Stephen T. Goudge

The appellant appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice, arguing the judge lacked jurisdiction and erred in awarding costs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant's consent effectively amended the right to seek the court's assistance under the arbitration agreement, which, along with Rule 14.05, provided ample jurisdiction.

The court found no error in principle in the costs award.

The court issued an endorsement to settle the terms of its orders following an appeal.

The court determined that interest on costs should run from September 29, 2004, the date the costs order was made, rather than the date of the main judgment.

The court declined to alter the trial judge's order regarding carriage of the reference, noting it was not argued and should not be modified absent agreement or if affected by the appeal reasons.

The court also declined to cross-reference the orders in the two separate actions, noting the agreement that there can be no double recovery.

The plaintiffs sued a tour operator and a cruise provider after allegedly contracting an airborne virus on a Caribbean cruise.

The cruise provider appealed a motion judge's decision that Ontario law applied to the action, arguing that the contract specified the law of England, which would bar the claim under the two-year limitation period in the Athens Convention.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the expiration of a limitation period does not constitute an injustice sufficient to override the contractual choice of law or the lex loci delicti rule.

The law of England was declared to apply to the issues between the plaintiffs and the cruise provider.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment that found the parties entered into a contract containing a performance guarantee, which the respondents breached, but limited damages to $1.00.

The appellants argued the trial judge erred by finding a performance guarantee existed despite it not being explicitly pleaded as a term, and by failing to find it unconscionable.

The respondents cross-appealed the trial judge's decision to order the parties to bear their own costs despite a Rule 49.10 offer.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the appeal and the cross-appeal, finding the trial judge's conclusions on the contract terms were supported by the pleadings and evidence, and her discretion on costs was properly exercised.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment regarding an insurance claim for economic loss following a fire.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision to reject a financial planner's letter and his conclusion that the appellant failed to prove economic loss for the period beyond the policy coverage based on tax returns.

The appeal was dismissed with costs fixed at $3,000.

The appellant estate appealed the dismissal of its claim that the respondent husband was unjustly enriched by the operation of his right of survivorship over farm properties held in joint tenancy with his deceased wife.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no absence of juristic reason for the enrichment, as it arose by operation of law and was consistent with the parties' expectations to keep the farm properties together.

Arguments for a constructive trust based on wrongful conduct and proprietary estoppel were also dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault, unlawful confinement, and assault against his wife.

During deliberations, the jury asked to review the testimony of the appellant and the complainant.

The trial judge permitted the jury to watch an unofficial video recording of the trial proceedings in the jury room without counsel present and without controlling which portions were viewed.

The Court of Appeal held this was a fatal error, as responses to jury questions must occur in open court to ensure the accused's right to be present and the judge's control over the proceedings.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment decision finding that the services it provided were real estate services under the Real Estate and Business Brokers Act.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the scope of services to be provided was a matter of factual dispute requiring a trial to determine the precise services and assess them against the legislative language.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment, arguing that the respondent fundamentally breached their contract by failing to invite the appellant to a conference.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's conclusion that the exclusion did not deprive the appellant of substantially the whole benefit of the contract, which was primarily to increase sales through preferred supplier status.

The appellants appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice.

At the hearing, all parties agreed that the appeal was moot, though they disagreed on when it became moot.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as moot and awarded costs of $1,000 to each of the two responding parties.

The plaintiff commenced an action against the defendants for oppression, wrongful dismissal, and breach of contract following his exclusion from the company.

The defendants moved to stay the action in favour of arbitration pursuant to a mandatory arbitration clause in the shareholders' agreement.

The motions judge denied a full stay, finding that some claims fell outside the arbitration clause.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the court had jurisdiction to determine arbitrability, but that all of the plaintiff's claims, including wrongful dismissal and oppression, related to the interpretation or implementation of the agreement and were therefore subject to mandatory arbitration.

The action was stayed.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder in the deaths of a married couple.

On appeal, he argued that the trial judge interfered unduly in the trial, had improper out-of-court contact with the jury, and erred in several evidentiary rulings, including the admission of similar fact evidence and the refusal to order production of third-party records.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the trial judge erred in failing to conduct a proper inquiry into the alleged jury contact, the error did not result in a miscarriage of justice.

The court also upheld the trial judge's evidentiary rulings, noting that the similar fact evidence was highly probative of a distinctive pattern of conduct.

The appellant appealed his conviction for a sexual offence, arguing the trial judge failed to properly apply the W.D. principles and adequately explain the reasons for conviction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge properly applied the law and had ample evidence to convict.

The Crown appealed the sentence, and while the Court agreed the sentence constituted an error in principle, it declined to set it aside as the sentence had already been fully served.

Both the appeal and cross-appeals were dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for having care or control of a motor vehicle with a blood-alcohol level over 80 milligrams.

He argued he had already been acquitted of the offence and that the trial judge erred in finding he had care or control.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the first ground but allowed the appeal on the second.

The Court held that the trial judge's conclusion that opening a passenger door to deposit a bag constituted a risk of danger was unreasonable, as there was no indication the appellant intended to resume driving.

The conviction was set aside and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault by a jury, arguing the verdict was compromised because the jury was not informed of sequestration until five hours into deliberations, and because they returned mixed verdicts on related charges.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reasonable possibility of coercion from the delayed sequestration notice and concluding the verdicts were not irreconcilable.

The court also found no error in the trial judge's instruction on the burden of proof.

The plaintiff pedestrian was injured by a motor vehicle driven without the owner's consent.

She sought a declaration of entitlement to uninsured automobile coverage under the owner's insurance policy.

The insurer argued the claim should be directed to the Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Fund due to a policy exclusion for vehicles operated without consent.

The Court of Appeal allowed the insurer's appeal, holding that the motion judge erred in finding the Insurance Act provided a complete code.

The policy's exclusion clause validly excluded coverage for the plaintiff, leaving her to resort to the Fund.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment, arguing the trial was unfair because their counsel was discharged mid-trial, a mistrial was not declared, and the trial judge relied on the appellant's conduct in court outside the witness box to assess credibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding ample evidence to justify the removal of counsel, no error in proceeding after a two-week adjournment for the appellant to prepare to represent himself, and sufficient additional basis for the trial judge's credibility findings.

The appellant appealed his convictions for unlawful confinement and assault following a judge-alone trial.

The trial judge's decision relied heavily on credibility assessments, ultimately rejecting the appellant's exculpatory evidence.

In doing so, the trial judge misapprehended a crucial piece of the appellant's testimony regarding the complainant's emotional state.

The Court of Appeal applied the test from R. v. Morrissey, finding that the misapprehended evidence played an essential part in the trial judge's reasoning process and adverse credibility finding.

Consequently, the conviction was not based exclusively on the evidence, resulting in a miscarriage of justice.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and invitation to sexual touching involving a nine-year-old complainant.

He argued that the trial judge erred in permitting the complainant to testify under oath, that the verdict was unreasonable, and that the evidence did not support a conviction under section 152 of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's inquiry into the complainant's understanding of an oath, as no objections were raised at trial.

The court also held that the verdict was reasonable and that section 152, interpreted purposively, encompasses a request by an accused to permit him to touch a complainant's private parts.

The appellant appealed his convictions for trafficking cocaine, possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, and possession of proceeds of trafficking.

The Crown conceded that the appeal regarding the proceeds of trafficking should be allowed, and an acquittal was entered on that count.

On the remaining counts, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in assessing police identification evidence, including a 'drive-by' identification.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge did not err in law, did not give improper weight to the police officers' evidence, and properly relied on substantial corroborating evidence.