G. Dennis Lane

Following the dismissal of an appeal regarding a summary judgment motion, the parties made written submissions on costs.

The respondents sought costs on a partial and substantial indemnity basis, while the appellant argued costs should be in the cause due to the unique circumstances and ongoing litigation in Kuwait.

The Divisional Court agreed with the motions judge that the costs claimed were excessive and ordered that the costs of the leave to appeal motion and the appeal be fixed and payable in the cause.

Following his conviction for assaulting his wife, the requester sought access to the Crown brief and related documents under the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.

The Ministry denied access under the solicitor-client exemption in s. 19 of the Act.

The adjudicator ordered disclosure, finding that the exemption under the second branch of s. 19 terminated when the litigation ended and that privilege was waived for documents disclosed to defence counsel.

On judicial review, the Divisional Court quashed the decision, holding that the statutory exemption in s. 19 does not terminate with the litigation and is not waived by the Crown's mandatory Stinchcombe disclosure.

The applicants, litigation guardians for severely developmentally delayed adults residing in Schedule I facilities, sought judicial review of the Minister of Community and Social Services' decision to close the remaining institutions.

The applicants argued the Minister lacked statutory authority under the Developmental Services Act to close the facilities.

The Divisional Court held that the Minister's broad discretionary power to establish and maintain facilities included the power to close them.

However, the Court declared that the consent of the incapable residents' substitute decision makers is required before they can be transferred to community placements, invoking the parens patriae jurisdiction to protect their fundamental interests.

The applicant sought costs following a successful judicial review application.

The parties agreed that costs should be awarded on a partial indemnity basis.

The applicant claimed $10,796.66, while the respondent argued for a lower amount.

The Divisional Court considered the respondent's conduct, which might have warranted solicitor and client costs, but also noted that the arguments were substantially similar to those at the lower level, allowing for economies in preparation.

Applying the principle of reasonable expectations, the court awarded the applicant $9,203.49 in total costs.

The City of Hamilton applied for judicial review of an arbitrator's award which found that the City was required to pay the Ontario Health Premium on behalf of its employees under the collective bargaining agreement.

The Divisional Court determined that the appropriate standard of review was patent unreasonableness, as the arbitrator was interpreting the collective agreement, not the legislation.

The Court found the arbitrator's conclusion that the premium constituted a 'cost' of the medicare plan under the agreement was not patently unreasonable, and would have been upheld even on a correctness standard.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her motion for summary judgment against the respondent bank.

The dispute involved funds in a bank account originally owned by the appellant's mother, which the bank had transferred to the appellant's brother.

A Kuwaiti court had ruled that the funds belonged to the appellant.

The Divisional Court found that the Kuwaiti judgment was final and that the bank was a privy to the brother, meaning it would be bound by the foreign judgment through issue estoppel.

However, the appeal was dismissed because the appellant's pleadings had not been amended to properly base the claim on the foreign judgment.

The applicants sought urgent judicial review of an interim order by the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario that required them to call ten specific witnesses and produce will-say statements for them.

The Tribunal had amended the complaint mid-hearing and ordered the applicants to call these witnesses to bridge the evidentiary gap.

The Divisional Court granted the application and quashed the order, holding that the Tribunal's inquisitorial approach breached natural justice and procedural fairness by depriving the applicants of their right to control their own defence in an adversarial proceeding.

The applicants sought judicial review of a decision by the Ontario Racing Commission disqualifying a horse for a positive drug test and suspending and fining its trainer.

The trainer argued the positive test resulted from contamination or an unknown metabolic process of a permitted drug, and that the Commission applied an absolute liability standard.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the Commission's rejection of the contamination theory was not patently unreasonable and that the trainer breached the standard of care by failing to keep adequate medical records.

The court also rejected the argument that the tribunal Chair's questioning of the trainer was unfair.

The appellant was successful in his appeal against the Law Society of Upper Canada and sought costs on a partial indemnity basis.

The court found that while the time spent and hourly rates were generally acceptable, the total amounts claimed were excessive given the reasonable expectations of the losing party and the historical scale of costs in such appeals.

The court fixed costs at $7,500 for fees at the Divisional Court level and $12,000 for fees at the appeal tribunal level, plus disbursements and GST.

The applicant physician sought judicial review to prohibit the respondent tribunal from proceeding with a patient's claim of sexual assault filed 10 years prior.

The applicant had been exonerated by both the police and his professional college shortly after the allegations were made.

The tribunal had closed its file for over four years before reopening it, and the applicant presented evidence that key witnesses' memories had faded.

The Divisional Court granted the application and stayed the proceedings, finding that the extraordinary delay compromised the fairness of the hearing and amounted to a gross abuse of process.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment that established the value of the respondent's minority shareholding and calculated amounts of excessive compensation and unjustified corporate expenses taken by the appellant.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred by refusing a late amendment to the pleadings regarding share ownership and by improperly weighing the expert valuation evidence.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge correctly refused the late amendment as the appellant had previously abandoned the issue, and the respondent remained the registered shareholder entitled to relief.

The Court also held that the trial judge's assessment of the expert evidence was supported by the record and entitled to deference.

The applicant, a police officer facing disciplinary charges, sought judicial review of the hearing officer's refusal to recuse himself.

The applicant argued there was a reasonable apprehension of personal bias because the hearing officer had a close working relationship with a key prosecution witness and had permitted the applicant to be cross-examined about his pending charges while testifying in an unrelated disciplinary matter.

The Divisional Court granted the application, finding that the hearing officer's actions in the unrelated matter compromised his ability to fairly assess the applicant's credibility and effectively deprived the applicant of his statutory right to silence under the Police Services Act.

The hearing officer's decision was quashed and the matter remitted for the appointment of a new hearing officer.

The applicant's motion for leave to appeal a temporary custody order was dismissed.

The respondent sought costs of $4,000 on a partial indemnity basis.

The applicant argued that because the respondent was legally aided, the costs should be limited to the Legal Aid tariff rate based on the indemnity principle under Rule 57.

The court rejected this argument, holding that s. 46(1) of the Legal Aid Services Act requires costs to be assessed without regard to the fact that the recipient is legally aided.

The court fixed costs at $2,500, taking into account the applicant's modest income and the lack of necessity in bringing the motion.

The appellant insurance broker appealed the revocation of its certificate of registration by the Registered Insurance Brokers of Ontario (RIBO).

The revocation was based on the appellant's failure to maintain at least two contracted standard insurance markets, as required by RIBO guidelines interpreting the regulatory requirement to conduct business as an insurance broker.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the Committee had the implied statutory authority to revoke the certificate, reasonably interpreted the regulation, and properly proceeded without a hearing because the appellant failed to request one after receiving notice.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Toronto Licensing Tribunal suspending his taxicab driver's licence for thirty days for breaching the municipal code.

The applicant, representing himself, alleged a conspiracy by city employees to harass him.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Tribunal proceedings were conducted fairly, in accordance with natural justice, and that the findings were supported by evidence.

Costs of $500 were awarded to the respondent.

The appellant mother sought leave to appeal a temporary care and custody order placing her child with the child's father.

The child had been removed from the mother's care by the Children's Aid Society due to concerns regarding her prescription drug use and mental health.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no conflicting decisions or good reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's order, and noting that the case was fact-driven and raised no broad issues of public importance.

The landlord moved to quash the tenant's appeal of an Ontario Rental Housing Tribunal eviction order and to set aside the automatic stay.

The eviction was based on the tenant and his guests disturbing the peace of other tenants.

The court found the tenant's appeal was weak, raised no serious questions of law, and appeared designed to extend his occupancy rent-free, as rent for October and November remained unpaid.

The court ordered that the stay of the eviction order would be lifted unless the tenant paid the outstanding and upcoming rent into court by specified dates.

The plaintiff brought a motion for an extension of time to apply for leave to appeal an order refusing an interlocutory injunction against a bank regarding credit reporting.

The underlying action had already been settled and dismissed by a Master.

The court dismissed the motion, finding there was no legal framework within which it could be brought given the dismissal of the action.

Costs of $1,500 were awarded to the respondent bank.

The respondent moved to quash an appeal brought to the Divisional Court from an order of a Master.

The Master's order required the appellant to provide legal descriptions of properties for execution of costs judgments.

The court held that the Master's order was interlocutory, not final, and therefore the appeal properly lay to a single judge of the Superior Court.

The appeal was struck from the Divisional Court list, with the appellant given 30 days to transfer it to the Superior Court, conditional on paying $500 in costs.

The tenant appealed an eviction order from the Ontario Rental Housing Tribunal.

The landlord brought a motion to lift the stay of the eviction order, noting the tenant was not paying rent and the notice of appeal raised no question of law.

The court ordered the stay lifted and the appeal quashed unless the tenant paid all arrears, current rent, and costs into court by a specified date.