Frank N. Marrocco

The applicant sought judicial review of the respondent's decision denying a certificate of eligibility for the Ontario Digital Media Tax Credit for its interactive digital sweepstakes games.

The respondent had concluded the games were ineligible because their primary purpose was to promote the sale of long-distance phone cards.

The Divisional Court allowed the application, finding the respondent's decision unreasonable.

The court held that the regulatory definition focuses on the characteristics of the game when operated by the user, making the developer's motivation for creating the games an irrelevant consideration.

The applicant sought an extension of time to file a motion for leave to appeal an interlocutory order requiring him to pay security for costs.

The court denied the extension, noting the litigation had been ongoing for 15 years and the applicant was pursuing a meritless property claim.

The court further held that even if the motion was timely, leave to appeal would be denied because the proposed appeal did not involve matters of importance beyond the interests of the parties.

The appellant tenants appealed an order of the Landlord and Tenant Board terminating their tenancy for non-payment of rent.

The Divisional Court quashed the appeal, finding that the appellants' grounds—which alleged inadequate notice and cited medical and financial hardship—did not raise a question of law as required by section 210 of the Residential Tenancies Act.

The court awarded costs of $3,500 to the respondent landlords.

The appellant tenant appealed an order of the Landlord and Tenant Board terminating her tenancy so the purchaser could move in.

The appeal automatically stayed the eviction, allowing the appellant to live rent-free for 14 months.

The appellant failed to perfect the appeal, claiming she could not afford the transcripts, and moved for an extension of time.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion and quashed the appeal, noting the appellant had saved approximately $21,000 in rent and failed to provide proper proof that the transcripts had been ordered.

The applicant, a reserve retailer, sought judicial review of a First Nation Council's decision to allocate tax-exempt cigarettes to another business, arguing the business was not located on the reserve.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the applicant lacked both private and public interest standing.

The applicant failed to show a causal relationship between the alleged prejudice and the challenged action, and the issue raised was not a serious justiciable issue affecting the public interest.

The appellants appealed a decision of the Ontario Securities Commission finding them liable for insider trading and tipping contrary to s. 76 of the Securities Act.

The Commission found that a corporate lawyer tipped an investment advisor about three corporate transactions, who then tipped others in a chain.

The Divisional Court upheld the findings against the lawyer and three of the investment advisors, finding the Commission's inferences from circumstantial evidence were reasonable.

However, the court allowed the appeal of one investment advisor at the end of the chain, finding the Commission made factual errors in concluding he ought reasonably to have known the information came from an insider.

The sanctions against the unsuccessful appellants were upheld.

The plaintiff moved for leave to appeal two orders that permitted the release of funds frozen pursuant to Mareva injunctions to pay the defendant's legal fees.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding no conflicting decisions, no reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's application of the Credit Valley test, and no question of general legal importance.

The applicant, a paralegal, was sued in Small Claims Court by the respondent for the return of fees.

After the trial was adjourned multiple times, the applicant sought a further adjournment, which was refused.

He then commenced an application for judicial review of that refusal, which was dismissed by the Registrar for failure to perfect.

The applicant's motion to set aside the Registrar's order was also dismissed.

The applicant subsequently failed to file an application for leave to appeal within the prescribed time and brought a motion for an extension of time.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, noting the applicant's lack of diligence and that he had already achieved the practical result of adjourning his trial.

The parties sought a consent order under Rule 48.14(4) directing the Registrar not to dismiss the action for delay, arising from a 2010 motor vehicle accident.

The court granted the order and issued a brief endorsement interpreting Rule 48.14 ahead of the January 1, 2017 administrative dismissals.

The court clarified that actions dismissed for delay by the Registrar should not contain a costs order, Rule 48.14 does not apply to case-managed actions or applications, and it does not apply to actions that have been stayed.

The applicant sought judicial review of an Ontario Labour Relations Board decision dismissing his complaint that his union breached its duty of fair representation.

The applicant had been reinstated by an arbitrator without back pay after a three-year delay in the arbitration decision.

The union initially sought judicial review to compel the arbitrator's reasons but abandoned the application once reasons were provided, concluding it was unlikely to succeed.

The Divisional Court found the Board's conclusion that the union acted reasonably to be reasonable and dismissed the application.

The appellants appealed decisions of the Ontario Securities Commission finding that they engaged in insider trading after receiving material non-public information from an administrative assistant at an investment bank.

The Commission relied on circumstantial evidence, including the proximity of telephone calls to highly profitable trades.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeals, holding that the Commission's inferences were reasonable and that the use of compelled examination transcripts was procedurally fair.

The Court also upheld the sanctions, which included trading bans, administrative penalties, and disgorgement orders.

The applicant, a justice of the peace, sought judicial review of a Hearing Panel's decision removing him from office for judicial misconduct involving sexual harassment of female staff, and denying him compensation for his legal expenses.

The Divisional Court upheld the findings of misconduct and the penalty of removal, finding the panel's decisions reasonable given the applicant's lack of insight and the need to preserve public confidence in the judiciary.

However, the Court set aside the decision denying compensation for legal fees, finding the panel erred by presuming that a judicial officer found guilty of misconduct should not be compensated, and remitted that issue for reconsideration.

The appellant, a registered representative, appealed an Ontario Securities Commission (OSC) decision that overturned an IIROC Hearing Panel's penalty decision and imposed a two-year suspension of her registration.

The appellant had recommended and facilitated off-book investments in second mortgages without her employer's knowledge or approval, and without ensuring prospectus requirements were met.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the OSC's decision to intervene and impose a suspension was reasonable, justified, and within the range of acceptable outcomes.

The applicant, a municipal councillor, sought judicial review of a decision by the City of Vaughan Council to suspend his pay for 90 days based on a report by the Integrity Commissioner.

The Commissioner found the applicant had improperly interfered with municipal tendering processes and attempted to obstruct her investigation.

The applicant argued he was denied procedural fairness because the Commissioner refused to disclose the names and statements of 32 witnesses.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, applying the Baker factors to find that the Commissioner properly balanced the applicant's right to know the case against him with the need to protect cooperating staff from reprisals.

The court also rejected arguments regarding reasonable apprehension of bias and the Commissioner's jurisdiction.

Following a successful appeal that set aside an order reducing spousal support, the appellant sought costs of the underlying motion.

The issue of costs for the motion had not been addressed during the appeal hearing or in the initial reasons for judgment.

The Divisional Court exercised its discretion to correct the oversight before the final order was entered, relieving the appellant from the requirement to file a formal notice of motion.

The court awarded the appellant partial indemnity costs of the underlying motion fixed at $14,604.53.

The applicant sought a stay of charges for sexual assault and sexual interference, or alternatively, a stay of charges related to two complainants or the removal of Crown Attorneys, alleging abuse of process due to prosecutorial misconduct during the preliminary hearing.

The alleged misconduct involved Crown Attorneys encouraging, hugging, and providing candy to child witnesses during breaks in cross-examination, and one Crown Attorney unilaterally excusing a witness.

The court applied the R. v. Babos test for abuse of process, considering the unique challenges of child witnesses in sexual assault cases.

The court found the Crown's actions, while requiring judicial direction, were innocuous attempts to console distressed child witnesses and did not compromise trial fairness or undermine judicial integrity.

The application was dismissed.

The tenant appealed a Landlord and Tenant Board order requiring him to pay rent arrears, less an abatement for maintenance issues.

The tenant argued the Board lacked jurisdiction due to a defective notice of termination, erred in calculating arrears without viva voce evidence, and wrongly limited his abatement claim to one year.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Board reasonably allowed the landlord to proceed with a claim for arrears only, properly relied on documentary evidence of arrears, and correctly applied the one-year limitation period for maintenance claims.

The appellant, a disabled former spouse, appealed a motion judge's order reducing her spousal support from $1,500 to approximately $800 per month.

The motion judge had found a material change in circumstances based on the respondent's adoption of his new wife's children, his deteriorating health, and his new wife's inability to work.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge made palpable and overriding errors of fact regarding the respondent's health and income, and erred in law by failing to apply the 'first-family-first' principle to the respondent's voluntary assumption of new financial obligations.

The original spousal support order was restored.

The applicant employer sought judicial review of a labour arbitrator's decision that mitigated the termination of an employee who engaged in a sophisticated scheme of job-related thefts.

The arbitrator had reinstated the employee for the purpose of applying for long-term disability benefits, finding that the employee's undiagnosed PTSD and depression 'clouded' the thefts.

The Divisional Court allowed the application and quashed the award, holding that the arbitrator's decision was unreasonable because it relied on contradictory findings regarding the medical evidence and failed to establish a clear nexus between the PTSD and the premeditated thefts.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision that he had no right to unilaterally set off disputed amounts against a court-ordered costs award in a family law proceeding.

The Divisional Court upheld the motion judge's finding that neither the Courts of Justice Act nor equitable principles permit unilateral set-off against a court order.

However, the Court allowed the appeal regarding the motion judge's costs award, reducing it from substantial indemnity to partial indemnity, finding the motion judge erred in principle by treating the appellant's maintained position as an additional factor justifying enhanced costs.