Ian B. Kasper

An appeal from a Superior Court decision dismissing a habeas corpus application challenging the appellant's reclassification from medium to maximum security and subsequent transfer to a penitentiary outside Ontario.

The appeal was rendered moot when the appellant was transferred back to medium security prior to the extension of time being granted.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as moot, finding that the current habeas corpus proceeding was the preferable forum to address the lawfulness of the appellant's present detention.

An appeal from a Superior Court decision dismissing a habeas corpus application challenging the appellant's reclassification from medium to maximum security and subsequent transfer to a penitentiary outside Ontario.

The appeal was rendered moot when the appellant was reclassified back to medium security and subsequently released on parole while the appeal was pending.

The Court of Appeal declined to exercise its discretion to hear the moot appeal, noting that the issues sought to be raised were not properly raised before the application judge and that attempting to expand upon the legal principles established in Mission Institution v. Khela without a proper factual foundation would provide limited assistance.

The applicant was successful on an interlocutory injunction related to a habeas corpus application challenging his placement in administrative segregation.

The issue was whether costs for the injunction should be payable immediately to the applicant or in the cause.

The court held that costs should be in the cause, noting that the injunction did not end the litigation, the issues were inextricably linked to the merits of the main application, and the application judge would be in a better position to assess costs with the benefit of hindsight.

The moving party, a federal inmate serving a life sentence, brought an emergency motion for an injunction to prevent his transfer from an Ontario institution to an Alberta institution pending his habeas corpus application.

The moving party argued the transfer violated his right to counsel and would disrupt his scheduled hip surgery and family support in Ontario.

The court applied the three-part test for an injunction and found a serious issue to be tried, irreparable harm, and that the balance of convenience favoured the moving party.

The injunction was granted, ordering the moving party's return to Ontario pending the outcome of the habeas corpus application.

The accused was charged with possession of a prohibited weapon (a flick knife) found during a police search of his pants pocket.

The accused brought an application to exclude the knife pursuant to s. 24(2) of the Charter, arguing that it was obtained in violation of his rights under ss. 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Charter.

The court found that the police detention of the accused became unlawful when he was removed from the van without proper grounds, and that the accused was denied access to counsel of choice throughout his detention.

The court excluded the knife as evidence and dismissed the charge.

An appeal under Part XX.1 of the Criminal Code against a disposition of the Ontario Review Board dated April 27, 2016.

The appellant raised two grounds of appeal: first, that the Board should have made further inquiries regarding the cause of the appellant's psychosis (whether from liver disease or bipolar disorder), and second, that the Board erred in rejecting conditions regarding community access and an approved person.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both grounds, finding no error in the Board's acceptance of the joint position that the appellant remained a significant risk to public safety and no error in the Board's decision to impose more limited community access conditions at that time.

The appellant appealed her convictions for threatening death and assault with intent to resist arrest.

She raised several grounds of appeal, including ineffective assistance of counsel, reversal of the burden of proof, and improper admission of prejudicial evidence.

The Superior Court of Justice found that the trial judge had improperly reversed the burden of proof by requiring the appellant to assist the court with her evidence and using disbelief of her evidence to accept the Crown's evidence.

The court also found that highly prejudicial bad character and hearsay evidence was improperly admitted at trial.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed his sentence for criminal harassment and failure to comply with an undertaking, arguing the sentencing judge erred by relying on unadmitted allegations in the pre-sentence report (PSR) and in assessing a conditional discharge.

The Superior Court found the sentencing judge erred in principle by considering unproven abusive and controlling behaviour from the PSR.

However, despite this error, the court conducted a fresh determination of the sentence, considering aggravating factors such as the appellant's disregard for court orders and the impact on his child, and mitigating factors like his lack of criminal record and rehabilitation efforts.

The court concluded that a conditional discharge would be contrary to the public interest due to the need for general deterrence and denunciation in cases involving repeated breaches of court orders in acrimonious family breakdowns.

The appeal on sentence was dismissed, affirming the original suspended sentence and 12 months' probation.