Stephen T. Goudge

The plaintiff brought a class action alleging that the administration fee charged by the defendant satellite television providers to delinquent subscribers constituted a criminal rate of interest under s. 347 of the Criminal Code.

The motion judge granted summary judgment to the plaintiff.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and dismissed the action.

The Court held that the administration fee was a legitimate estimate of collection costs and was not paid or payable for the advancing of credit, and therefore did not constitute interest under s. 347.

The appellant proceeded by way of power of sale but the Notice of Sale did not reference an obligation under the Agreement of Purchase and Sale.

The respondent tendered the full amount of the debt specified in the Notice of Sale.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's finding that the appellant was bound to deliver the discharge upon tender of the specified amount, as finding otherwise would impermissibly clog the equity of redemption.

The appellant appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice regarding a child protection matter.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal to a limited extent, ordering that the ongoing status review hearing proceed by way of an expedited new trial before a different judge, with the status quo remaining in the interim.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for sexual assault.

He argued the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on the complainant's credibility and by stating that penetration was not relevant to establish sexual assault.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the jury would have understood the evidence relevant to the complainant's credibility and that the trial judge was correct in law regarding penetration.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed as the sentence was not outside the appropriate range.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and sexual interference involving his nieces.

He argued the trial judge erred by failing to consider evidence of collusion and by applying a higher standard of scrutiny to his evidence.

The Court of Appeal found no error regarding the collusion issue but held that the trial judge erred in relying on the appellant's evasive answers to ambiguous and irrelevant questions about whether he found his nieces attractive to reject his testimony.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant home builder appealed a trial judgment dismissing its counterclaim against a developer and its negligence claim against Tarion Warranty Corporation.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal against the developer, finding the trial judge failed to make necessary findings of fact and misapprehended a prior court order, necessitating a new trial.

However, the appeal against Tarion was dismissed, as the appellant's failure to file required financial statements for registration renewal was wilful, and Tarion's refusal to accept the late application was justified under the Ontario New Home Warranties Plan Act.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of a loaded prohibited firearm found in the trunk of his car during a traffic stop.

The motion judge had ruled the search lawful, finding the appellant consented.

The Court of Appeal found the motion judge erred, as the police officer's threat to bring in a canine unit—which he had no lawful authority to do—vitiated the appellant's consent.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered to determine the admissibility of the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The appellant condominium corporation appealed a trial decision regarding the conversion of a commercial building into a residential condominium.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the respondent Lomico was a 'declarant' under the Condominium Act, that a lease of HVAC equipment to the condominium corporation was null and void because the equipment formed part of the common elements, and that the developers breached the construction warranty by failing to substantially renovate the parking garage.

The Court dismissed the developers' cross-appeal, affirming that unit owners have an appurtenant property right to lease parking spaces at market rates.

Damages and market rates were directed to a reference.

The appellant appealed a decision declaring that the arbitration clause in its Alliance Agreement with the respondent did not require a party to file a notice of request to arbitrate with the Arbitration and Mediation Institute of Ontario to commence arbitration.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the application judge erred in his interpretation of the arbitration clause.

The Court held that the standard of review for contractual interpretation in this case was correctness, and that the clear wording of the agreement required the arbitration to be conducted under the 'then-current rules' of the Institute, which mandated filing a notice with the Institute to commence proceedings.

The appellant appealed the judgment of Justice Andra Pollak of the Superior Court of Justice dated April 24, 2008, and the subsequent cost award.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the reasons of the lower court judge and dismissed the appeal, awarding costs to the respondent fixed at $8,000.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder after organizing and leading a coordinated attack on the deceased, during which an associate fatally stabbed the victim.

The appellant admitted to participating in a planned assault but argued he lacked the mens rea for murder.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred by instructing the jury on party liability under s. 21(2) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that s. 21(2) is applicable to render a party guilty of second degree murder where the common unlawful purpose is assault and the accused actually knew that murder would be a probable consequence.

The appellant brought an appeal to the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

On consent of the parties, the court determined that the first level of appeal was properly to the Superior Court of Justice, and an order was made in accordance with the draft order filed.

The respondents were acquitted of operating a commercial motor vehicle in a dangerous or unsafe condition under s. 84(1) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The Crown appealed, arguing that a regulation defining 'critical defects' for the purpose of vehicle impoundment under s. 82.1 should also apply to the offence provision in s. 84(1.1).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the regulation explicitly applies only to s. 82.1 and that the legislature intended a higher threshold of danger for a conviction under s. 84(1.1) than for an impoundment under s. 82.1.

The respondent previously succeeded on an appeal declaring that the parties had entered into an enforceable settlement agreement.

The resulting order included a paragraph directing compliance with the agreement, which the motion judge subsequently interpreted as requiring the appellants to assert their repudiation claim in a new action rather than as an excuse for non-performance.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appellants' appeal, finding that the original panel had not considered the disputed paragraph or its implications for the repudiation claim.

The court set aside the motion judge's order and directed the parties to submit their questions directly to the original panel for clarification.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their application to declare a share valuation null and void, and the granting of the respondents' application to declare the valuation binding.

The appellants argued the valuator acted as an arbitrator and failed to follow an understanding regarding document disclosure.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's findings that the valuator was not an arbitrator and had no contractual obligation to provide the requested documents.

The appeal, including an appeal on costs, was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentence for sexual offences against two complainants.

He argued the trial judge erred in his jury charge regarding the reliability of the complainants' evidence and the standard of evaluation, and that the Crown made improper comments on reasonable doubt during closing submissions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the jury charge was adequate and the Crown's improper comments were cured by the trial judge's instructions.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the prolonged regime of sexual abuse by a parent figure justified the sentence imposed.

The appellant, subject to a s. 161(1)(a) Criminal Code prohibition order preventing him from attending public parks where children under 14 could reasonably be expected to be present, was arrested while working at a fairground.

He appealed his conviction for breaching the order, arguing the paved fairground was not a 'public park'.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that a public park does not require greenery and that the location's recreational use and accessibility to the public, including children, satisfied the definition.

The appellant, bound by a s. 161(1)(a) prohibition order preventing him from attending a public park where children under 14 could reasonably be expected to be present, was arrested while working at a game booth at the Super Ex fair at Lansdowne Park.

He appealed his conviction, arguing that a paved fairground is not a 'public park'.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the definition of 'public park' under s. 161(1)(a) focuses on the recreational activities available to the public and the likelihood of children being present, rather than the physical geography or presence of green space.

The respondent architectural firm produced volumes of blueprints and specifications, which it purchased from a third-party duplicator and distributed to contractors.

The Minister of Finance denied a retail sales tax exemption, arguing the volumes were not 'published' to the general public and were not 'solely' for a technical purpose due to the firm's commercial intent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the Minister's appeal, holding that distribution to a targeted audience satisfies the publication requirement and that the technical purpose is determined by the content of the books, not the producer's commercial intention.

The applicant, whose conviction for first degree murder was set aside and a new trial ordered, sought a review of a decision denying him judicial interim release.

The Court of Appeal found that the application judge erred in denying bail on the secondary and tertiary grounds.

Given the applicant's previous compliance with bail conditions for five and a half years, his age, the weakness of the Crown's case, and the presumption of innocence, the Court concluded that his detention was not necessary for public safety or to maintain confidence in the administration of justice.

The application for release was granted.