John H. Hale

The court issued a costs endorsement following an appeal.

The respondent on appeal sought costs of $8,218.80.

The court noted that the respondent's offer to settle was reasonable and less favourable than the final outcome.

However, balancing this with the reasonable expectations of the parties and the factors under Rule 57, the court found the claimed amount excessive.

Costs were awarded to the respondent in the amount of $6,500 for fees, plus HST and disbursements.

Following an appeal, the successful respondent sought costs.

The court considered the respondent's reasonable offers to settle, which were less favourable than the final outcome, alongside the Rule 57 factors.

Finding the claimed amount of $8,218.80 excessive, the court fixed costs at $6,500 for fees plus HST and $386.46 for disbursements.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court decision awarding the respondent $5,000 in general damages and $3,000 in punitive damages following an altercation at a hockey arena.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in finding he acted out of revenge, in rejecting his claim of self-defence, and in the damages awarded.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding ample evidence to support the trial judge's conclusions that the appellant was motivated by revenge and was not acting in self-defence, and that the damages awards were appropriate and supported by the evidence.

The appellant, David Simms, appealed a Small Claims Court decision that found him liable for damages.

The appeal raised four issues: whether the trial judge erred in finding the appellant's conduct was motivated by revenge for his son, whether the judge erred in rejecting the defence of self-defence, and appeals against the awards of punitive damages ($3000) and general damages ($5000).

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's conclusions on any of the issues, as they were supported by evidence.

The appellant appealed his convictions for two counts of sexual assault, arguing he was denied a fair trial due to ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

He alleged his counsel failed to cross-examine the complainant on certain text messages and conducted a perfunctory examination-in-chief.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that counsel's decision not to use the text messages was a deliberate tactical decision within the range of reasonable professional assistance.

Furthermore, the appellant failed to demonstrate prejudice, as the text messages largely corroborated the complainant's account.

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault following a physical altercation at a restaurant where he placed the victim in a headlock, causing the victim to lose consciousness and hit his head.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge's jury instructions on consent were inadequate and that the proceedings should have been stayed due to appellate delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal held that while s. 11(b) does not apply to appellate delay, the trial judge failed to adequately relate the evidence to the law of consent, potentially leading the jury to believe the victim had to consent to every specific act for the defence to apply.

The conviction was set aside and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his sentence, seeking corrections to clerical errors on the warrant of committal and adjustments to his pre-sentence custody credit.

The Crown conceded errors in the recorded sentence and the calculation of 2012 pre-sentence custody.

The Court of Appeal corrected these errors and applied the Summers framework to grant 1.5:1 credit for the appellant's pre-sentence custody, noting that the 1:1 limit under s. 719(3.1) did not apply because the Crown had not proceeded with a bail revocation application under s. 524(8).

The appeal was allowed and the warrant of committal amended.

The Crown appealed the sentence of three years less a day imposed on the respondent for 36 offences, including assault, assault with a weapon, and criminal harassment, committed against two domestic partners.

The trial judge had improperly credited the respondent with one year for 133 days of pre-sentence custody based on an unsupported Charter breach.

The Court of Appeal found the original sentence manifestly unfit given the serious aggravating factors, including assaults on pregnant victims and blatant disregard for probation orders.

The appeal was allowed and the sentence was increased to 4.5 years' imprisonment.

The Crown appealed two summary conviction decisions declining to impose the mandatory victim surcharge after relying on an earlier Ontario Court of Justice decision finding the provision unconstitutional.

The appeal turned on whether the Ontario Court of Justice could effectively apply that prior ruling without giving the Crown meaningful opportunity to make submissions on the constitutional issue.

The court held that although formal notice need not be required in every recurring case, the Crown must still receive sufficient opportunity to argue the validity of the legislation.

Because that procedural fairness requirement was not met, the waivers were set aside and the matters were remitted for a proper hearing.

The appellant appealed his convictions for break and enter, dangerous driving, failing to stop for police, and mischief.

He argued the trial judge erred in relying on eyewitness identification, that he was not being 'pursued' by police when boxed in, and that there was no mens rea for mischief when he reversed into a police cruiser.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly assessed the reliability of the identification evidence, correctly interpreted 'pursuit' to include the police's actions to capture him, and reasonably inferred recklessness for the mischief charge.

The appellant appealed historical sexual offence convictions arising from abuse alleged to have occurred more than 30 years earlier.

The principal issue was whether the trial judge erred in dismissing a pre-trial application for a stay based on unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The court reallocated portions of the delay, found approximately 26 months of institutional and Crown delay, and held that although actual prejudice was not established, significant prejudice had to be inferred from the length of the delay and the inadequate justification for it.

Balancing the appellant’s Charter interests against the strong societal interest in a trial on the merits, the court concluded that a stay should have been ordered.

The evidentiary complaints about the recorded police interview were rejected.

The appellant sought leave to appeal sentence for manslaughter arising from the fatal stabbing of his common law spouse in the context of prior domestic abuse and a no-association order.

The Court of Appeal held that, although it did not agree with the sentencing judge's use of the phrase 'aggravated manslaughter', that terminology did not lead to error and the 12-year penitentiary sentence was fit on the facts.

The court also declined to interfere with the one-for-one credit granted for 632 days of pre-sentence custody, noting the issue had not been raised at trial or in the factum.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the sentence appeal was dismissed.

The court addressed a constitutional challenge to the victim surcharge provision in the Criminal Code.

The Crown argued that a prior declaration of unconstitutionality made by the judge in R. v. Michael was not available to be applied in the present case unless a new Charter application was brought.

The judge rejected the Crown's position and held that provincial court judges have the power to issue declarations of invalidity under s.52 of the Constitution Act, and that such declarations have persuasive precedential value in subsequent cases.

The judge concluded that the victim surcharge was unconstitutional as cruel and unusual punishment and declined to impose it.

The applicant, convicted of 36 counts related to domestic violence against two former partners, sought an extension of time to file an appeal and judicial interim release pending his appeal of conviction and sentence.

The Crown consented to the extension of time.

On the issue of bail, the chambers judge applied the test under s. 679(3) of the Criminal Code.

While the applicant would surrender into custody, the judge found the grounds of appeal were weak and the public interest favoured immediate enforcement of the sentence given the serious nature of the domestic violence offences, the applicant's history of breaching probation, and his high risk to re-offend.

The application for bail pending appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed sentence after convictions for break and enter, assault, threats, wounding by stabbing, and breach of release conditions arising from a violent residential break-in.

He argued that the sentencing judge erred by not quantifying presentence custody credit, over-emphasized his extensive criminal record, and imposed an unfit sentence outside the proper range.

The Court of Appeal held that, for a pre-Truth in Sentencing Act charge, failure to express an arithmetic formula for credit was not an error in principle where the sentencing judge clearly took harsh dead time into serious account.

Given the grave facts, lasting harm to the victim, the appellant's entrenched recidivism, and the need for denunciation, deterrence, and public protection, the effective sentence was held to be within range and fit.

The appellant appealed a criminal conviction, arguing that the trial judge's reasons were inadequate.

The court held that the reasons clearly explained why the verdict was reached, addressed both the appellant's denial and the complainant's evidentiary frailties, and permitted meaningful appellate review.

The court also found no material misapprehension of the evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The youth appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge provided inadequate reasons and erred in admitting a hearsay statement.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding the trial judge's reasons were too brief to reveal the basis for resolving conflicting evidence.

Furthermore, the hearsay statement lacked reliability, as the declarant had a motive to fabricate and the evidence required cross-examination.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered, subject to the Crown's discretion given the appellant had almost completed his probation.

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault following an altercation at a restaurant where he placed the victim in a headlock, resulting in the victim falling and suffering a severe brain injury.

At trial, the judge refused to leave the defence of consent to the jury, instructing them that consent is not a defence to aggravated assault.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred, as consent is only vitiated if the accused both intended to cause serious bodily harm and actually caused it.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The offender was convicted of possession of a large quantity of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking after police discovered approximately 29 pounds in the trunk of his vehicle during a highway stop.

The defence sought a conditional sentence or, alternatively, an intermittent custodial sentence followed by probation, emphasizing the offender’s role as a single parent and the passage of time since prior offences.

The Crown sought a custodial sentence of 12–15 months given the offender’s prior trafficking convictions and the substantial value of the drugs.

The court held that denunciation and deterrence were the primary sentencing objectives and that a conditional sentence was inappropriate for a repeat offender involved with a large quantity of drugs.

A custodial sentence of nine months’ imprisonment followed by two years’ probation was imposed.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a summary conviction appeal decision that upheld his conviction.

The sole ground of appeal was that the trial judge applied uneven scrutiny to his evidence compared to the complainant's evidence.

The Court of Appeal denied leave, finding that the appellant failed to meet the test for leave and that the argument had little merit.