras. 33 and 34:
As I read Hryniak, the court on a motion for summary judgment should undertake the following analysis: (1) The court will assume that the parties have placed before it, in some form, all of the evidence that will be available for trial; (2) On the basis of this record, the court decides whether it can make the necessary findings of fact, apply the law to the facts, and thereby achieve a fair and just adjudication of the case on the merits; (3) If the court cannot grant judgment on the motion, the court should: (a) Decide those issues that can be decided in accordance with the principles described in (2), above; (b) Identify the additional steps that will be required to complete the record to enable the court to decide any remaining issues; (c) In the absence of compelling reasons to the contrary, the court should seize itself of the further steps required to bring the matter to a conclusion.
The Supreme Court is clear in rejecting the traditional trial as the measure of when a judge may obtain a "full appreciation" of a case necessary to grant judgment. Obviously greater procedural rigour should bring with it a greater immersion in a case, and consequently a more profound understanding of it. But the test is now whether the court's appreciation of the case is sufficient to rule on the merits fairly and justly without a trial, rather than the formal trial being the yardstick by which the requirements of fairness and justice are measured.
[21] On a motion for summary judgment, the court will assume that the parties have placed before it, in some form, all of the evidence that will be available for trial and that the parties have advanced their best case (Masales at paragraph 54).
[22] As stated at para. 54 of Masales, the onus is on the moving party to show that there is no genuine issue requiring a trial, but the responding party must present its best case or risk losing.
[23] The holding of a trial is unnecessary and, accordingly, represents a failure of procedural justice, in proceedings which do not involve any genuine issues which requires a trial (Irving Ungerman Ltd. v. Galanis (C.A.), at para. 20).
[24] As provided for in Rules 20.04(2.1), of the Rules of Civil Procedure, at a hearing of the summary judgment motion, the judge may weigh evidence, evaluate the credibility of the deponents, and draw any reasonable inferences from the evidence.
[25] On a motion for summary judgment a party must ‘put its best foot forward’ with respect to the existence or non-existence of material issues to be tried, and may not sit back and rely on the possibility that more favourable facts may develop at trial. (Transamerica Life Insurance Co of Canada v. Canada Life Insurance Co., para. 29).
[26] Once a moving party has met the appropriate test for summary judgment, the responding party must show a real chance of success in order to oppose the summary judgment motion. A self-serving affidavit is not sufficient in itself to create a triable issue in the absence of detailed facts and supporting evidence. (Guarantee Co. of North America v. Gordon Capital Corp., [1999] 3 SCR 423, at paras. 27 and 31).
Part 5 - Analysis
a) Bibi’s Visa
[20] In my view, the Plaintiff has not established that there is no genuine issue regarding a trial with respect to Bibi’s Visa.
[21] Bibi does not dispute that it is her credit card or that the principal amount is owing. She disputes the interest.
[22] Paragraph 5 of Michael Connolly’s Affidavit sworn January 28, 2022, filed on behalf of the Plaintiff, is as follows:
- Attached hereto and marked as Exhibit “B” is a true copy of a RBC Royal Bank Credit Card Agreement that governs Bibi’s Visa and to which she is bound.
[23] Exhibit B is a document entitled RBC Royal Bank Credit Card Agreement. The right-hand corner has a date of 08/2019. Various interest rates are set out in the Agreement depending on the type of credit card the holder has. The Agreement is not signed.
[24] There is no evidence before the Court as to how this Agreement is the one Bibi is bound by. I have no evidence as to whether it was sent to her or in some other manner provided to her. I do not know if she obtained the Visa card before or after the date on the Agreement. Further, the rate of interest claimed by the Plaintiff does not seem to align with any of the interest rates set out in the Agreement.
b) The Overdrafts
[25] I will deal with all three overdrafts together. The Plaintiff has not established that there is not a genuine issue requiring a trial with regard to these overdrafts. The evidence is deficient.
[26] As set out above, it is undisputed that the balances on all three overdrafts were caused, for the most part, by the Plaintiff debiting the Defendants’ accounts in or about August of 2019, for the collective amount of $28,000.
[27] Paragraph 23 of Michael Connolly’s Affidavit sworn August 16, 2021, filed on behalf of the Plaintiff, provides as follows with regard to the overdrafts:
- The balances on the Overdrafts were caused, for the most part, by the defendants withdrawing funds from the Overdrafts immediately after making large deposits, which did not clear and were subsequently returned to the Bank.
[28] This would suggest that the Defendants made large deposits that did not clear. No other details are provided for as to why the accounts were debited in this first Affidavit of Michael Connolly.
[29] Paragraphs 6, 7, and 8 of Michael Connolly’s Affidavit sworn January 28, 2022 state:
- As set out in my First Affidavit, the Overdrafts were caused, in large part, due to large deposits that did not clear and were subsequently returned by the Bank. Specifically, the following deposits (the “Disputed Deposits”) to the Overdrafts were returned:
| Date of Deposit | Deposit Amount | Description | Account |
|---|---|---|---|
| July 22, 2019 | $4,000.00 | Third party deposit | Joint Account |
| July 23, 2019 | $8,000.00 | Third party deposit | Bibi’s Overdraft No. 2 |
| July 24, 2019 | $8,000.00 | Third party deposit | Bibi’s Overdraft No. 1 |
| July 25, 2019 | $8,000.00 | Third party deposit | Bibi’s Overdraft No. 1 |
On or about July 26, 2019, the Bank flagged the Disputed Deposits as suspicious and froze access to the Overdrafts. After the Bank concluded its investigation, it reversed the Disputed Credits as the sender did not authorize the funds to be sent to the defendants.
The Overdrafts were a result of the defendants withdrawing funds from their accounts that did not belong to them. Simply put, the defendants are not entitled to money that does not belong to them.
[30] This would suggest that unnamed third parties made the deposits, not the Defendants. Paragraph 7 refers to a “sender” who did not authorize the funds to be sent to the Defendants.
[31] There are inconsistencies in the evidence - were the deposits made by the Defendants or by a third party sender?
[32] Further, para. 7 references an “investigation” that led to the reversal of the deposits. There is no indication that Michael Connolly was involved in the investigation. He does not indicate the sources of this information in regard to these reversals.
[33] Exhibit E to the Affidavit of Michael Connolly, sworn January 28, 2022, the correspondence set out in para. 10 above, refers to the accounts being the recipient of fraudulently transferred funds. This is the third explanation for the reversal offered by the Plaintiff. First, the Defendants making large deposits that did not clear. Second, a “sender” who did not authorize the funds to be sent. Third, fraudulently transferred funds. It is possible the second and third are related.
[34] The author of the letter at Exhibit E, who is identified by initials only and as being from the Disputed Claims Investigation Centre, did not provide an Affidavit.
[35] There is insufficient evidence as to what occurred in regard to the overdrafts put forward by the Plaintiff. There is a genuine issue requiring a trial. The Plaintiff has not adduced evidence of anyone with direct knowledge of the reason the Defendants’ accounts were debited. Michael Connolly does not indicate that he has direct knowledge. Further, insufficient details have been provided as to what occurred.
[36] The Plaintiff relies on the Personal Deposits Accounts - Disclosures and Agreements document set out at Exhibit C to Michael Connolly’s Affidavit sworn January 28, 2022 as governing the accounts and overdrafts. It is the Plaintiff’s position that the Defendants are bound by Exhibit C based on their signature cards at Exhibit D. The Personal Deposit Accounts - Disclosure and Agreements is dated June 1, 2019. It is not signed. The signature cards appear to be from 2011 and 2014 and for Bibi only. There is no apparent link in the evidence between the signature cards from 2011 and 2014 and the Disclosure and Agreements document from 2019. I do not know if the 2019 document was sent to the Defendants or how they are bound by it.
c) Bye’s Visa
[37] In my view, the Plaintiff has not established that there is no genuine issue regarding a trial with respect to Bye’s Visa
[38] Bye does not dispute that it is his credit card or that the principal amount is owing. He disputes the interest. He also disputes that the Plaintiff has the right to bring an action to collect from a customer who is making more than the minimum payments on the credit card.
[39] Paragraph 4 of the Affidavit of Michael Connelly, sworn January 28, 2022 provides as follows:
- Since the swearing of my First Affidavit, additional payments have been made onto Bye’s Visa. As of January 17, 2022, the balance owing on Bye’s Visa was $3,990.57. Interest continues to accrue on Bye’s Visa from January 18, 2022 to the date of payment at the rate of 199.99% per annum. Attached hereto and marked as Exhibit “A” is a true copy of Bye’s Visa statement for the period from December 17, 2022 to January 17, 2022 along with a true copy of a RBC Royal Bank Credit Card Agreement that governs Bye’s Visa and to which he is bound. Nothing in the attached agreement prevents the Bank from commencing an action on an outstanding credit card debt even if minimum payments are being made by the client.
[40] I believe the reference to 199.99 per cent is meant to be 19.99 per cent. I also believe it should be December 17, 2021 and not 2022.
[41] Exhibit A is a document entitled RBC Royal Bank Credit Card Agreement. The right-hand corner has a date of 08/2020. The Agreement is not signed. There is no evidence before the Court as to how this Agreement is the one that Bye is bound by. I have no evidence as to whether it was sent to him or in some other manner provided to him. It is clear that Bye had the credit card in 2019. I have no explanation as to how a document dated in 2020 is applicable to his credit card.
[42] I, therefore, have no evidence as to what interest rate is applicable. Further, I have no evidence as to whether this Agreement (as it may or may not be the Agreement that binds Bye) can be relied on by the Plaintiff to commence an action when the debtor is making minimum payments.
[43] Further, the Plaintiff has provided no caselaw that supports their argument that nothing prevents the Plaintiff from commencing an action on a credit card debt even when the minimum payments are being maintained.
d) The Counterclaim
[44] The Plaintiff seeks summary judgment on the Defendants’ counterclaim based on the pleading being deficient. The Plaintiff refers to Rule 25.06(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure that requires that every pleading contain a concise statement of the material facts on which the party relies. The Plaintiff also refers to Rule 25.06(2), which provides that a party may raise any point of law in a pleading, but conclusions of law may be pleaded only if the material facts supporting them are pleaded.
[45] The Plaintiff relies on para. 2 of Royal Bank of Canada v. 1747444 Ontario Limited:
[2] The court “shall” grant summary judgment if “satisfied that there is no genuine issue for trial with respect to a claim or defence.” [1] The party responding to the motion “may not rest on the mere allegations or denials of the party’s pleading, but must set out in affidavit material or other evidence, specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” [2] The Supreme Court of Canada has set out the appropriate approach a motions court is to use on a motion for summary judgment as follows: “The appropriate test to be applied on a motion for summary judgment is satisfied when the applicant has shown that there is no genuine issue of material facts requiring a trial, and therefore summary judgment is a proper question for consideration by the court…Once the moving party has made this showing, the respondent must then ‘establish his claim as being one with a real chance of success.’” [3] Therefore not only must the issue raised be a “genuine” issue, but it must be a genuine issue of “material” facts. In my view a genuine issue of material facts are those related to a claim or defence as defined by the pleadings.
[46] The Plaintiff also relies on paras. 30 and 31 of EnerWorks Inc. Glenbarra Energy Solutions Inc., 2010 ONSC 6563:
[30] In my opinion, there is no genuine issue requiring a trial about whether EnerWorks is not a proper party because it has assigned its claims against Glenbarra. There are four reasons for this conclusion:
First, this allegation cannot be an issue requiring a trial because it is not pleaded as material fact in the statement of defence. Subject to the court’s power to grant amendments, a party cannot rely on a claim or defence not pleaded: Kalkinis (Litigation Guardian of) v. Allstate Insurance Co. of Canada (1998), 41 O.R. (3d) 528 (Ont. C.A.); Severin v. Vroom (1977), 15 O.R. (2d) 636 (Ont. C.A.); Allan v. New Mount Sinai Hospital, (1981), 33 O.R. (2d) 603 (Ont. C.A.); Hydro-Electric Power Commission of Ontario v. St. Catharines (City), [1971] 3 O.R. 674 (Ont. H.C.J.), affd , [1972] 1 O.R. 806 (Ont. C.A.), affd , 36 D.L.R. (3d) 160n (S.C.C.). In Lang v. Kligerman, [1998] O.J. No. 3708 (C.A.) at para. 9, the Court of Appeal stated that the responding party assumes the evidentiary burden of presenting evidence which is capable of supporting the position advanced in its pleading. In the case at bar, Glenbarra does not plead in its statement of defence that EnerWorks is not the proper party to enforce the contract for the supply of goods and services.
Second, the hearsay, tentative, vague evidence of Mr. Cooper in his affidavit that there was an assignment is insufficient to show a genuine issue for trial.
Third, the affirmative evidence of Mr. Whiting that there was no assignment is sufficient to show that there was no assignment and that there is no genuine issue for trial.
Fourth, even if there was an assignment of the debt, this would not refute liability for payment; rather, it would mean that the action had not been properly constituted because a necessary party was missing. The solution to that problem, however, is simply to add the assignee as a party. This solution has been utilized as late as on an appeal in the improperly constituted action; see Di Guilo v. Boland, [1958] O.J. No. 150 (C.A.).
[31] In my opinion, there is no genuine issue for trial about whether EnerWorks’ claim is premature because payment is not due until NRCan has first paid Glenbarra for the various projects for which EnerWorks goods were supplied. There are four reasons for this conclusion:
First, once again, this allegation cannot be an issue requiring a trial because it is not pleaded as material fact in the statement of defence.
Second, the onus being on Glenbarra to show the existence of the alleged agreement postponing the time of payment, it is inevitable that it could not prove the existence of the alleged agreement at trial. Mr. Cooper admitted in this cross-examination that the e-mail messages are not evidence of an agreement, and there is no other written confirmation of the alleged agreement. I also agree that the agreement would not make commercial sense.
Third, even if there was an agreement, on Mr. Cooper’s own evidence, the agreement would postpone only a part of the payments owed to EnerWorks on some projects. In para. 39 of his affidavit, Mr. Cooper deposed: “On these projects, it is known and understood by those who are involved that a certain amount is made either “up front” or during regular progress payments, while another portion waits under NRCan forwards payments through the rebates, etc.” Thus, there is no agreement that all payments on a particular project be delayed, and in the case at bar there is no evidence that Glenbarra made the “up front” portion of the payment.
Fourth, even if there was evidence to establish the alleged agreement, the evidence would not be admissible in evidence or would not be given any weight because of the parol evidence rule, which precludes effect being given to an oral term that is inconsistent with the terms that the parties to a contract have reduced to writing. In the case at bar, the invoices and also Glenbarra’s own purchase orders require payment within 30 days or 45 days. I do not see the case at bar as falling within any of the exceptions to the parol evidence rule.
[47] Further, the Plaintiff references para. 39 of Bank of Montréal v. 1480863 Ontario Inc.:
[39] The respondent has neither pleaded that a fiduciary relationship existed between her and the bank, nor has the respondent adduced evidence to support that position. I conclude that no genuine issue for trial has been raised in relation to a fiduciary duty being imposed on the bank.
[48] The Statement of Defence in regard to the Counterclaim is deficient. It was prepared by the Defendants when they were self represented. It does not specifically refer to a Counterclaim. Para. 4 refers to claiming Costs due to “constant psychological and moral harassments”. Paras. 6 and 7 refer to some material facts that could potentially relate to claims of negligence and breach of contract.
[49] A pleading may contain a conclusion of law. This is optional.
[50] In these circumstances, I decline to grant summary judgment. Rather, I grant the Defendants leave to amend their deficient pleading in regard to the Counterclaim.
e) Defendants’ claim to dismiss the Plaintiff’s action.
[51] There is no basis for the Plaintiff’s action to be dismissed. There are genuine issues for trial. The Defendants have not established that summary judgment should be granted in their favour.
Part 6 - Conclusion
[52] There are genuine issues for trial. This is not an appropriate case for the court to use the powers in Rules 20.04(2.1) and (2.2) as there are significant evidentiary issues and possible disclosure that must still be provided. The Plaintiff’s summary judgment motion is dismissed. The Defendants motion to dismiss the Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is granted.
[53] The Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Plaintiff’s action is dismissed.
[54] The Defendants shall have leave to amend their Counterclaim. The Defendants’ amended pleading (Statement of Defence) shall be served and filed within 20 days. The Plaintiff shall have leave to serve and file an amended Reply and Defence to Counterclaim within 40 days of today.
Part 7 - Costs
[55] I encourage the parties to resolve the issue of costs of the Motion. If they are unable to do so, the Defendants shall serve and file brief written submissions as to costs, limited to two pages (double spaced with regular font and margins), with a bill of costs attached, to be served and filed within 30 days of today.
[56] The Plaintiff shall serve and file brief written responding submissions as to costs, limited to two pages (double spaced with regular font and margins), (with a bill of costs attached, if the Plaintiff is claiming costs), to be served and filed within 60 days of today.
[57] The Defendants may serve and file a one-page submission in reply (double spaced with regular font and margins), within 75 days of today.
Coats J. Date: February 28, 2022