Helen A. Rady

The Crown and defence attended a case conference to determine whether the defendant's sentencing hearing should proceed remotely due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

The defendant objected to a remote hearing and requested an in-person hearing.

The court ordered that the hearing proceed by videoconference pursuant to the newly enacted provisions of the Criminal Code, finding that a remote hearing would be fair, public, and appropriate given public health concerns.

The offenders were sentenced for their roles in the unprovoked shooting death of a random victim during an attempted robbery.

McDonald, convicted of second-degree murder, was sentenced to life imprisonment with 25 years of parole ineligibility, to be served consecutively to a previous life sentence for another murder.

Lako, convicted of manslaughter, was sentenced to 12 years' imprisonment.

The court denied Lako's request for enhanced pre-sentence custody credit related to the COVID-19 pandemic, finding insufficient evidence of unique personal vulnerability or measurable impact beyond that experienced by the general public.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to strike the defendant's jury notice in a personal injury action arising from a motor vehicle accident.

The plaintiffs argued that the anticipated expert evidence was too complex for a jury and that the COVID-19 pandemic would cause undue delay.

The court dismissed the motion as premature, adopting a 'wait and see' approach, noting that the trial was not scheduled until September 2021 and the trial judge retains discretion to strike the jury if necessary.

The defendants brought a motion for an order compelling the plaintiff to attend an independent medical examination (IME) with a neuropsychologist in Hamilton.

The plaintiff agreed to the IME and the choice of physician but sought accommodation due to childcare responsibilities and ongoing family and criminal proceedings.

The court, while acknowledging the defendants' entitlement to the IME, imposed conditions to accommodate the plaintiff, including covering transportation and childcare expenses, and allowing the assessment to be conducted over multiple days if necessary to respect her childcare commitments.

The court-appointed Receiver sought approval of its first report and authorization to file an assignment in bankruptcy on behalf of the debtor, a farmer.

The debtor opposed the assignment, arguing he was protected as a farmer under section 48 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The court found that the debtor ceased to be a farmer upon the appointment of the Receiver and authorized the Receiver to file the assignment in bankruptcy due to the debtor's lack of cooperation and misrepresentations.

The appellant physician appealed a decision of the Discipline Committee finding he committed sexual abuse and professional misconduct, and revoking his license.

The Divisional Court upheld findings that he removed patients' clothing without warning and breached a chaperone order.

However, the Court quashed the finding of sexual abuse regarding Patient B due to a flawed credibility assessment and a reversal of the burden of proof.

The Court also quashed a finding of professional misconduct regarding abdominal contact with two other patients because it was an unpleaded allegation.

Finally, the Court held that the mandatory revocation provisions of the Protecting Patients Act, 2017 did not apply retrospectively.

The penalty was substituted with a suspension for the period already served.

An applicant mother sought a declaration of true ownership of a family cottage, asserting a purchase money resulting trust, against her daughter, the registered owner.

The court examined the transferor's intent at the time of purchase, considering tax planning advice and the registration of a mortgage.

It found that the parents intended for the daughter to be the beneficial owner, primarily to avoid capital gains and protect the asset from future creditors or matrimonial claims involving the daughter.

The application was dismissed, affirming the daughter's ownership, though her liability under the original mortgage was maintained, while a later increased mortgage without consideration was deemed not to reflect indebtedness.

The appellant physician appealed the liability and penalty decisions of the Discipline Committee of the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario.

The Committee had found the appellant guilty of sexual abuse and unprofessional conduct regarding two patients and ordered the revocation of his licence, as well as requiring him to post security for patient counselling.

The Divisional Court upheld the liability findings, concluding the Committee's credibility assessments were reasonable.

However, the Court allowed the appeal on penalty, finding that the Committee erred in principle by failing to balance all sentencing criteria, ignoring proportionality, and incorrectly applying retrospective legislation.

The penalty of revocation was set aside and remitted to the Committee.

The order for security for counselling was varied to apply only to the patient who demonstrated a need for it.

The applicant sought judicial review of an Ontario Labour Relations Board decision affirming a compliance order that required the applicant to pay overtime to employees at its centralized sweet corn processing facility.

The Board had found that the facility was not a 'farm' and the work was not 'directly related to primary production' under the farm worker exemption in Regulation 285/01.

The Divisional Court held that the Board's decision was unreasonable because it disregarded uncontradicted expert and operational evidence, adopted an arbitrary interpretation that created absurd results, and failed to properly balance the protective purpose of the exemption.

The application was granted, the Board's decision was set aside, and the court declared that the farm worker exemption applied to the employees.

The appellant, Patrick Flynn, appealed his conviction for an offence under s. 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code ("blowing over").

At trial, the judge found two Charter breaches (s. 8, 9, and 10(b)) but admitted the breath samples under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The appeal advanced three grounds: error regarding the "as soon as practicable" requirement for breath samples, failure to prove the first sample was within two hours, and error in the s. 24(2) Charter analysis.

The Superior Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error or error in principle in the trial judge's findings of fact or application of the s. 24(2) balancing test, which concluded that the minimal nature of the Charter breaches did not warrant exclusion of the breath samples.

Following a jury verdict in favour of the plaintiffs in a personal injury action, the parties sought rulings on two issues.

First, the court held that under s. 278(2) of the Insurance Act, the insurer must share any subrogated recovery with the plaintiffs on a pro rata basis until the plaintiffs are fully indemnified under their OPCF 44R endorsement.

Second, the court held that a third party who defended the main action is not jointly and severally liable to the plaintiffs under s. 1 of the Negligence Act, but rather is severally liable to the defendant who commenced the third party claim.

This motion concerned the amendment of a statement of claim for statutory accident benefits (SABs) to include claims for medical and rehabilitation benefits denied post-issuance and a declaration of catastrophic impairment.

The action was commenced prior to 2016 amendments to the Insurance Act which removed the right to bring actions for SABs disputes, redirecting them to the Licence Appeal Tribunal (LAT).

The court granted the amendment, finding that the proposed changes constituted a particularization of claims already broadly pleaded in the original statement of claim, rather than new disputes arising after the statutory amendments.

The court emphasized the policy against multiplicity of proceedings and the potential for inconsistent findings if claims were bifurcated between the Superior Court and the LAT.

The plaintiff, a commercial corn grower, brought a proposed class action against the defendants, manufacturers of genetically modified corn seeds (Agrisure), alleging negligence and breach of the Competition Act.

The plaintiff claimed that North American corn prices fell due to China's rejection of corn shipments containing unapproved Agrisure, causing economic loss to non-Agrisure farmers.

The defendants moved to strike the claim under Rule 21, arguing no duty of care existed for pure economic loss.

The court granted the motion, finding that while the claim was framed in misrepresentation, the plaintiff's reliance on the defendants' alleged undertaking not to introduce Agrisure without global approvals was unreasonable, as commingling was inevitable and preventing it would require withholding the product from the domestic market, which had regulatory approval.

The court also noted the risk of indeterminate liability and the illogical elevation of foreign approvals over domestic ones.

This is a proposed class action seeking certification against Samsung Electronics Canada Inc. regarding allegedly defective Galaxy Note7, S7, and S7 Edge smartphones.

The plaintiff alleged misrepresentation, breach of consumer protection and sale of goods acts, negligence, unjust enrichment, and waiver of tort, claiming inadequate compensation for losses from a recall program.

The court dismissed the motion for certification, finding that the misrepresentation and statutory claims lacked contractual privity between the manufacturer and consumers, and were inadequately pleaded.

Claims for data loss and pain and suffering were deemed highly individualized, lacking commonality.

Furthermore, the plaintiff's expert failed to establish a credible methodology for class-wide damages.

The court concluded that a class action was not the preferable procedure, given Samsung's voluntary compensation program which addressed access to justice and behaviour modification concerns.

The Estate Trustee sought a Benjamin Order to distribute the residue of an estate, assuming a named beneficiary, William Graham, had predeceased the testator.

Despite extensive efforts to locate William, he remained missing.

The Office of the Public Guardian and Trustee suggested paying William's share into court for further inquiry.

The court, applying principles from Neville v. Benjamin and subsequent Canadian cases, found the inquiries sufficient and granted the Benjamin Order, allowing the Estate Trustee to distribute William's share to the remaining beneficiaries.

The defendant, B’nai Brith Canada, brought a motion under s. 137.1(3) of the Courts of Justice Act to dismiss a libel action initiated by the plaintiff, Alexander Dimitri Lascaris, as a strategic lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP).

The plaintiff claimed damages for an article and tweet published by the defendant.

The court found that the defendant's expression related to a matter of public interest (the conflict in the Middle East and the BDS movement).

The burden then shifted to the plaintiff to demonstrate substantial merit, no valid defence, and that the harm outweighed the public interest in protecting the expression.

The court concluded that the plaintiff could not overcome the defence of fair comment, as it was arguable that a person could honestly believe the plaintiff's actions constituted support for terrorists, even if unreasonable.

Consequently, the defendant's motion was granted, and the plaintiff's action was dismissed.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to certify a proposed shareholder class action arising from the successful joint take-over bid for Baffinland Iron Mines Corporation.

The plaintiffs asserted claims for circular misrepresentation, insider trading, oppression, and unjust enrichment.

The court found that the plaintiffs met the requirements for certification under s. 5 of the Class Proceedings Act.

The court excluded compulsory acquisition security holders from the class definition but included secondary market sellers.

The court also held that the oppression claims raised common issues and that a class action was the preferable procedure.

The plaintiff and defendant both moved for summary judgment regarding an aborted real estate transaction.

The plaintiff sought damages for anticipatory breach, while the defendant counterclaimed.

The court found that the evidence on damages was inadequate and that determining liability alone via partial summary judgment would be inefficient and risk inconsistent findings.

Both motions for summary judgment were dismissed, and the matter was directed to trial.

The moving party (the respondent in the family proceeding) brought a motion to sever the divorce from the corollary issues under Rule 12(6) of the Family Law Rules.

The responding party opposed the motion, arguing that child support arrangements were not reasonable and that she would lose extended health benefits.

The court granted the severance, finding that reasonable arrangements for child support had been made and that the loss of health benefits did not amount to significant prejudice.

The applicant sought judicial review of an Information and Privacy Commissioner order requiring the disclosure of commercial benchmarking data provided to the Treasury Board Secretariat.

The applicant argued the adjudicator misapprehended evidence and applied too high a standard of proof for the third-party records exemption under s. 17(1) of the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the adjudicator reasonably concluded the applicant failed to demonstrate a reasonable expectation of probable harm to its competitive position if the redacted information was disclosed.