Kathleen J. Caldwell

The defendant was charged with production of marijuana and related offences.

He applied under section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms to quash search warrants that led to the discovery of marijuana plants.

The defendant held a production license allowing him to produce marijuana for personal medical purposes.

Four search warrants were issued for different units in a warehouse plaza—two licensed units (17 and 18) and two unlicensed units (15 and 16).

The licensed units were authorized for a combined total of 294 plants.

The defendant challenged whether the warrants had sufficient reasonable grounds to believe there was an "overgrow" in the licensed units and whether the unlicensed units were operating as a grow operation.

The court found that after excision and amplification of the Information to Obtain, the warrants were supported by reasonable grounds and dismissed the application.

The Crown charged two accused jointly with possessing cocaine (crack and powder) for the purpose of trafficking, possessing $13,000 in proceeds of crime, and possessing marijuana for the purpose of trafficking.

The accused Ward-Jackson faced additional charges of possession of marijuana for trafficking and possession of $120 as proceeds of crime.

Following a search warrant execution at their residence, the Crown relied on circumstantial evidence to establish possession.

The trial judge found that while residency and bedroom occupancy could be inferred, the Crown failed to establish knowledge and control of the drugs and money beyond a reasonable doubt.

The judge emphasized the critical distinction between evidence and facts, and the necessity of establishing primary facts before drawing further inferences.

The accused pleaded guilty to marijuana production and fraudulent consumption of electricity.

The Crown sought 18 months of incarceration, while the accused sought a conditional sentence.

The court imposed a conditional sentence of two years less one day with strict conditions, including 12 months of house arrest and electronic monitoring.

The court found this was a rare case warranting a conditional sentence despite the sophistication of the grow operation, the accused's prior record, and the aggravating features including a downed live electrical hydro line.

Significant mitigating factors included the accused's cognitive and emotional challenges stemming from a serious assault ten years prior, his willingness to take responsibility and warn police of dangers, and his motivation to earn money for family court litigation.

The accused were jointly charged with possession of cocaine (crack and powder) for the purpose of trafficking, possession of $13,000 as proceeds of crime, and possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking.

The accused brought a directed verdict motion on the joint counts.

The court found sufficient evidence of possession of the cocaine and cash to proceed to trial, but discharged both accused on the marijuana count due to insufficient evidence.

The court applied the test for directed verdicts and analyzed the inferences that could reasonably be drawn from the evidence, including residency, bedroom occupancy, and knowledge and control of the drugs and proceeds.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level exceeding 80 mg per 100 ml of blood.

The Crown's case rested on breathalyzer readings of 118 mg and 110 mg.

The accused raised a bolus drinking defence, arguing that she had consumed most of the alcohol immediately before being stopped and that it had not been fully absorbed into her bloodstream at the time of driving.

The trial judge rejected the accused's evidence regarding the timing and volume of her alcohol consumption, finding her testimony not credible.

The trial judge also found problems with the expert evidence that was based on the accused's account.

The accused was convicted.

In a preliminary inquiry for second-degree murder, the court determined whether sufficient evidence existed to commit the accused to trial for the beating death of a rooming house resident.

The Crown's case was circumstantial, relying on witness testimony, DNA evidence from shoes found at the scene, and circumstantial evidence of the accused's presence and conduct.

The court applied the test for committal, examining whether evidence could support reasonable inferences regarding both the requisite intent and the identity of the perpetrator.

The court found sufficient evidence on both issues to commit the accused to trial.

At a preliminary inquiry into a mass shooting at the Toronto Eaton Centre, the Crown sought committal on two counts of first-degree murder.

The accused was charged with nine counts total, including two counts of first-degree murder and five counts of attempted murder.

The court found that the attempted murder charges should be reduced to aggravated assault, as there was no evidence of specific intent to kill the five survivors.

The central issue was whether there was sufficient evidence to support committal on first-degree murder rather than second-degree murder for the two victims who died.

The court found that motive (revenge for a prior stabbing) combined with the deliberate and calculated nature of the shooting provided sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to infer planning and deliberation.

The accused pleaded guilty to seven "guns and gangs" related offences arising from a specific incident in Hamilton.

The Crown and defence made a joint submission for a 4.5-year sentence but disagreed on pre-trial custody credit.

The court imposed the joint submission of 4.5 years and granted 1.25 days credit for each day served in pre-trial custody (approximately 32 months), resulting in 22 months remaining to be served in the provincial system rather than the penitentiary system.

The accused was charged with mischief, assault on police, obstruction of police, and assault with intent to resist arrest arising from his conduct during a protest at Toronto City Hall against budget cuts.

The Crown called seven police officers; the defence called the accused and two witnesses.

The court found the accused guilty of assault on police (pushing PC Hopkinson) and obstruction of police, but acquitted him of mischief and assault with intent to resist arrest.

The court also dismissed Charter applications alleging breaches of sections 7, 8, and 9 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, finding no unlawful detention, no unreasonable search, and no lost evidence constituting a Charter breach.

The accused was charged with driving while impaired and driving with a blood alcohol level over 80 mg per 100 ml.

The Crown alleged the accused drove to a liquor store while already intoxicated, purchased vodka, and was observed by LCBO employees exhibiting signs of impairment before nearly causing an accident.

The accused contended he consumed alcohol only after arriving home and before police arrived.

The court rejected the accused's evidence as lacking credibility and not raising reasonable doubt.

The court also dismissed Charter applications regarding alleged violations of section 8 (unreasonable search) and section 10(b) (right to counsel) rights.

The accused was found guilty on both charges.

The accused was sentenced for breaching two terms of an eight-year Long Term Supervision Order (LTSO): failing to reside at a designated correctional centre and entering a prohibited county.

The court imposed a six-year sentence, finding the breaches serious given the accused's extensive criminal history, pattern of non-compliance with release conditions, and the link between the breaches and risk of re-offence.

The court applied principles from R v Ipeelee, balancing public protection, rehabilitation, and deterrence while emphasizing that compliance with LTSO terms is essential for both objectives.

The accused was charged with impaired driving after being stopped while driving the wrong way on Adelaide Street West in downtown Toronto with blood alcohol readings of 230 and 232 mg per 100 ml of blood.

The Crown's evidence of impairment was undisputed.

The sole issue was whether the accused possessed the requisite mens rea.

The accused testified that he consumed only two drinks voluntarily and suggested that his unattended drink may have been drugged, causing him to lose cognitive awareness of subsequent alcohol consumption.

The court found that the evidence raised a reasonable doubt regarding whether the impairment resulted from voluntary consumption, and acquitted the accused.

The accused was charged with refusing to provide a breath sample on December 29, 2010.

The Crown alleged that a police officer made a lawful demand for a breath sample under section 254(2) of the Criminal Code, which the accused refused.

The key issues were whether the Crown must prove actual care or control of the vehicle to establish a valid demand, whether the officer had reasonable suspicion to make the demand, and whether the accused possessed the necessary mens rea to commit the offence.

The court found that following 2008 amendments to section 254(2), the officer's reasonable suspicion of care or control is sufficient, not proof of actual care or control.

The officer had reasonable suspicion based on the tow truck driver's identification and the circumstances.

The accused clearly understood the demand and intentionally refused to comply.

The accused was found guilty.

The applicant, a municipal election candidate, failed to file required campaign financial documents by the statutory deadline under the Municipal Elections Act, 1996.

He sought an extension of time to file the documents, but the application itself was brought after the deadline for applying had passed.

The applicant therefore made two applications: first, to extend the time to apply for an extension, and second, to extend the time to file the documents themselves.

The court found strong mitigating circumstances, including good faith efforts to comply, reliance on an accountant who lacked proper qualifications, and the unexpected early birth of the applicant's child during the critical period.

The court granted both applications, finding that the Act should not operate as a trap for the unskilled or unwary.