Kelly C. Tranquilli

The accused, a father and his common-law partner, were charged with failing to provide the necessaries of life to a six-year-old child, and the partner was additionally charged with aggravated assault.

The child sustained severe burns to her buttocks from hot water while in the care of the accused.

The court found that the partner intentionally caused the burns in an angry outburst and that both accused failed to seek timely medical attention, which constituted a marked departure from the conduct of a reasonably prudent parent or caregiver.

Both accused were found guilty of failing to provide the necessaries of life, and the partner was found guilty of aggravated assault.

This criminal trial concerned a charge of sexual assault against J.M. involving fellatio and vaginal intercourse with the complainant, A.M. The central issue was consent, with conflicting accounts from both parties.

The complainant alleged non-consensual acts, supported by secretly recorded phone calls where she confronted the accused about violating boundaries.

The accused maintained consent, interpreting his responses in the calls as attempts to de-escalate conflict.

The court assessed the credibility and reliability of both witnesses, noting inconsistencies in the complainant's testimony regarding the details of the assault and her initial reports to police, particularly concerning the vaginal intercourse and her use of the term "gave" for oral sex.

The court concluded that the Crown failed to prove lack of consent beyond a reasonable doubt, leading to an acquittal.

The accused was charged with nine offences arising from multiple incidents of intimate partner violence against his former partner, including assault, unlawful confinement, and sexual assault.

The incidents occurred in the context of severe drug addiction and trafficking.

The court applied the W.D. framework to assess credibility, rejecting the accused's denials and accepting the complainant's evidence despite her history of drug use and memory gaps.

The accused was found guilty on all counts.

This family law trial addressed the allocation of parenting time for three young children.

The father sought equal parenting time, arguing it would reduce conflict and affirm his role.

The mother sought to maintain the existing interim biweekly schedule, emphasizing the children's need for a stable "home base." The court, prioritizing the children's best interests, ordered the continuation of the mother's proposed regular parenting schedule, finding it more practical and stable given the children's ages, school, and the distance between homes.

However, the court granted the father's request for a week-about schedule during summer holidays, recognizing the reduced logistical pressures during that period.

The decision highlighted ongoing parental conflict and the importance of child-focused communication.

The moving defendants sought an interlocutory or interim injunction restraining a mortgagee from completing a power of sale of a residential property that was also alleged to be a matrimonial home.

They argued the underlying promissory note and mortgage were unconscionable, the spouse had not validly consented to the encumbrance, and the statutory notice requirements under the Mortgages Act were not met.

Applying the RJR-MacDonald framework, the court held that most asserted grounds did not raise a serious issue to be tried, found no irreparable harm because any loss was compensable in damages, and concluded the balance of convenience favoured the mortgagee and the third-party purchaser.

The motion was dismissed and the sale was permitted to proceed.

The respondent psychiatrist brought a motion under s. 19(1) of the Health Care Consent Act to administer antipsychotic medication to an involuntary patient pending his appeal of a Consent and Capacity Board decision.

The Board had confirmed the psychiatrist's finding that the patient was incapable of consenting to treatment for a schizophrenia relapse.

The court granted the motion, finding that the patient's condition was likely to deteriorate rapidly without treatment, that he had previously responded well to the proposed medication, and that the treatment was necessary before the final disposition of the appeal.

The applicant, a non-profit corporation operating a seniors' apartment complex, sought a municipal property taxation exemption under s. 3(1)(12)(iii) of the Assessment Act, claiming to be "organized for the relief of the poor." The Municipal Property Assessment Corporation opposed.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the applicant did not demonstrate the required "endeavour" to relieve poverty as interpreted by the Court of Appeal in Religious Hospitallers of St. Joseph Housing Corp. and reaffirmed in Stamford Kiwanis Non-Profit Homes Inc. The court also found insufficient evidence that the majority of the applicant's tenants were "poor" within the meaning of the legislation, despite some units being Rent Geared-to-Income and a means test for others.

The Toronto-Dominion Bank sought summary judgment against Helen Marie MacNeill, the guarantor of a corporate loan to Cellular Transport Inc., which was in default.

MacNeill argued she had no knowledge of the guarantee, signed under undue influence, and was indemnified by a separation agreement with her former spouse.

The court found no material facts in dispute, noting MacNeill was an equal shareholder and direct beneficiary of the loan.

Her claims of undue influence and *non est factum* were dismissed as her evidence did not meet the legal threshold, and her actions amounted to carelessness.

Summary judgment was granted in favour of the bank for the full amount of the debt.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for summary judgment to recover funds advanced to the defendants for unperformed work on a farm construction project.

The plaintiffs claimed unjust enrichment and breach of a settlement agreement reached under the Farm Debt Mediation Act.

The court found a genuine issue requiring trial regarding the limitation period for the unjust enrichment claim.

However, the court granted summary judgment enforcing the settlement agreement, finding the personal defendants had personally guaranteed the corporate debt and were bound by the clear terms of the mediated settlement.

The defendant, Jesse Bleck, was found guilty by a jury of failing to stop at an accident causing bodily harm and driving while prohibited.

The victim sustained catastrophic injuries.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the defendant's prior driving record and defiance of court orders, and mitigating factors, such as his age, role as a primary caregiver, and pre-trial detention conditions.

The court rejected a conditional sentence, emphasizing denunciation and deterrence due to the high moral blameworthiness and the legislative intent for harsher penalties for such offenses.

A global sentence of 54 months (4.5 years) imprisonment was imposed, along with driving prohibitions and other ancillary orders.

Wesley Berman was charged with aggravated assault after stabbing Jordan Stiles during a confrontation over a dog.

Stiles had refused to return the dog despite a court order.

Berman claimed self-defence, stating Stiles attacked him.

The court assessed the credibility of both parties and the elements of self-defence under s. 34(1) of the Criminal Code.

The judge found Stiles' testimony unreliable and accepted Berman's account that he was attacked and used the knife in self-defence.

The Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Berman did not act in lawful self-defence, leading to an acquittal.

The plaintiff brought a motion to strike the defendant's statement of defence due to the defendant's chronic non-compliance with court orders, including failure to provide undertakings and pay costs, and his persistent assertion that he is not subject to the court's jurisdiction.

The court granted the motion, finding that the defendant's conduct made it impossible to advance the matter and that striking the defence was the only proportionate remedy.

Following the dismissal of the applicant's motion for leave to apply for judicial review under the Construction Act, the parties could not agree on costs.

The respondent sought $13,803.13, while the applicant argued for no costs or $1,500 to $2,000.

The court found the respondent's claimed time excessive given their argument that the motion was doomed to fail based on established case law.

Applying the principles from Boucher, the court fixed costs payable by the applicant to the respondent at $5,000 inclusive of fees, disbursements, and HST.

This decision addresses cross-motions concerning undertakings and refusals arising from examinations for discovery in a property damage action.

The defendant sought to compel answers from the plaintiff regarding the incident, damages, and insurance, while the plaintiff brought a cross-motion seeking the defendant's corporate tax returns.

The court largely granted the defendant's requests for further answers from the plaintiff, including details about her son's involvement as a witness, the use of a home equity line of credit, her current address, and visitors who saw the damage.

However, the court dismissed the defendant's request for detailed time estimates on the plaintiff's use of damaged areas, deeming it disproportionate.

The plaintiff's cross-motion for the defendant's tax returns was dismissed as irrelevant.

Both parties were ordered to bear their own costs due to procedural non-compliance.

The respondent father (W.F.) sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis following his successful motion for an interim variation of a parenting order, which granted him primary residency of the child E.F. The applicant mother (S.F.) opposed costs, arguing divided success and financial hardship.

The court found the respondent presumptively entitled to costs, noting the applicant's position was inconsistent with the Voice of the Child Report.

Balancing the respondent's success, settlement offers, and the applicant's ability to pay, the court fixed costs at $1,200, payable by the applicant within 120 days.

The accused was charged with possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking after police executed search warrants at a residence and on her vehicle, finding significant quantities of fentanyl, cocaine, and cash.

The Crown's case relied on circumstantial evidence to prove constructive possession.

The court found that while there was a high suspicion of the accused's involvement in the trafficking operation, the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that she had knowledge and control of the drugs, as other individuals had access to the residence and vehicle.

The accused was found not guilty.

The appellant, Brandon Mott, appealed a Consent and Capacity Board decision that found him incapable of consenting to anti-psychotic medication.

Mott, diagnosed with schizophrenia, denied his illness and argued the Board failed to consider reported side effects and the role of substance use in his mental health history.

The Board had concluded Mott was unable to appreciate the foreseeable consequences of declining treatment due to his inability to recognize the manifestations of his mental condition, a finding upheld by the court.

The appeal was dismissed, with the court finding no palpable and overriding error in the Board's decision.

The third-party insurer, United States Liability Insurance Company, brought a summary judgment motion to determine its duty to defend its insureds, Harold Douglas Eakins and Jack-O’s Sports Bar, in a personal injury claim.

The plaintiff alleged over-serving of alcohol, a fall from a barstool, and a subsequent forcible removal and assault by the proprietor.

The insurer relied on broad assault and battery exclusion clauses in its commercial general liability and liquor liability policies, which explicitly included negligence in their definitions of assault and battery.

The court found that the plaintiff's pleadings, even as amended, could not be severed from the factual matrix involving assault or battery as broadly defined in the policy.

Consequently, the court granted summary judgment, dismissing the third-party claim against the insurer, finding no duty to defend.

The plaintiffs sought summary judgment in a simplified procedure action for breach of contract arising from a failed residential real estate transaction.

The defendant purchasers counterclaimed, alleging misrepresentation regarding an "in-law" suite and frustration of contract due to market changes.

The court dismissed the summary judgment motion, finding that without cross-examinations (not permitted under Rule 76), it could not weigh evidence or make credibility findings, and there were gaps in the damages evidence.

The court also granted leave to amend the plaintiffs' claim to correct a defendant's name.

The plaintiff brought an unopposed motion for approval of a negotiated settlement and class counsel fees in a class action arising from the defendant's failure to follow public health standards in sterilizing medical instruments at its wound care clinics.

The court approved the settlement, which established a $195,000 fund to compensate the Infected Persons Class, finding it fair, reasonable, and in the best interests of the class.

The court also approved class counsel fees of $112,078.93 and a representative plaintiff honorarium of $1,500.