Joseph Romano De Luca

The appellants were convicted of possession of firearms found in a vehicle but acquitted of possessing over-capacity magazines.

They appealed their convictions on multiple grounds, including inconsistent verdicts, improper jury instructions, and Charter violations.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding the verdicts reconcilable and the jury instructions proper.

The court also dismissed one appellant's sentence appeal, upholding his nine-year sentence due to his persistent criminality and prior firearms convictions.

The appellant appealed an order of the Ontario Review Board detaining him in a medium security facility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board's determination that the appellant posed a significant threat to public safety and that detention was the least onerous and least restrictive disposition was reasonable based on the evidence.

The appellants appealed their convictions for second degree murder, and one appellant appealed his sentence.

The victim was killed by a group of assailants who mistakenly believed he was their intended target.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding no reversible errors in the trial judge's instructions on reasonable doubt, the right to disagree, mistaken identity, or the defence of abandonment.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, upholding the 17-year parole ineligibility period due to the brutal nature of the murder.

The appellant was found guilty of domestic assault and sought a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter, arguing his s. 9 rights were violated by a police policy of routinely detaining those charged with domestic violence.

The trial judge found a Charter breach but refused a stay, instead granting enhanced pre-trial custody credit.

The summary conviction appeal judge dismissed the appeal.

The Court of Appeal refused leave to appeal, finding no error in the lower courts' discretionary choice of remedy and noting the police policy had been properly denounced.

The appellant appealed a 2008 disposition of the Ontario Review Board, which ordered his continued detention in a medium security ward.

The Court of Appeal found ample evidence to support the Board's conclusion that the appellant remained a significant threat to public safety.

The Court declined to remit the matter for the imposition of conditions, finding the issue moot because the Board was already conducting a multifaceted hearing that would address the appellant's current circumstances and conditions.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of attempting to obstruct justice and breach of recognizance after allegedly dissuading a witness from testifying by suggesting he obtain a false doctor's note.

The indictment was particularized to allege dissuasion 'by a threat or other corrupt means'.

The trial judge found the suggestion of a false doctor's note constituted the corrupt means.

On appeal, the majority held that the false doctor's note was not the means of dissuasion, but rather the fear of cross-examination on a prior fraud.

Because the Crown failed to prove the particularized means, and amending the indictment on appeal would prejudice the appellant, the appeal was allowed and acquittals entered.

Blair J.A. dissented, finding the false doctor's note was an integral part of the corrupt means of dissuasion.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittals on drug and gun charges, arguing the trial judge erred in excluding evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The trial judge had found that the police breached the respondent's s. 10(b) rights by asking an officer safety question after he requested counsel, which led to the discovery of marijuana and a gun in the trunk.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge committed material errors in his s. 24(2) analysis, including failing to consider the respondent's own testimony, the reason for the delay in the search, and the context of the officer safety question.

The appeal was allowed, the acquittals set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant was convicted of robbery with a firearm and related weapons offences following a home invasion, and was sentenced to 12 years' imprisonment.

He appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing that his sentence offended the parity principle because his co-accused received a 5-year sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's assessment of witness credibility.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the disparity was justified by the co-accused's early guilty plea and the appellant's extensive criminal record for violent offences.

The Crown moved to quash an appeal from a Not Criminally Responsible (NCR) verdict on a dual procedure offence.

The matter originally started as a fitness hearing and proceeded without an election by the Crown or the accused as to the mode of trial, and without arraignment or plea.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion to quash, finding that it could not be presumed the Crown proceeded summarily.

Given the procedural flaws, the Crown conceded the appeal must be allowed.

The NCR verdict was set aside and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge erred in assessing the complainant's credibility and improperly curtailed cross-examination.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's credibility assessment was sound and entitled to deference, and noting that defence counsel had agreed to use a written transcript instead of playing the complainant's video statement.

The sentence appeal was dismissed as moot.

The appellant was convicted of obstructing police in two separate incidents after being stopped while driving an uninsured vehicle.

In both instances, he interfered with police efforts to impound the vehicle and, in one case, to seize his licence plate.

On appeal, he argued the police lacked statutory or common law authority to impound an uninsured vehicle, meaning they were not acting in the lawful execution of their duties.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that while no express statutory power exists, police have common law authority under the Waterfield/Dedman test to impound uninsured vehicles to protect public safety and control traffic.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for defrauding the public of over $3 million in income tax and GST payments.

He argued that no fraud occurred because no false income tax returns were actually filed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant caused false GST returns to be filed and that his deliberate failure to file income tax returns, combined with creating false records, imperilled the public purse and constituted a risk of deprivation.

The sentence of six years' imprisonment and a $2,000,000 fine was upheld as fit.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence of seven months' imprisonment for sexual offences against a child.

He argued the trial judge erred by admitting hearsay statements without a voir dire, applying uneven scrutiny to the evidence, and prematurely terminating the cross-examination of the child witness.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the admission of evidence, the assessment of credibility, or the trial judge's decision to stop cross-examination due to the witness's distress.

The sentence was also upheld as fit.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual interference involving a young girl who lived next door.

He argued the trial judge failed to consider the implausibility of the complainant's evidence and applied a harsher standard of scrutiny to the defence evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge carefully reviewed the evidence, reasonably believed the complainant, and applied the same level of scrutiny to all witnesses.

The Crown appealed a sentence of 90 days' intermittent custody imposed on the respondent for two counts of sexual interference involving a young child.

The Crown argued the trial judge placed too little weight on aggravating factors and that the sentence was demonstrably unfit.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that while the sentence was at the low end of the range, the trial judge did not err in principle and the sentence was not demonstrably unfit.

The young person appealed findings of guilt on two counts of sexual assault involving two child complainants.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in assessing credibility, considering collusion, and applying the W.(D.) framework.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge adequately scrutinized the evidence and properly rejected collusion.

Although the trial judge erred at the second step of the W.(D.) analysis by asking if the appellant's evidence 'could not reasonably be true', the Court applied the curative proviso, concluding the Crown's case was overwhelming and the rejected evidence could not have left a reasonable doubt.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of robbery, unlawful confinement, and other offences arising from a home invasion.

The Crown alleged she acted as an aider or formed a common intention with the principals under s. 21(2) of the Criminal Code.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge's jury instructions were confusing and failed to explain the essential elements of the offences.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding the instructions failed to link the general principles of party liability to the specific offences charged and improperly commingled the alternative grounds of liability.

The appeal was allowed, convictions quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentence of 10.5 years for historical sexual offences against five young female victims over a 25-year period.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in using hearsay evidence of prior consistent statements and misapplied evidence in evaluating his credibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, noting the appellant was bound by trial counsel's strategic concession regarding the hearsay evidence.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the sentence appropriately reflected the appellant's moral blameworthiness and breach of trust.

The appeal was allowed on consent regarding one summary conviction count, which was quashed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and sexual interference involving his nieces.

He argued the trial judge erred by failing to consider evidence of collusion and by applying a higher standard of scrutiny to his evidence.

The Court of Appeal found no error regarding the collusion issue but held that the trial judge erred in relying on the appellant's evasive answers to ambiguous and irrelevant questions about whether he found his nieces attractive to reject his testimony.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his robbery conviction, arguing his s. 10(b) Charter right to counsel was violated when police questioned him after he asked to speak to a specific lawyer.

The trial judge found the appellant was eager to tell his story and only wanted to ensure his lawyer was available for his bail hearing the next day.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings, concluding the appellant was not interested in consulting counsel before speaking to the police and therefore his rights were not violated.

The appeal was dismissed.