Ian R. Smith

The plaintiff commenced an action for damages arising from a motor vehicle accident within the two-year limitation period.

More than six years after the accident, she successfully moved to add family members as plaintiffs to assert derivative claims under the Family Law Act.

The defendant appealed, arguing the derivative claims were statute-barred because they must follow the limitation period of the principal claim.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that as long as the principal action was commenced in time, each derivative claimant is entitled to have their limitation period determined separately based on the discoverability principle under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The appellant insurer appealed a motion judge's decision dismissing its motion for summary judgment.

The respondent had received disability benefits after an accident but returned to work full-time for over six months before going off work again following an MRI.

The insurer denied the resumption of benefits based on the 'Recurrent Disability' clause in the policy.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding the policy language clear and unambiguous, and held that the motion judge erred in law by concluding a trial was necessary to interpret the policy in light of the MRI.

Summary judgment was granted dismissing the action.

The appellant wife appealed a trial judgment regarding child support, spousal support, unjust enrichment, and costs.

She argued the trial judge was biased, erred in apportioning child support with the biological father, improperly limited spousal support to 9 years despite her disability, and wrongly dismissed her constructive trust claim.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal on all grounds, finding no error in the trial judge's exercise of discretion, needs and means analysis, or application of the test for unjust enrichment.

The tenant appealed an eviction order and a subsequent order denying his request for review.

The tenant had arrived 20 minutes late to the eviction hearing due to traffic, and the Board proceeded in his absence.

The Board later denied his request for review, making an adverse credibility finding without conflicting evidence.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the Board erred in law by failing to conduct the mandatory review under s. 83(2) of the Residential Tenancies Act, 2006, and denied the tenant natural justice.

The orders were set aside and the matter remitted for a rehearing.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Licence Appeal Tribunal that ordered the Registrar of Motor Vehicles to suspend its Commercial Vehicle Operator's Registration for 14 days.

The appellant argued the Tribunal applied the wrong legal test under s. 47(1)(f) of the Highway Traffic Act by focusing on punishment rather than future safety.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Tribunal reasonably balanced the appellant's poor safety record against its recent remedial efforts, and that the sanction was necessary for public safety.

The appellant sought to appeal a decision of a Superior Court judge who had dismissed his appeals from two Small Claims Court decisions.

The respondent raised a preliminary issue regarding jurisdiction.

The Divisional Court agreed it lacked jurisdiction, noting that the Superior Court judge was hearing appeals, not a motion.

Consequently, the proper route of appeal was to the Court of Appeal with leave under section 6(1)(a) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The appeal was dismissed without a determination on the merits.

The landlord appealed a Landlord and Tenant Board decision granting the tenants a 2.5 per cent rent reduction due to the loss of green space resulting from infill construction.

The Board had found the lands constituted a 'common recreational facility' under the Tenant Protection Act, 1997.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that ordinary green space does not meet the statutory definition of a facility, which requires something built or installed to perform a particular function.

The Court also found the Board erred in law by calculating the rent reduction using a novel mathematical approach rather than the mandatory method prescribed by regulation.

The applicant, a paralegal, sought a declaration that the Law Society of Upper Canada's by-laws regulating paralegals under the Access for Justice Act, 2006 were of no force and effect, arguing the Act infringed s. 15 of the Charter.

He also sought judicial review of the Lieutenant Governor's decision to grant royal assent to the Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that occupational status is not a protected ground under s. 15 of the Charter.

Furthermore, the court held that the granting of royal assent is a constitutional convention not subject to judicial review.

The employer brought an application for judicial review of an Ontario Labour Relations Board decision.

The Board had upheld a union grievance, finding that fire restoration work at a Petro-Canada site was 'construction work' under the Labour Relations Act and governed by the provincial agreement, rather than the General Presidents' Maintenance Agreement.

The employer argued the Board erred in its application of the doctrine of estoppel and lacked jurisdiction to issue supplemental reasons.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that the Board had jurisdiction to issue supplemental reasons and that its decision on the nature of the work and the application of estoppel was reasonable.

The appellant appealed an Ontario Municipal Board decision dismissing its claims for compensation for injurious affection, business loss, and disturbance damages following the expropriation of lands for a highway overpass.

The Divisional Court held that the standard of review for findings of fact by the OMB is palpable and overriding error, and correctness for questions of law.

The court found no palpable and overriding error in the OMB's conclusion that the appellant's loss of profits was not attributable to the expropriation, but rather to other factors including the appellant's own strategic marketing decisions.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Board of Trustees appealed a decision of the Licence Appeal Tribunal that reversed the Board's refusal of the respondents' claim for compensation regarding a stolen vehicle.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the Tribunal's factual findings were supported by the evidence and that the Tribunal correctly addressed the issue of willful blindness without improperly shifting the onus to the Board.

The appellant appealed a family law order and both parties sought to introduce fresh evidence, including report cards and updated financial information.

The Divisional Court relaxed the usual rules for admitting fresh evidence, noting the case involved the best interests of children.

Finding that the new evidence established a change in circumstances and could have affected the decision below, the court allowed the appeal in part, directing a new hearing on the issues with updated financial disclosure.

The court also allowed the appeal regarding retroactive support, as the respondent conceded it had been satisfied.

The appellant client appealed an order of a Superior Court judge dismissing his motion to set aside a certificate of costs in favour of his former solicitor.

The Divisional Court held that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal under s. 19(1) of the Courts of Justice Act, as the order appealed from was not an order 'for a single payment'.

The court transferred the appeal to the Court of Appeal pursuant to s. 110(1) of the Act.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Ontario Board of Inquiry, which held that it had jurisdiction to continue hearing a human rights complaint after the Ontario Human Rights Commission withdrew its carriage of the proceeding.

The Divisional Court granted the application, finding that under the Human Rights Code, a Board of Inquiry may not proceed in the absence of the Commission.

The Court held that the Commission cannot delegate carriage of the complaint to the complainant, and that the public interest representation of the Commission is required for the hearing to proceed.