Kelly P. Wright

The applicant, Javoni Palma, facing a charge of possessing cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, brought three applications at the outset of his trial, alleging violations of his section 7 and section 9 Charter rights.

The applications sought exclusion of evidence or a stay of proceedings, based on claims of arbitrary detention, excessive force during arrest, and lost video evidence from seized iPhones.

The court dismissed all three applications, finding that the police had reasonable grounds for investigative detention, did not use excessive force, and that the alleged lost evidence was either irrelevant or not proven to have been tampered with by police.

The appellant appealed a common law peace bond order, arguing that it could only be made on consent, that the Crown failed to prove the complainant feared for their life, and that the peace bond hearing breached natural justice.

The court dismissed the appeal, clarifying that common law peace bonds do not require consent, the threshold is a "reasonably apprehended breach of the peace," and natural justice was observed as the appellant had notice, made submissions, and gave evidence, with the trial judge relying on evidence adduced at the prior criminal harassment trial.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent on charges of impaired care or control and over 80.

The respondent was involved in a single motor vehicle accident and was later arrested after registering a fail on an approved screening device.

The trial judge acquitted the respondent, finding that he had successfully rebutted the statutory presumption of care or control for the period between a tow truck's arrival and police arrival.

The Superior Court found that the trial judge erred by failing to apply the presumption of care or control under section 258(1)(a) of the Criminal Code to the entire relevant time period, specifically the period of driving leading up to the collision.

The appeal was allowed, the acquittal set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant, Xueming Yang, appealed his conviction for 'over 80' and failing to stop at a red light, alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

The appellant claimed counsel failed to interview a key witness and file a Charter application regarding arbitrary detention.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding no miscarriage of justice.

It concluded that even if a Charter application had been pursued, there was no reasonable possibility of acquittal because the police officer had reasonable grounds for the traffic stop, and the appellant's credibility was significantly undermined by his immigration motivations for the appeal and inconsistent testimony.

The appellant, Mark Broxterman, appealed his conviction for operating a motor vehicle with more than 80 milligrams of alcohol in 100 milliliters of blood.

The appeal was based on three grounds: the trial judge erred in finding reasonable and probable grounds for arrest, misapprehended the evidence regarding the approved screening device (ASD) result, and rendered an unsafe verdict due to comments about writing two judgments.

The appeal court dismissed all grounds, affirming the trial judge's findings on reasonable grounds, the reliability of the ASD result based on expert evidence, and the appropriateness of the trial judge's decision-making process.

The appellant, Marti Mayrhofer-Lima, appealed his conviction and sentence for impaired operation of a motor vehicle.

The appeal focused on alleged Charter breaches (sections 7, 10(a), 10(b), 8, and 9) and the trial judge's failure to provide sufficient reasons.

The Crown had conceded breaches of sections 8, 9, and 10(b), but the trial judge rejected these concessions without notifying counsel or allowing submissions on the pivotal case of R. v. Bush.

The appellate court found that the trial judge erred in not accepting the Crown's concession regarding the section 10(b) breach and in failing to provide counsel an opportunity to make submissions on R. v. Bush, which was central to the rejection of the section 9 concession.

These errors were deemed reversible, as they impacted the appellant's strategic decisions at trial.

The conviction was set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant was convicted of operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over the legal limit.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's findings that breath samples were taken "as soon as practicable" despite delays caused by a new police booking system (Versadex) and the dismissal of a Charter application regarding the grounds for a breath demand, specifically concerning mouth alcohol.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge applied the correct legal tests for "as soon as practicable" and for the officer's reasonable belief in the accuracy of the Approved Screening Device (ASD) test.

The appellant, Ivanmarino Mazia, appealed his conviction for theft under $5,000, arguing the trial judge erred by failing to grant his Rowbotham application and provide adequate assistance given his visual impairment.

The Superior Court admitted fresh evidence establishing Mazia's legal blindness at the time of trial.

The court found the trial judge erred by not inquiring into Mazia's stated vision problems and by applying an overly stringent "rare and exceptional" test for the Rowbotham application.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

Hassan Jarrar was charged with three counts of breaching a section 810.2 recognizance.

The Crown withdrew one count.

The court found Jarrar guilty on two counts: having contact with a female under 16 years of age (K.S.) and breaching curfew.

The court rejected the defence of mistake of fact regarding K.S.'s age, finding Jarrar knew she was 14 and failed to take reasonable steps to ascertain her age.

The court also found Jarrar breached his curfew by staying at a motel with K.S. instead of his designated residence.

Earl Zammit applied for a stay of proceedings, alleging an infringement of his s. 11(b) Charter right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The court applied the new framework established in R. v. Jordan, finding a total delay of approximately 36 months, which exceeded the 30-month presumptive ceiling for Superior Court.

The court determined that the delay was not attributable to the defence, nor were there exceptional circumstances or transitional exceptions to justify it.

Consequently, the application was granted, and the charges were stayed.

The defendant, Leon Bookal, was charged with possession for the purpose of trafficking cocaine and possession of proceeds of crime, stemming from a search warrant executed at his residence.

The Crown's case relied on circumstantial evidence to prove constructive possession, while the defendant claimed the cocaine belonged to a friend who was staying at his condominium and had access to his locker.

The court found the police officers' note-taking inadequate and their independent recollections unreliable.

Despite some inconsistencies in the defendant's testimony, the court found his evidence compelling and was left with a reasonable doubt regarding his knowledge of the cocaine and the origin of the cash.

Consequently, the defendant was found not guilty on both counts.

The defendant, a Service Ontario customer service representative, was charged with four counts of fraud-related offences, including making false documents, possessing identification with intent to commit fraud, using forged documents, and breach of trust.

It was alleged he participated in a scheme to provide false identification for obtaining genuine Ontario Driver’s Licences and Health Cards.

The Crown's case relied heavily on circumstantial evidence and the testimony of a co-accused, which the court found unreliable.

The defendant testified he was unaware of the fraudulent nature of the documents, believing he was merely helping a friend's driving students bypass wait times.

The court found the Crown failed to prove actual knowledge or wilful blindness beyond a reasonable doubt, leading to an acquittal on all counts.

The defendant brought an application to exclude evidence (crack cocaine) found in his condominium, arguing a section 8 Charter breach due to an unlawful strip search conducted at the police station subsequent to his arrest.

The court found a section 8 breach occurred due to the blatant lack of record-keeping regarding the reasons for and the manner in which the strip search was conducted, despite finding reasonable and probable grounds for the search itself and general compliance with most *Golden* guidelines.

However, the court dismissed the application to exclude the evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding no temporal, contextual, or causal connection between the strip search breach and the evidence, which was obtained hours earlier under a valid search warrant.

The defendant, Kyle Hazelton, was charged with criminal negligence causing death, dangerous driving causing death, and failing to stop at the scene of an accident, all stemming from an incident on July 18, 2013, that resulted in the death of Scott Shannon.

The Crown alleged that Hazelton intentionally or negligently accelerated his truck while Shannon was holding onto the driver's side, causing his death, and then failed to stop.

The defence argued that the Crown's inferences were speculative and that the key witness's evidence was unreliable.

The court found the Crown's evidence insufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, particularly regarding the reliability of witness observations, the nature of the acceleration, and Hazelton's knowledge of the accident.

The accused pleaded guilty to manslaughter in the stabbing death of her intimate partner.

The Crown and defence jointly submitted to a sentence of six years imprisonment.

The court accepted the joint submission, finding it appropriate given the circumstances.

The offence occurred in a domestic context, which was significantly aggravating.

However, the accused's lack of criminal record, genuine remorse, substantial rehabilitation efforts including four years of sobriety, and strong family support were mitigating factors.

The court imposed a six-year sentence with credit for time served on a 1.5:1 basis, resulting in approximately five years and one month remaining to be served.

The accused was charged with two counts of dangerous driving causing death arising from a motor vehicle collision on October 31, 2008, in which two passengers died.

The defence brought a Charter application seeking a stay of proceedings under s. 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, arguing that proceeding to trial would violate the accused's right to security of the person due to catastrophic physical injuries and severe psychological trauma.

The Crown opposed the application, citing the seriousness of the charges and public interest in prosecution.

The court granted the stay, finding that the accused suffered irreparable harm to her health and could not meaningfully participate in her own defence.

The accused was charged with residential break and enter and possession of stolen property.

The Crown proceeded by indictment and the accused elected trial in Ontario Court of Justice.

The trial proceeded over three days.

The Crown called five witnesses and the defence called one witness (the accused's mother).

The court found the accused guilty of break and enter based on circumstantial evidence including his presence near the property at the time of the offence, possession of tools consistent with break and enter, and possession of stolen items identified by the victim.

The court found the accused not guilty of possession of stolen property as the Crown failed to provide evidence regarding the stolen cell phones particularized in the information.

The accused was charged with failing to provide a suitable sample of breath into an approved screening device on December 12, 2010.

The Crown's case relied on two police officers with significantly divergent observations regarding the accused's sobriety and the sobriety of a female passenger.

The trial judge found material inconsistencies between the officers' evidence, particularly regarding whether alcohol was detected on the accused's breath and whether the female passenger was impaired.

These inconsistencies created reasonable doubt regarding the reliability of the investigation.

The accused was acquitted.

The accused was charged with domestic assault and unlawful confinement arising from an incident on September 15, 2011 involving his wife.

The Crown's case relied primarily on the testimony of the complainant, whose credibility and reliability were significantly undermined during cross-examination.

The accused's testimony was also found to be unconvincing.

The court found that the Crown failed to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt and acquitted the accused on both counts.

The accused was charged with possession for the purpose of trafficking cocaine and oxycodone following a vehicle stop and search.

The accused brought a Charter motion seeking exclusion of evidence based on alleged breaches of sections 7, 8, 9, 10(b), and 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found that while the accused's section 10(b) rights were breached (failure to inform of right to counsel immediately upon investigative detention), the evidence should be admitted under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The court determined that the investigative detention was justified on reasonable grounds to suspect involvement in drug trafficking, the search was lawful as a protective pat-down search based on safety concerns, and the brief delay in providing rights to counsel was reasonable given officer safety considerations.