Gérard V. La Forest

The respondent bank extended credit to the appellant company, secured by merchandise.

Upon default, the bank took possession of the merchandise but, unable to find a buyer, gratuitously abandoned it to a third-party lessor.

The bank sued for the balance of the loan, and the appellant cross-demanded for the value of the abandoned goods.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the bank breached its duty of good faith under the Bank Act by abandoning the property without notifying the debtor or restoring the status quo.

The appeal was allowed, and the bank was ordered to pay the value of the goods as damages.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal that overturned his acquittals for criminal negligence causing death and ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal from the bench, agreeing that the trial judge failed to consider evidence relating to the manner in which the appellant was operating his vehicle prior to the collision.

The respondents were prevented by airport officials from distributing political pamphlets and recruiting members at a federal airport.

The appeal concerned whether the airport regulations and related governmental action infringed freedom of expression under s. 2(b) of the Charter and, if so, whether the restriction was justified under s. 1.

The Court held that political expression in non-security areas of an airport engaged Charter protection and that the blanket prohibition on solicitation and advertising infringed that freedom.

The restriction was not saved under s. 1, with members of the Court variously emphasizing overbreadth, vagueness, lack of a sufficient objective, and the impropriety of relying on government property rights alone to suppress expression.

The Crown appealed a judgment setting aside a murder conviction and substituting a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity.

The Supreme Court held that the court below erred by treating the first branch of s. 16(2) of the Criminal Code as extending to moral wrongfulness and by invoking s. 7 of the Charter to re-interpret that branch contrary to existing authority.

However, applying the majority reasoning in Chaulk, the Court concluded the accused's delusional state rendered him incapable of knowing the act was morally wrong under the second branch of s. 16(2).

The appellate substitution of a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity under s. 686(1)(d) was therefore upheld and the Crown's appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder after shooting a highway patrol officer.

At trial, he admitted to the killing but raised the defence of insanity.

The Crown adduced evidence that the appellant was a suspect in a New York murder to explain his flight, and Crown counsel made highly prejudicial remarks about a defence psychiatric expert during the address to the jury.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the presumption of sanity in s. 16(4) of the Criminal Code infringes s. 11(d) of the Charter, it is saved by s. 1.

However, the Court allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial because the trial judge's failure to comment on Crown counsel's prejudicial remarks in the jury charge constituted an error of law that could not be cured by the proviso.

The appellant killed his wife and raised the defence of insanity at his first degree murder trial, arguing he suffered from paranoid schizophrenia and delusions.

The trial judge instructed the jury that 'wrong' in s. 16(2) of the Criminal Code meant legally wrong, relying on previous Supreme Court jurisprudence.

The jury convicted the appellant.

On appeal, the Supreme Court of Canada applied its recent decision in R. v. Chaulk, holding that 'wrong' means morally wrong.

The Court found the jury was misdirected and ordered a new trial, while affirming that the presumption of sanity in s. 16(4) is a justifiable limit on the Charter right to be presumed innocent.

The appellants appealed their convictions for operating a broadcasting undertaking contrary to the Radio Act and the Broadcasting Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal from the bench, adopting the reasons of the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal.

The appellants appealed from a judgment of the British Columbia Court of Appeal that dismissed an appeal from a judgment continuing an interlocutory injunction.

The injunction restrained the appellants and members of their bands from fishing in accordance with Tribal Council by-laws.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the Court of Appeal's decision not to interfere with the Chambers Judge's disposition.

The respondents were locked out by their employer during a labour dispute.

A collective agreement was signed and a memorandum governing the return to work was agreed upon, with a portion of the workforce returning immediately and the rest gradually recalled.

The appellant Commission held that the workers not immediately recalled were only eligible for unemployment insurance benefits once production reached a certain level.

The Supreme Court of Canada upheld the Federal Court of Appeal's decision that the stoppage of work terminated on the date the collective agreement was signed, as the lack of intent to perform the contract of service had ended.

The appellant's ship grounded after avoiding a collision with the respondent's ship, which was found solely at fault.

The appellant's ship later grounded a second time due to unrelated causes.

Both sets of damage were repaired concurrently in dry dock.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the respondent was liable for the loss of profit for the entire 27-day period required to repair the first grounding, as the second grounding did not cause any additional loss of profit-earning capacity.

The appellants challenged their first degree murder convictions on the basis of the insanity provisions in the Criminal Code and alleged that the reverse onus in s. 16(4) violated the presumption of innocence in s. 11(d) of the Charter.

A majority held that s. 16(4) infringed s. 11(d) because it permits conviction despite a reasonable doubt as to sanity, but that the infringement was justified under s. 1.

The Court overruled prior authority holding that 'wrong' in s. 16(2) meant legally wrong, and held instead that the provision refers to morally wrong according to society's standards.

Because the jury had been instructed on the narrower legal-wrong meaning, a new trial was ordered.

Appeal concerning whether employees of an intraprovincial Alberta short line railway carrying grain to a national railway fell under federal or provincial labour jurisdiction.

The majority held the railway was neither itself an interprovincial undertaking nor sufficiently integrated with a core federal undertaking under the functional integration analysis from the labour jurisdiction jurisprudence.

Physical connection, commercial dependence, and participation in a federally regulated grain transport system were insufficient to constitutionalize the undertaking as federal.

The appeal was allowed, the constitutional question was answered in the negative, and provincial labour jurisdiction applied.

The appellant suffered severe spinal injuries when a pleasure craft he was on struck rocks in tidal waters.

He sued the respondents in tort.

The respondents sought to limit their liability under ss. 647 and 649 of the Canada Shipping Act.

The appellant challenged the constitutional validity of these provisions, arguing they fell under provincial jurisdiction over property and civil rights.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the provisions are intra vires Parliament as they are in pith and substance legislation in respect to Canadian maritime law, which extends to torts committed on navigable waters, including those involving pleasure craft.

The appellant sought to disqualify the respondent's law firm after a junior lawyer, who had actively worked on the appellant's case at her previous firm, joined the respondent's firm.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and disqualified the firm.

The Court established a new, stricter test for conflicts of interest, holding that where a lawyer possesses relevant confidential information and joins an opposing firm, the court will infer that confidences will be shared unless satisfied by clear and convincing evidence that all reasonable measures, such as institutional screening, have been taken to prevent disclosure.

As no such verifiable steps were taken here, the firm was removed from the record.

The appellant residents association challenged a municipal rezoning that permitted a condominium development, arguing that a municipal councillor who had previously supported the development was disqualified by a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the strict test for reasonable apprehension of bias does not apply to municipal councillors acting in their legislative capacity, unless they have a personal interest.

A councillor is only disqualified for prejudgment if their mind is so closed that any representations would be futile.

The Court also found that the rezoning application complied with statutory requirements and conformed to the city's development plan.

The appeal was dismissed.

The respondents obtained default judgments in Alberta against the appellant for mortgage deficiencies after the appellant had moved to British Columbia.

The respondents then brought actions in British Columbia to enforce the Alberta judgments.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the courts of one province should give full faith and credit to the judgments of another province if the originating court properly exercised jurisdiction.

The Court established the 'real and substantial connection' test, finding that the Alberta court had jurisdiction because the properties and contracts were located there.

The appeal was dismissed, and the Alberta judgments were held to be enforceable in British Columbia.

The Minister of National Revenue reassessed the respondent, attributing dividends paid to his wife on her Class B shares to his income under s. 56(2) of the Income Tax Act.

The dividends were declared pursuant to a discretionary dividend clause in the company's Articles of Incorporation.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the discretionary dividend clause was valid under corporate law and did not violate the common law presumption of equality among shares.

The Court further held that s. 56(2) generally does not apply to dividend payments, and the dividends paid to the wife were a legitimate return on her investment and contribution to the company, not a tax avoidance scheme.

The Crown's appeal was dismissed.

The appellants challenged a municipal zoning by-law that converted agricultural land to residential use, arguing that an alderman who voted on the by-law was disqualified due to a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The alderman had made public statements indicating he would not change his mind on the rezoning.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that a municipal councillor is only disqualified by bias if they have prejudged the matter to the extent of being no longer capable of persuasion.

Finding that the alderman had not closed his mind entirely, the Court dismissed the appeal.

The appellants challenged the constitutionality of s. 13(1) of the Canadian Human Rights Act after repeated antisemitic recorded telephone messages led to a human rights cease and desist order and contempt proceedings.

The Supreme Court held that the provision infringed freedom of expression under s. 2(b), but the majority found the infringement justified under s. 1 because the objective of preventing harm caused by hate propaganda and promoting equality was pressing and substantial.

The majority also held that the tribunal order was sufficiently clear and that any apprehension of bias challenge had been waived and could not be raised collaterally in contempt proceedings.

The appeal was dismissed, with a partial dissent that would have struck down the provision while still upholding the contempt convictions.

Criminal appeal concerning the constitutionality of the hate propaganda provisions in the Criminal Code after a high school teacher was convicted for communicating anti-semitic statements to students.

The majority held that s. 319(2) infringed freedom of expression under s. 2(b) of the Charter, but that the infringement was justified under s. 1 because the provision targeted the wilful promotion of hatred, a form of expression only tenuously connected to core free-expression values, in pursuit of the pressing objective of combating the harms of hate propaganda.

The majority also held that the reverse onus in the truth defence under s. 319(3)(a) infringed s. 11(d), but was similarly justified under s. 1.

The appeal was allowed and the provisions were upheld as constitutional.