Kathleen J. Caldwell

During a Zoom preliminary inquiry for two accused charged with first-degree murder, a screen capture of one accused was taken and uploaded to social media, violating section 136 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The court suspended the observer portion of the Zoom proceedings to prevent further violations, emphasizing the seriousness of such acts and the potential for witness intimidation.

To uphold the open court principle, arrangements were made for public observation in a physical courtroom with limited capacity due to COVID-19 protocols and police supervision, while the main proceedings continued virtually.

The defendant, Roberto Suarez Flores, was charged with four counts of assault involving his estranged wife and their two sons.

The court assessed the credibility of all witnesses, noting the particular considerations for young witnesses.

While the court found reasonable doubt regarding the assault charge involving the wife due to conflicting accounts and a potentially coercive message from the wife's nephew, it found the defendant guilty of the three assault charges involving his sons.

These included assaults with a snow brush, a speaker wire, and a haircut tool, with the court accepting the sons' consistent and credible testimony despite minor inconsistencies.

The accused pleaded guilty to four serious offences: making child pornography, possessing child pornography, sexual assault, and counselling a person under 16 to touch her with an object.

The offences involved her very young son and were discovered through international cooperation between American and Canadian authorities.

The Crown sought a long-term offender designation and a sentence of six to eight years.

The defence sought a five-year sentence with no long-term offender order.

The court imposed a six-year sentence (apportioned as 3.5 years for sexual assault concurrent with 3.5 years for invitation to sexual touching, 2.5 years consecutive for making child pornography, and 2 years concurrent for possession of child pornography) and declined to impose a long-term offender designation, finding the accused posed a low risk of reoffending based on psychiatric evidence.

The defendant was convicted of impaired driving, drive over 80, and dangerous driving, and acquitted of fail to remain.

Following conviction, the defendant's new counsel brought an application to reopen the trial to introduce new evidence regarding an alleged sexual assault, potential ineffective assistance of prior counsel, and the defendant's alleged confusion during cross-examination.

The court declined to reopen the trial, finding no merit to the application and emphasizing that the authority to grant a mistrial post-conviction should only be exercised in exceptional circumstances and in the clearest of cases.

The accused entered a guilty plea to possession of a loaded prohibited firearm and possession of methylenedioxyethylvalerone (bath salts) for the purpose of trafficking.

The plea was entered shortly after the Supreme Court of Canada struck down the mandatory minimum sentence in R. v. Nur.

The accused subsequently sought to have the plea struck, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel.

The court struck the plea, but not on the basis of ineffective assistance.

Rather, the court found that the accused did not fully understand the ramifications of entering the plea, particularly that Charter violations could no longer be argued post-plea.

The court noted the accused's tendency to hear what he wanted to hear and the difficulty in assessing his true comprehension of the proceedings.

The accused was charged with sexual interference involving a twelve-year-old girl.

The Crown alleged that the accused intentionally touched the complainant's breast on Danforth Avenue in Toronto.

The court found that while the accused made intentional contact with the complainant, the contact was not for a sexual purpose.

The accused was motivated by frustration with pedestrians not following his perceived rules about sidewalk usage.

The court acquitted the accused of sexual interference, finding no sexual purpose to the contact.

The court also considered whether common assault was an included offence within sexual interference and concluded it was not, as common assault requires lack of consent while sexual interference does not.

The accused was charged with four driving offences: impaired driving, drive over 80, dangerous driving, and fail to remain.

The central issue was whether the accused voluntarily consumed alcohol or whether a drug was surreptitiously placed in her drink, rendering her intoxication involuntary.

The court rejected the accused's evidence that her drink was spiked and found that her alcohol consumption was voluntary.

The court found the accused guilty of impaired operation, drive over 80, and dangerous driving, but acquitted her of fail to remain due to reasonable doubt regarding her intent to escape liability.

The accused was charged with impaired driving, drive over 80, and dangerous driving on December 4, 2011, with the information sworn on January 6, 2012.

Following a trial that spanned over five years, eight months, and two weeks, the accused was convicted on all counts on September 19, 2017.

The accused subsequently brought a section 11(b) application alleging a breach of the right to trial without unreasonable delay.

The court dismissed the application, finding that while the total delay exceeded the 18-month presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan, exceptional circumstances justified the extended timeline, including a change in counsel, the illness of a defence expert, the accused's medical difficulties during cross-examination, a gross underestimation of trial time, and the transitional nature of the case occurring largely under the pre-Jordan legal framework.

Two brothers were jointly charged with possession of cocaine, possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, and possession of proceeds of crime.

Following a preliminary inquiry, the Crown sought committal to trial based on surveillance evidence showing hand-to-hand transactions over two days and the subsequent discovery of drugs and cash at a residence where both accused were found.

The court applied the test for committal in circumstantial cases, examining whether a reasonable jury could draw inferences of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court found sufficient evidence to commit both accused to trial on all three counts.

The Crown charged two accused jointly with two counts of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime, with the first accused facing an additional count.

At a preliminary inquiry, both accused contested committal, arguing insufficient evidence of knowledge and control.

The court applied the test from R v Arcuri, examining circumstantial evidence including extensive police surveillance of hand-to-hand transactions, large quantities of cash and drugs found in a locked apartment, drug paraphernalia, and documentary evidence linking both accused to the premises.

The court found sufficient evidence to commit both accused to trial on the joint possession counts and the first accused on the additional count.

The accused was charged with human trafficking and misrepresentation to immigration authorities under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.

The accused brought a third party records application seeking disclosure of Children's Aid Society records and police records relating to the complainant.

The court determined that the O'Connor regime applied to the CAS records and the Mills regime (section 278) applied to the police records.

The court denied production of the police records as the accused failed to establish they were likely relevant, relying solely on credibility arguments which are insufficient under section 278.3(4).

The court found the CAS records were likely relevant as they were compiled during a joint investigation that led to the charges, and ordered the second stage of the O'Connor test to proceed.

This is a preliminary inquiry decision concerning charges of trafficking in cocaine and possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

The Crown proceeded largely through filed 540(7) materials.

The court applied the test for committal, which requires determining whether there is evidence upon which a reasonably instructed jury could convict beyond a reasonable doubt.

The case involved circumstantial evidence and required careful analysis of inferences that could be properly drawn from the evidence presented.

The accused was charged with impaired operation and drive over 80 after being stopped leaving a parking garage in downtown Toronto.

The accused raised multiple Charter motions challenging the grounds for arrest, delays in administering the approved screening device, delays in providing the breath demand, and violations of the right to counsel of choice.

The court found two Charter breaches: a section 8 breach regarding the failure to provide the breath demand as soon as practicable, and a section 10(b) breach regarding the right to counsel of choice at the station.

However, applying the section 24(2) test from R v Grant, the court admitted the breath evidence.

The court found the accused guilty of impaired operation based on extensive evidence of impairment observed by security and police, as well as video footage.

The accused was charged with three sexual offences involving a 14-year-old complainant.

The alleged incident occurred in the accused's car in an alley after the complainant and accused had consumed cocaine together.

The complainant testified to sexual contact including digital penetration, attempted kissing, and oral sex.

The accused denied all allegations.

The complainant's aunt, who was present in the home at the time, testified that no conversation about the incident occurred between the accused and herself, contradicting the complainant's account.

The court found the accused not guilty of all charges, citing concerns about the complainant's credibility due to her history of dishonesty and the timing of disclosure, combined with the powerful evidence of the aunt regarding the absence of the alleged McDonald's conversation.

GO Transit appealed the dismissal of a charge against the respondent for travelling without a valid ticket on the Lakeshore West Rail contrary to Metrolinx By-law No. 2, section 2.2.

The trial Justice of the Peace dismissed the charge, finding that the prosecution had not proven the essential element of the accused's identification.

The appeal court allowed the appeal, finding that the Justice of the Peace erred in law by effectively nullifying the powers created by section 48.1 of the Provincial Offences Act.

The court held that the certified statement in the certificate of offence, which identified the respondent as the person stopped, constituted proof of that fact in the absence of evidence to the contrary.

A conviction was entered.

The accused pleaded guilty to engaging in securities trading without being registered in violation of the Ontario Securities Act.

She was a hospital file clerk who provided names of new mothers to an investment company representative in exchange for payment, facilitating high-pressure sales tactics targeting vulnerable new parents.

The court imposed a $36,000 fine (plus 25% surcharge totalling $45,000), two years probation, and 300 hours community service, rejecting both the Crown's request for 90 days jail and the defence's request for a $20,000 fine.

The sentence balanced general deterrence principles with the accused's mitigating factors including remorse, guilty plea, no prior record, and rehabilitative efforts.

The Crown sought to call a Detective Constable as an expert witness on covert, coded, and street language to assist in understanding wiretap evidence in a conspiracy to commit robbery case.

The defence challenged the officer's qualifications under the fourth branch of the Mohan test, arguing he could not give impartial evidence and lacked necessary qualifications.

The court admitted the expert evidence, finding the officer capable of satisfying his duty to remain independent and impartial despite being a police officer, and that he possessed sufficient specialized knowledge acquired through thirteen years of police work, including eight years in specialized units dealing with street gangs and coded language.

The defendant pleaded guilty to wilfully and without lawful excuse injuring a dog contrary to section 445(1)(a) of the Criminal Code and failing to comply with a house arrest condition of his recognizance.

The defendant threw his girlfriend's small Yorkshire terrier violently up a flight of stairs, causing bilateral scleral hemorrhage to the dog's eye.

The court imposed a sentence of 60 days custody (already served), three years probation with conditions prohibiting ownership or possession of animals, and a four-year section 447.1 order prohibiting contact with animals.

The court emphasized the defendant's extensive history of violent criminal conduct as the primary aggravating factor.

The accused was charged with assaulting a security guard with intent to resist arrest and possessing hydromorphone, morphine, and marijuana for the purpose of trafficking.

Security guards employed by a private contractor observed the accused and a companion acting suspiciously in a Toronto Parking Authority parking lot and conducted an investigation.

The accused claimed the security guards planted the drugs and breached his Charter rights.

The court found that the Charter does not apply to private security guards, even when employed by a public entity.

The court rejected the accused's credibility regarding both the drug possession and the assault, finding him guilty on all counts.

At a preliminary inquiry, the accused was charged with conspiracy to import heroin from Tanzania and Uganda, importing heroin from Tanzania, and possession of heroin for the purposes of trafficking.

The Crown presented evidence of two intercepted packages containing heroin destined for the accused's address.

While the accused conceded sufficient evidence existed for the possession for trafficking count, the court found insufficient evidence to commit the accused to trial on the importation and conspiracy counts.

The court held that the evidence could not bridge the inferential gap between the accused's knowledge of the package's arrival and his participation in the actual importation process, as no evidence connected him to the arrangements required to bring the drugs across the border.