Fariborz Davoudi

The offender was convicted by a jury of second degree murder for stabbing his wife to death.

The Crown sought 15-18 years of parole ineligibility, while the defence sought 10-13 years.

The court considered the brutal nature of the stabbing, the offender's lack of remorse, the vulnerability of the victim, and the jury's recommendation of 25 years.

The court sentenced the offender to life imprisonment with no eligibility for parole for 17 years, along with ancillary orders.

During a jury trial, the Crown sought to play the defendant's entire video-recorded police statement to challenge him on prior inconsistent statements and demonstrate his demeanour.

The defence argued that parts of the statement should be edited to prevent infringing the defendant's rights to counsel and silence, as he had answered some questions and not others.

The court ruled that playing the entire statement would not prejudice the defendant or create an unfair trial, noting that the statement had previously been ruled voluntary.

With the exception of one agreed-upon redaction, the court permitted the whole video statement to be played to the jury.

The defence applied for a directed verdict for second degree murder on a first degree murder count, which was previously dismissed.

The court issued supplementary reasons to correct factual errors in the original decision regarding the evidence presented at trial.

Despite excising the incorrect references to the evidence, the court concluded there was still sufficient evidence for a properly instructed jury to find the defendant guilty of first degree murder, and the application remained dismissed.

The accused was charged with first degree murder for the stabbing death of his wife.

After the Crown closed its case, the defence applied for a directed verdict of second degree murder, arguing there was insufficient evidence of planning and deliberation.

The court reviewed the evidence globally, including the accused's journal entries expressing frustration with his wife, his delay in calling 911 after the stabbing, and his medical knowledge of vital organs.

The court concluded there was sufficient evidence for a properly instructed jury to reasonably find planning and deliberation, and dismissed the application.

In a first-degree murder trial, the Crown sought to admit autopsy, hospital, and clothing photographs of the deceased.

The defence objected, arguing the photographs were excessive, unnecessary, and unduly prejudicial.

The court applied the test of relevance and probative value versus prejudicial effect, finding the photographs highly probative for the jury to understand the nature of the injuries and the defendant's statements, and not unduly prejudicial.

The court ruled to admit all vetted photographs, emphasizing their necessity to assist the pathologist's testimony and provide context beyond diagrams.

The accused, charged with first-degree murder, brought an O'Connor application seeking the production of the deceased's OHIP records.

The court found no foundation that the records were likely relevant to the issues at trial, noting that the best evidence of the deceased's mental health was an existing psychologist's report.

The court concluded the application was based on speculation and sought to enlarge collateral issues.

The first stage test was not met, and the application was dismissed.

The Crown sought to introduce a statement made by the accused, whose first language is Pashto, during a murder investigation.

The defence argued the statement was involuntary and obtained in violation of sections 7, 10(a), and 10(b) of the Charter due to a language barrier.

The court found that the accused understood English sufficiently, was provided with an interpreter and duty counsel, and gave the statement voluntarily without any police oppression or inducements.

The statement was ruled admissible.

The accused pleaded guilty to four counts relating to child sexual exploitation: attempt to live on the avails of a person under 18, exercise control, procuring, and child luring.

The accused, along with two co-accused, lured three young girls aged 14 and 15 into prostitution at the Scarborough Town Centre.

The Crown sought 5 years imprisonment less pre-trial custody credit, while the defence sought 4 years.

The court imposed a global sentence of 4 years, finding this to be the minimum necessary to meet sentencing principles.

The court credited 1,157 days of pre-trial custody at the 1.5:1 ratio, resulting in 303 days remaining to be served, followed by 2 years probation and a 10-year s.161 order.

The accused was charged with trafficking heroin and claimed he was acting as a police agent under the direction and control of an unnamed detective, relying on the exemption in s. 4 of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act (Police Enforcement) Regulation.

The Crown brought a motion arguing there was no air of reality to this defence.

The court reviewed the accused's testimony and found that he had explicitly rejected the detective's instructions and acted on his own initiative when arranging the drug transaction.

The court concluded there was no evidential foundation that the accused was acting under the direction and control of a police officer, and ruled the defence would not be put to the jury.

A jury trial arising from the kidnapping, extortion, assault, and unlawful confinement of the complainant.

The court issued written reasons for numerous pre‑trial and mid‑trial rulings including mistrial motions, evidentiary disputes, cell tower evidence admissibility, video‑link testimony under s. 714.2 of the Criminal Code, interpretation issues under s. 14 of the Charter, and jury charge requests.

The court dismissed several defence mistrial applications, permitted certain Crown evidence including cell tower records as factual evidence, allowed video‑link testimony from a witness abroad, and provided jury instructions concerning fabricated statements and the Browne v. Dunn rule.

The jury ultimately convicted two accused and acquitted one.

In a criminal prosecution for kidnapping, extortion, and assault, the court conducted a blended voir dire regarding the admissibility of statements made by the accused to police following a 911 call and police entry into a residence where a bound complainant was discovered.

The accused argued the statements were involuntary and obtained in breach of Charter rights, particularly the right to counsel under s. 10(b).

The court found that one police officer violated the accused’s right to counsel during investigative detention but declined to exclude certain statements after applying the s. 24(2) framework from Grant.

Spontaneous utterances and statements made after proper cautions and waiver of counsel were admitted, while statements allegedly made to another officer in the police cruiser were excluded because the Crown failed to prove voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt due to unreliable notes and evidentiary inconsistencies.

The accused pleaded guilty to three counts of sexual offences against a 13-year-old victim: two counts of sexual interference and one count of invitation to sexual touching.

The offences occurred in September 2014 when the accused was 33 years old.

The accused had exploited his position as a trusted family friend to initiate sexual contact with the victim, engaging in unprotected vaginal intercourse and oral sex on two separate occasions.

The Crown sought a global sentence of 5 years imprisonment, while the defence argued for 2 years less a day.

The court imposed a global sentence of 5 years imprisonment with credit for 345 days of pre-sentence custody at a rate of 1.5 days per day served, resulting in approximately 17 months credit.

The court also imposed ancillary orders including a DNA order, prohibition on communication with the victim, lifetime sex offender registry requirement, and a 10-year prohibition on employment or volunteering with persons under 16 years of age.

The offender was convicted of historical sexual interference and invitation to sexual touching against a child who was 9 to 12 years old at the time.

The abuse occurred over a two-year period while the offender lived with the victim's family.

The court found the offender was in a position of trust and the abuse was prolonged and frequent.

The court sentenced the offender to three and a half years' imprisonment, with six months' credit for strict bail conditions, resulting in a net sentence of three years in the penitentiary, along with SOIRA, DNA, weapons prohibition, and s. 161 orders.

This is a Dawson Motion brought by multiple defendants in a drug and firearm investigation known as Project Wheeler.

The defendants sought leave to cross-examine the affiant who deposed to the affidavit in support of a wiretap authorization granted by a Superior Court judge.

The defendants challenged two areas: claims about possession of firearms and statements that observations about meetings were indicative of drug trafficking.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the defendants failed to demonstrate how cross-examination would undermine the preconditions for the wiretap authorization and that the allegations of sweeping generalizations and circular reasoning were not relevant to an attack on facial validity in the circumstances presented.

In a criminal jury trial on kidnapping, extortion, and assault charges, the Crown sought to adduce hearsay statements made by an absent alleged participant through a former friend.

The court held the co-conspirators' exception did not apply because there was no direct or circumstantial evidence that a joint criminal enterprise involving the accused already existed when the statements were made.

The court also rejected alternative hearsay routes based on penal interest, present intention, motive, and credibility corroboration, finding the proposed evidence irrelevant to the live issue of the identity and participation of the accused.

The application was dismissed, subject only to a narrow allowance to refer to the Square One meeting to refresh the witness's memory about a phone number.

The applicants sought a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging their right to trial within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) had been breached.

The case involved charges of kidnapping, extortion, and assault arising from a violent abduction.

The court conducted a detailed Morin analysis of delay, allocating periods to inherent requirements, defence delay, institutional delay, and Crown delay, including delay caused by a mistrial following disclosure failures.

The court determined that total Crown and institutional delay amounted to approximately 14 months and 27 days, falling within the Morin guidelines.

Although some prejudice was established, it did not reach the level required to justify a constitutional remedy, and the seriousness of the offences weighed strongly in favour of a trial on the merits.

The Crown applied to adduce evidence under s. 540(7) of the Criminal Code at a preliminary inquiry for a second degree murder charge.

The Crown sought to introduce various evidence including photographs, statements from ambulance attendants, victim statements to her lawyer and mother, video and audio recordings, cell phone records and text messages, forensic reports, and pathology reports.

The defence opposed admission of the victim's statements to her lawyer and mother.

The court admitted most of the Crown's proposed evidence, finding it credible and trustworthy under the s. 540(7) threshold.

The court also admitted the victim's statements to her mother and lawyer, finding they met the threshold test and that the witnesses had sufficient reliability despite potential credibility issues.

The accused brought a pre‑trial application under s. 276 of the Criminal Code seeking leave to cross‑examine the complainant about prior sexual activity with him and with other individuals.

The proposed questioning arose in the context of numerous text messages between the parties that appeared to reference sexual relations during the period when they lived together.

The court held that cross‑examination regarding alleged prior consensual sexual activity between the complainant and the accused was relevant to credibility and necessary to provide context for the text message evidence.

However, proposed questioning about the complainant’s sexual activity with other individuals was excluded as irrelevant and as improperly engaging the prohibited “twin myths.” Leave was therefore granted only in relation to prior sexual activity between the complainant and the accused.

At a preliminary inquiry, the Crown sought to establish sufficient evidence to commit four accused persons to trial for armed home invasion robbery, kidnapping with intent to hold for ransom, and related offences.

The evidence included direct testimony from the complainant, extensive video surveillance from the complainant's home security system, CTV news helicopter footage of the police takedown, and mall security video.

The court found sufficient evidence upon which a properly instructed trier of fact could reasonably find guilt on charges of armed robbery, kidnapping with use of firearms, masked commission of indictable offences, and escape from lawful custody.

All four accused were committed to stand trial in Superior Court before a judge and jury.

During a murder trial involving multiple accused, an issue arose regarding a potential conflict of interest after counsel for one accused had previously represented a co‑accused on an unrelated impaired driving matter years earlier.

The court considered whether the prior representation created a risk of misuse of confidential information or an appearance of conflict under the principles in MacDonald Estate v. Martin.

Although the risk of prejudice was assessed as minimal and both affected accused were willing to waive any conflict, the court emphasized the unpredictability of a multi‑accused criminal trial and the need to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice.

The judge permitted counsel to continue acting subject to strict conditions, including written waivers, restrictions on cross‑examination of the former client, and prohibitions on accessing or using any prior confidential information.