J. Douglas Cunningham

The applicants sought judicial review of the Minister of the Environment's approval of Terms of Reference for an environmental assessment regarding a proposed landfill expansion.

The core issue was the interpretation of section 6.1(3) of the Environmental Assessment Act, specifically whether the phrase 'other than' meant 'in addition to' or 'different from' the standard requirements.

The Divisional Court held that 'other than' means 'in addition to', requiring the proponent to fulfill the comprehensive environmental assessment requirements listed in section 6.1(2).

The Minister's decision approving the Terms of Reference was quashed.

The defendant insurer appealed an order granting a mandatory interlocutory injunction that required it to pay periodic disability benefits to the plaintiff pending trial.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal and set aside the order, finding that the motions judge erred in concluding the plaintiff would suffer irreparable harm.

The Court held that social stigma, loss of dignity, and potential loss of residence were not supported by the evidence as constituting irreparable harm in this context, and that the policy did not provide for ongoing future benefits without proof of continuing disability.

The plaintiff, who claimed to suffer from chronic fatigue syndrome, was denied long-term disability benefits by the defendant insurer.

The plaintiff commenced an action and successfully moved for a mandatory interlocutory injunction requiring the insurer to pay periodic disability benefits and arrears until trial.

The insurer appealed.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal and set aside the injunction, finding that the motions judge erred in concluding the plaintiff would suffer irreparable harm.

The majority held that the plaintiff's financial hardship and potential loss of dignity did not constitute irreparable harm, as damages would be an adequate remedy if the plaintiff succeeded at trial.

The appellant vendor appealed a decision dismissing her application regarding the adjustment of two RRAP forgivable mortgages on the closing of a real estate transaction.

The application judge had interpreted the agreement of purchase and sale within its four corners, finding no ambiguity, and refused to consider extrinsic evidence from the vendor's agent.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that Rule 14.05(3)(d) is limited to the interpretation of a written instrument and the application judge correctly excluded extrinsic evidence where the agreement was unambiguous and contained an entire agreement clause.

The applicant, a non-custodial parent, sought access to his son's medical records through the Ontario Human Rights Commission, alleging discrimination on the basis of family or marital status.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application for judicial review, holding that the Commission lacks jurisdiction to usurp the Family Court's role in determining parental access rights.

The court found no discrimination and upheld the tribunal's procedural fairness, awarding $1,000 in costs to the Commission.

The Registrar of Motor Vehicle Dealers appealed a decision of the Ontario Licence Appeal Tribunal, which ordered the Registrar to grant a registration with conditions to the respondent.

The issue was whether the Tribunal applied the proper test in determining whether the Registrar's proposal to revoke registration should be carried out.

The Divisional Court found that the Tribunal correctly identified and applied the test from Brenner v. Ontario, which asks whether past conduct affords reasonable grounds for belief that the applicant will not carry on business in accordance with law and with integrity and honesty.

The court held that it could not interfere with the Tribunal's exercise of discretion unless it was clearly wrong, and dismissed the appeal.

The applicant union sought judicial review of an Arbitration Board's decision regarding whether the union was entitled to grieve a matter as a union grievance.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Board's disposition of the issue was not patently unreasonable and reflected a careful analysis of the collective agreement.

The appellant wife appealed a trial judgment fixing time-limited spousal support at $550 per month.

The wife, who was qualified in Early Childhood Education, refused to seek employment in her field, instead pursuing a lengthy and unrealistic educational program to become a teacher.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle in the time limit, as the husband should not bear the costs of an unrealistic educational program.

The quantum was also upheld, as the parties were in similar after-tax positions and the wife had exclusive possession of the matrimonial home.

The respondent, an 80-year-old woman, slipped and fell on an icy municipal sidewalk after disembarking from a city transit bus.

She sued the appellant city in both negligence and breach of contract.

The trial judge found the negligence claims statute-barred but allowed the contract claim, holding that section 266 of the Insurance Act did not preclude it.

On appeal, the Divisional Court held that while section 266 does not automatically foreclose genuine actions in contract where a motor vehicle is merely incidental, the respondent's claim was essentially a disguised negligence claim.

As there was no independent contractual obligation imposing liability, the action was statute-barred and the appeal was allowed.

The appellant housing co-operative appealed a decision dismissing its application to evict the respondent for breaching its lock and pet by-laws.

The trial judge had dismissed the application on the basis that the by-laws were unreasonable.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence and erred in principle by failing to defer to the democratically enacted by-laws of the co-operative.

The Court held that absent bad faith or overwhelming unreasonableness, courts should not substitute their views for those of a co-operative's membership.

The appellant appealed an order made on a motion to transfer an action to the Small Claims Court.

The motion judge had ordered that the successful party at trial would have their costs of the action to the date of transfer in the cause.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal and set aside the order, finding that the motion judge lacked jurisdiction under the Courts of Justice Act to order costs payable in another court or to fetter the discretion of the Small Claims Court trial judge regarding costs.