Frances P. Kiteley

The appellant telecommunications carriers appealed a final order of the Ontario Energy Board (OEB) that increased the annual pole attachment charge payable to Hydro One Networks Inc. The appellants argued that the OEB breached procedural fairness by expanding the scope of their review and vary motion to include new evidence and issues, and erred in law by refusing to order production of a pole sharing agreement between Hydro One and Bell Canada.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the OEB conducted the hearing fairly by granting the appellants' request for a hearing de novo and allowing all parties to present updated evidence.

The Court also held that the OEB's refusal to order production of the actual agreement, while requiring disclosure of its relevant financial impacts, was within its procedural jurisdiction and did not breach natural justice.

A reporter requested the names, billing amounts, and specialties of the top 100 physicians billing OHIP.

The Ministry refused to disclose the names, but the Information and Privacy Commissioner ordered disclosure, finding the information was not 'personal information' under the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.

The Ontario Medical Association and affected physicians sought judicial review.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that the Adjudicator's conclusion that OHIP payments revealed professional rather than personal information was reasonable.

The appellant, an estate trustee, appealed an order requiring him to pay damages for breach of fiduciary duty and repay pre-taken compensation following an application to pass accounts.

The Divisional Court found it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal under the Estates Act.

The Court held that the application judge failed to afford the unrepresented appellant procedural fairness, given the complexity of the issues, the lack of proper notice of the claims, the failure to consider statutory defences, and the informal manner in which evidence was introduced.

The appeal was allowed and the matter referred for trial.

The landlord appealed two Landlord and Tenant Board (LTB) orders that awarded the tenant damages and ordered the return of a dog.

The landlord had not attended the initial hearing because the tenant provided an incorrect mailing address.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the LTB denied the landlord procedural fairness by failing to inquire into service and by improperly dismissing her request for review.

Furthermore, the court held that the LTB erred in law by exceeding its statutory jurisdiction under the Residential Tenancies Act when it made orders regarding the return of the tenant's dog and awarded damages far exceeding the amount claimed.

The appellant sued a public transit commission after falling on a bus when another passenger flipped up an accessible seat.

At trial, the judge granted the transit commission's motion for non-suit, finding no evidence of the standard of care.

On appeal, the appellant argued the driver had special knowledge and should have warned her.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge did not err in finding the appellant failed to establish a prima facie case of negligence by omission.

The applicants, owners of a designated heritage property, sought judicial review of a decision by the Director of the Ministry of the Environment and Climate Change to issue a Renewable Energy Approval (REA) for a wind farm project.

The applicants argued the Director failed to properly interpret the REA Regulation regarding cultural heritage and breached procedural fairness.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the standard of review was reasonableness, the Director's decision to issue the REA was reasonable and balanced the statutory priorities, and the comprehensive procedural code in the REA Regulation fulfilled the duty of procedural fairness.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision dismissing her complaint against the City of Toronto as an abuse of process, and against her union and its counsel for having no reasonable prospect of success.

The applicant had previously settled her grievance and human rights complaint with the City but later filed a new complaint, alleging she signed the settlement under duress from her union.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the Adjudicator's decision was reasonable and correct, as the settlement was binding and the allegations of duress did not invalidate it.

The appellant lawyer appealed a decision of the Law Society Appeal Panel, which had set aside a Hearing Panel's 18-month suspension and substituted a penalty of licence revocation for professional misconduct.

The Appeal Panel had also overturned the dismissal of two particulars of misconduct, finding the appellant had misled investigators and filed false reports.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the Appeal Panel's decisions on both the penalty and the findings of misconduct were reasonable and entitled to a high degree of deference.

The appellant, a lawyer who acted for a mortgagee in enforcement proceedings, appealed a Small Claims Court judgment that found him jointly and severally liable for $9,000 in punitive damages and $5,750 in costs.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the Deputy Judge erred in law by awarding punitive damages against the lawyer without finding any primary liability, independent actionable wrong, or duty of care owed to the mortgagor.

The judgment against the lawyer was set aside.

The applicant union sought judicial review of an arbitral award that dismissed a grievance regarding the calculation of retirement gratuities for employees working less than 12 months per year.

The arbitrator found the employer's method of dividing yearly earnings in half to determine the six-month cap was reasonable and consistent with the Municipal Act paradigm referenced in the collective agreement.

The Divisional Court applied the reasonableness standard of review and concluded that the arbitrator's interpretation fell within the range of acceptable outcomes.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a decision of the License Appeal Tribunal which found that his injuries from a motor vehicle accident fell within the Minor Injury Guideline under the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule.

The adjudicator preferred the objective medical evidence of the respondent's experts over the self-reported evidence of the appellant's treating physicians, noting credibility issues with the appellant.

The Divisional Court held that the adjudicator properly applied the law and that the decision was reasonable.

The appeal was dismissed with costs fixed at $5,000.

The applicant pharmacist sought judicial review of a decision by the Discipline Committee of the Ontario College of Pharmacists dismissing his motion to quash disciplinary charges.

The charges arose from a complaint that the College failed to process according to the mandatory statutory requirements under the Health Professions Procedural Code.

Instead of following the complaint process, the College invited the complainant to withdraw her complaint in favour of a Registrar's investigation under s. 75(1)(a).

The Divisional Court held that the College's failure to strictly comply with the statutory complaint procedures deprived it of jurisdiction to refer the matter to discipline.

The application for judicial review was granted, the Panel's decision was quashed, and the College was prohibited from prosecuting the charges.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Social Benefits Tribunal decision that upheld the termination of her ODSP benefits and established an overpayment of over $22,000 due to undisclosed assets.

The applicant had a statutory right to appeal the Tribunal's decision to the Divisional Court but failed to do so, instead bringing an application for judicial review.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that judicial review is a discretionary remedy not available where an adequate alternative remedy exists, and the applicant demonstrated no exceptional circumstances to justify bypassing the statutory appeal process.

The tenant and occupant appealed a Landlord and Tenant Board order terminating the tenancy on the basis that the tenant illegally transferred possession of the unit to his sister.

The Divisional Court found the Board erred in law by assuming a person can only have one residence and failing to properly apply the test for transfer of occupancy under s. 100 of the Residential Tenancies Act.

The appeal was allowed, the Board's order was set aside, and the landlord's application was dismissed.

The plaintiff appealed a motion judge's refusal to grant default judgment against two defendants who failed to defend a claim for unpaid private copying levies.

The motion judge had declined default judgment, citing an unpleaded allegation of fraud and requiring oral evidence of the quantity and nature of the blank media.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that the statement of claim did not plead fraud and that the defendants were deemed to admit the pleaded facts regarding the quantity and nature of the media under Rule 19.02.

Default judgment was granted.

The self-represented plaintiff brought a motion seeking extensions of time to appeal several previous orders, including costs orders and dismissals of her actions.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding it lacked jurisdiction over the appeals on the merits, which properly lay to the Court of Appeal.

Furthermore, the court found the proposed appeals lacked merit and noted the plaintiff's history of initiating a proliferation of meritless lawsuits using fee waivers.

The court awarded costs to the defendants and ordered that the plaintiff take no further steps in any proceeding until all outstanding costs are paid.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing its motion to strike the respondent's wrongful dismissal claim.

The respondent, a former CSIS employee, alleged wrongful dismissal based on the revocation of his security clearance.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the court lacked jurisdiction because the CSIS Act provides a comprehensive administrative procedure for redress, precluding a civil action under the Public Service Labour Relations Act.

Furthermore, the respondent's claims for pre-termination salary and benefits were an abuse of process as they attempted to re-litigate issues already addressed through grievances.

The statement of claim was struck without leave to amend.

The appellant veterinarian appealed findings of professional misconduct, penalty, and costs made by the Discipline Committee of the College of Veterinarians of Ontario.

The Committee found the appellant guilty of obstructing an investigation, suppressing evidence, and having criminal convictions for assault.

On appeal, the appellant argued procedural unfairness due to language barriers and lack of a witness list, and challenged the reasonableness of the credibility findings, penalty, and costs.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no procedural unfairness and concluding that the Committee's decisions on misconduct, the four-month suspension, practice restrictions, and costs were reasonable.

The appellant appealed a trial decision ordering him to pay spousal support despite a waiver in the parties' separation agreement.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge erred in applying the Miglin test by failing to consider whether the agreement as a whole substantially complied with the Divorce Act and whether there had been a significant change in circumstances.

The court set aside the spousal and child support orders and increased the appellant's trial costs award to $60,000 due to his complete success and the respondent's unreasonable conduct.

The applicant contractor sought an interim injunction staying the City of Toronto Chief Purchasing Official's decision to temporarily suspend it from bidding on city contracts.

The suspension was based on performance issues that occurred before the new Supplier Code of Conduct took effect.

The Divisional Court granted the stay, finding the applicant established a strong prima facie case that the Chief Purchasing Official lacked authority to suspend for conduct predating the Code, and that the applicant would suffer irreparable harm if unable to bid on imminent solicitations.