Jason Emile Bogle

The plaintiff brought an urgent motion for a Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL) on a property she had an Agreement of Purchase and Sale (APS) for, which the defendant was attempting to sell to a third party.

The transaction had failed to close due to disputes over extension requests.

The court considered the equitable factors for granting a CPL, including the uniqueness of the land, the plaintiff's intentions, the adequacy of damages as a remedy, and the plaintiff's diligence in prosecuting the claim.

The court found the plaintiff's evidence on uniqueness and intent vague and concluded that the plaintiff had not prosecuted the claim with reasonable diligence.

The motion for a CPL was dismissed, and the plaintiff's alternative request for payment of sale proceeds into court was also denied.

The appellant appealed his summary conviction for impaired driving, arguing the trial judge made a W.(D.) error in assessing credibility.

The trial judge had rejected the appellant's exculpatory evidence as 'not believable' and accepted the police officer's evidence where it conflicted with the appellant's.

The Superior Court of Justice found that the trial judge failed to apply the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt to the credibility contest, improperly treating it as an either/or choice between the two versions of events.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered.

The plaintiffs, former executives of the Durham College student association (DCSI), sued Durham College and DCSI following their termination by DCSI.

Durham College brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the claims against it, arguing it had no involvement in the termination and owed no duty to supervise DCSI's employment relationships.

The court granted the motion, finding that the governing legislation prohibited Durham College from interfering with DCSI's normal activities, precluding any duty of care.

The court also dismissed the plaintiffs' claims for negligent misrepresentation, intentional infliction of mental distress, specific performance, and discrimination due to lack of evidence and insufficient pleadings.

This decision concerns the costs of a motion where Dynacare Gamma Laboratory Partnership successfully moved to strike Stedfasts Inc.'s Amended Statement of Claim for non-compliance with the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Dynacare sought $9,972.52 in costs, which the court found fair and reasonable.

Stedfasts Inc. "shamelessly" requested $13,544.25 for its purported success or, alternatively, no costs, and accused Dynacare of bad faith, which the court dismissed.

The court awarded Dynacare its requested costs, emphasizing the reasonableness of their claim given Stedfasts' repeated non-compliant pleadings.

The defendant brought a motion to strike the plaintiff's Revised Amended Statement of Claim for non-compliance with the rules of pleading.

The court found that many paragraphs contained evidence or irrelevant allegations rather than material facts.

Instead of striking the pleading without leave to amend, the court conducted a paragraph-by-paragraph analysis, striking the non-compliant paragraphs and assembling the remaining compliant paragraphs into a new Amended Statement of Claim, which the plaintiff was granted leave to deliver.

The defendant was successful on a motion to strike the plaintiff's amended statement of claim in its entirety, with leave granted to the plaintiff to plead a claim for breach of contract.

The defendant sought partial indemnity costs of $9,929.48.

The plaintiff, despite being unsuccessful, sought costs of $12,966.56, arguing it achieved substantial success by being granted leave to amend.

The court rejected the plaintiff's argument, finding no special circumstances to justify awarding costs against the successful party.

The court awarded the defendant its requested costs of $9,929.49, payable in any event of the cause.

The defendant brought a motion to strike the plaintiff's Amended Statement of Claim in its entirety.

The plaintiff, a courier service, sued the defendant medical laboratory for various claims including negligence, unjust enrichment, and breach of contract following the termination of their contract.

The court found the pleading to be a gross violation of the rules of pleading, as it contained evidence, was vague, and included untenable claims.

The court struck the Amended Statement of Claim in its entirety but granted the plaintiff leave to deliver a Fresh as Amended Statement of Claim confined solely to a cause of action for breach of contract.

The plaintiff brought a motion for leave to amend the statement of claim to add new causes of action for specific performance and rescission.

The defendants opposed the amendments, arguing they were statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court found that the plaintiff failed to rebut the statutory presumption of discoverability, as there was no evidence establishing when the plaintiff actually discovered the claims.

The opposed amendments were denied as statute-barred or untenable, while unopposed amendments were granted.

The defendants were awarded costs of the motion and costs thrown away for an aborted examination for discovery.

This endorsement addresses the issue of costs following the dismissal of the plaintiffs' action for damages arising from an arrest.

The defendants, as the successful parties, sought costs.

The plaintiffs argued against a cost award, citing divided success, public interest litigation, and access to justice concerns.

The court rejected these arguments, affirming the general principle that costs follow the event.

While finding the defendants entitled to costs, the court declined to impose joint and several liability on both plaintiffs, instead apportioning costs separately.

The total amount of costs awarded was significantly reduced from the amount sought by the defendants, emphasizing proportionality and reasonableness, particularly given the case's initial designation as a simplified procedure action.

The plaintiff brought a civil action against the Toronto Police Services Board and individual officers, alleging they used excessive force during his arrest and were negligent in his subsequent detention.

The plaintiff claimed he was severely beaten without warning, while the police testified they executed a controlled take-down after he resisted arrest.

The court found the police officers' evidence credible and reliable, concluding that the force used was necessary, justified, and not excessive under section 25(1) of the Criminal Code.

The court also dismissed the plaintiff's claims of negligence and breach of fiduciary duty, ultimately dismissing the action in its entirety.

The Attorney General of Ontario brought a motion for an order compelling answers to undertakings, refusals, and questions taken under advisement from Huddy Conserve in the context of a civil forfeiture application under the Civil Remedies Act, 2001.

The application sought forfeiture of $53,990.00 in Canadian currency found in Mr. Conserve's home, alleged to be proceeds or instruments of unlawful activity (e.g., undeclared income, proceeds of crime, drug trafficking).

Mr. Conserve claimed legitimate ownership, having saved the funds over his working life.

The court found the requested information relevant to Mr. Conserve's financial means and the legitimacy of the funds, and ordered him to provide the answers and documents, emphasizing the "best efforts" requirement for disclosure.

The accused, Hassan Abdulle, sought a stay of proceedings under sections 9, 11(b), and 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging unreasonable delay in bringing his case to trial.

The total delay was calculated at 19-20 months, well below the 30-month presumptive ceiling for Superior Court matters established in R. v. Jordan.

The court applied the Jordan framework, requiring the defence to demonstrate both "meaningful steps that demonstrate a sustained effort to expedite the proceedings" and that the matter "took markedly longer than it reasonably should have." The court found that the defence did not take sufficient sustained steps beyond merely requesting earlier dates and did not waive any procedural steps.

Furthermore, considering the complexity of securing witness testimony and the multiple charges, the court concluded the matter had not taken "markedly longer than it should have." The application for a stay was dismissed.

In a blended voir dire, the Crown sought to admit the accused's confessions regarding two armoured truck robberies, while the accused sought their exclusion under the Charter.

The court found the statements were voluntary and dismissed claims of arbitrary detention and initial right to counsel breaches.

However, the court found a s. 10(b) breach occurred when police failed to re-advise the accused of his right to counsel after questioning shifted to a separate, earlier robbery, which significantly changed his jeopardy.

Statements regarding the earlier robbery were excluded under s. 24(2).

The plaintiff's action against police defendants, alleging Charter breaches, negligent investigation, falsified evidence, and assault, was dismissed after a lengthy trial where the plaintiff failed to prove any allegations and was found to be an incredible witness.

The defendants, as the successful parties, sought partial indemnity costs.

The court, applying Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, considered the seriousness of the plaintiff's unsubstantiated allegations and his conduct in forcing a lengthy trial.

The court awarded the defendants partial indemnity costs in the amount of $367,704.87, finding the request fair and reasonable.

Following a successful motion by the plaintiff, the parties submitted written arguments regarding costs.

The defendant insurer sought costs against the plaintiff's counsel personally for allegedly unnecessary court appearances.

The court declined to award costs against counsel personally but significantly reduced the plaintiff's costs award to $1,750 due to the plaintiff's responsibility for delay and unnecessary expense.

The plaintiff sued the police for negligent investigation, assault and battery, misfeasance of public office, and conversion of property following his arrest on drug trafficking charges that were later stayed.

The plaintiff alleged the police relied on fabricated information to obtain wiretap authorizations and used excessive force during his arrest, causing severe injuries including deep vein thrombosis.

The court dismissed the action in its entirety, finding the wiretap authorizations were validly issued based on reasonable grounds and the police did not breach their duty of care.

The court also rejected the plaintiff's claims of excessive force, finding his injuries were minor, his testimony lacked credibility, and his severe medical issues were pre-existing.

The accused, charged with attempted murder and robbery, sought a bail review after being detained by a justice of the peace.

He argued the justice of the peace erred in law and that a new plan of release constituted a material change in circumstances.

The Superior Court found no procedural unfairness or error of law in the initial hearing, noting the strong Crown case on the tertiary ground.

The court also rejected the new plan of release, finding the proposed sureties unsuitable due to evasiveness and inability to properly supervise the accused.

The application for bail review was dismissed.

The accused brought a Garofoli application alleging a s. 8 Charter breach and seeking to exclude evidence obtained through a search warrant.

As a preliminary step, they sought leave to cross-examine the affiant and several sub-affiant police officers regarding the Information to Obtain supporting the warrant.

The court reviewed the governing test from Garofoli and Pires and emphasized that cross-examination is permitted only where it is reasonably likely to assist in determining whether the issuing justice had sufficient grounds.

Most proposed areas of questioning were rejected as speculative, irrelevant, or risking disclosure of confidential informant identities.

Limited cross-examination was permitted on specific issues relating to informant independence, the meaning of “successful result” in relation to informant compensation, certain TPS disclosure materials, and errors in the ITO.

The applicants, charged with multiple drug trafficking offences, brought an application under s 11(b) of the Charter alleging unreasonable delay.

The total delay from arrest to the anticipated end of trial was approximately 39 months.

The court applied the Morin framework, attributing much of the delay to inherent time requirements and defence actions, calculating institutional delay at just over 16 months.

Finding minimal prejudice to the applicants' liberty and fair trial rights, the court concluded the balance favoured society's interest in a trial on the merits and dismissed the stay application.

Three accused persons charged with possession for the purpose of trafficking under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act brought a Charter application alleging violation of their s. 11(b) right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The Crown laid four counts of possession for the purpose of trafficking against each accused involving cocaine, MDMA, methamphetamine, and marijuana.

The case was initially commenced in Toronto but was transferred to Brampton where the offences occurred.

The preliminary inquiry commenced on April 14, 2015, but collapsed after the Crown received analysis certificates showing the alleged methamphetamine was not a controlled substance.

The Crown amended the charges to reduce cocaine and MDMA to simple possession and elected to proceed summarily.

The court found the Crown failed to act diligently in preparing its case, failed to disclose critical certificates in a timely manner, and caused unnecessary delay through improper venue selection.

The total delay of approximately 22 months, comprising 7.5 months of institutional delay and 6.5 months of Crown delay, exceeded the Morin guidelines of 8 to 10 months for provincial court matters.

The court found the accused suffered actual prejudice through stress and anxiety from facing unmeritorious trafficking charges for an extended period, increased legal fees, and restrictions on liberty.

A stay of proceedings was granted.