Erica Jill Baron

The applicant brought an urgent application for physician-assisted death and sought confidentiality orders, including a publication ban and sealing order, without giving notice to the media.

The court balanced the open court principle with the applicant's dire medical circumstances and privacy interests.

The court granted an interim publication ban and sealing order, authorized the use of pseudonyms, and directed the applicant to provide notice to the media, giving the media 60 days to bring a motion to challenge the orders.

The applicant sought judicial authorization for physician-assisted death during the interim constitutional exemption regime established by Carter.

The court held that the evidentiary record established all five Carter criteria, including adult capacity, a grievous and irremediable medical condition, intolerable suffering, absence of acceptable alleviating treatment, and clear consent.

The court further held that a court-authorized physician-assisted death in these circumstances did not trigger the notification provisions in s. 10(1) of the Coroners Act.

The application and ancillary declaratory relief were granted.

The applicant, an 80-year-old man with advanced-stage aggressive lymphoma, brought a preliminary motion for confidentiality orders in his application for physician-assisted death under the Carter framework.

He sought orders allowing him, his family, and his physicians to proceed anonymously, a publication ban on identifying information, and a sealing order for the application record, proposing to file a redacted version for the public.

The media respondents opposed the anonymity of the physicians and requested a 'counsel's eyes only' review of the unredacted record.

The court granted the motion, finding that the applicant's proposal struck the appropriate balance between the open court principle and the need to protect the privacy and dignity of the applicant, as well as the public interest in not deterring physicians from participating in such applications.

The appellants sued the respondent physicians for damages, including the difference between their actual legal fees and the costs awarded in prior proceedings regarding the withdrawal of life support, as well as damages for various torts based on a pre-litigation letter sent by the respondents' counsel.

The motion judge dismissed the action as an abuse of process.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding that the claim for legal fees was barred by issue estoppel and the tort claims were barred by the doctrine of absolute privilege, as the letter was intimately connected to contemplated judicial proceedings.

Following a prior judgment, the parties reached an agreement regarding costs arising from the motion and the action.

The court issued a costs endorsement confirming the parties’ consent.

The plaintiffs, acting personally and as substitute decision maker and litigation guardian for other parties, agreed to pay the defendant physicians a lump sum amount.

The order formalized the agreed costs payment resolving the outstanding costs issue between the parties.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their medical malpractice action against the respondent doctor following the death of a patient who underwent an axillary-femoral bypass.

The trial judge found the respondent breached the standard of care by using a graft that was 'not recommended' by the manufacturer and failing to obtain informed consent, but concluded the appellants failed to prove causation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge did not err in his robust and pragmatic analysis of the evidence and correctly concluded that the 'material contribution' approach to causation was inapplicable.

Physicians sought to withdraw life support from an incapable patient while the substitute decision-maker refused consent.

The Court held, by majority, that withdrawal of life support in the circumstances constituted treatment under Ontario’s Health Care Consent Act, 1996 and therefore required consent under the statutory regime.

The majority concluded that disputes over refusal of consent must be addressed before the Consent and Capacity Board, which may substitute its decision if statutory best-interests criteria are not met.

Dissenting reasons would have resolved the dispute under the common law rather than the statutory board process.

The appeal was dismissed, with dissent.

A not‑for‑profit organization sought an interlocutory injunction preventing a bank from terminating its banking relationship pending trial or the outcome of related Federal Court of Appeal proceedings.

The bank had provided approximately four months’ notice of termination after the organization’s charitable status had been revoked by the Canada Revenue Agency.

The court held that banks may terminate banking relationships without cause provided reasonable notice is given and that reasonableness should be assessed in ordinary circumstances rather than based on the plaintiff’s regulatory difficulties.

Applying the RJR‑MacDonald test, the court found the plaintiff failed to establish a strong prima facie case, failed to prove irreparable harm, and did not satisfy the balance of convenience.

The request for mandatory injunctive relief was therefore refused.

The plaintiffs brought a medical malpractice action following the death of Frederick Fowlow, who died from a detached vascular graft four days after undergoing an axillofemoral bypass surgery performed by the defendant surgeon.

The plaintiffs alleged the surgeon was negligent for using a graft that the manufacturer expressly warned was not recommended for that specific procedure.

The court found that the surgeon breached the standard of care by failing to read the manufacturer's instructions, using the non-recommended graft, and failing to inform the patient of the manufacturer's warning.

However, the action was dismissed because the plaintiffs failed to prove causation; there was insufficient evidence to establish that the detachment of the graft was caused by the type of graft used rather than being a known inherent risk of the procedure.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to set aside a registrar’s order dismissing a medical malpractice action as abandoned under Rule 48.15 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and to extend time for service of the statement of claim.

The action alleged negligent misdiagnosis and treatment resulting in severe brain damage following whole brain radiation administered on the basis of an incorrect MRI interpretation.

Applying the contextual analysis and the Reid factors, the court found the delay was attributable to inadvertence arising during a transition between counsel rather than solicitor negligence.

The defendants failed to demonstrate actual prejudice and presumptive prejudice was minimal given the short interval between the limitation expiry and notice of the claim.

The dismissal order was therefore set aside and the time for service extended.

The appellant surgeon appealed a trial judgment finding him negligent in his care and treatment of the respondent patient.

The patient suffered severe complications, including nerve and artery damage, during surgery for Thoracic Outlet Syndrome.

The trial judge found that the surgeon failed to adequately disclose the risks of the surgery and that a reasonable person in the patient's position would not have consented had proper disclosure been made.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual findings regarding informed consent.

The appellants appealed an order granting summary judgment to the respondents in a medical malpractice action.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the respondents had not filed an expert medical report and failed to meet their burden of showing no genuine issue for trial.

The Court also held that the limitation period defence raised an issue of discoverability that must go to trial.

The summary judgment was set aside and costs were awarded to the appellants.

The appellant hospital appealed a motion judge's order refusing to approve a 1998 infant settlement and granting the plaintiff's motion to amend the claim for damages.

The plaintiff sought the amendment based on new expert evidence indicating her life expectancy had increased by 30 to 35 years since the settlement was reached.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge correctly focused on the best interests of the child under Rule 7.08 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and reasonably relied on the uncontradicted expert evidence regarding life expectancy.

The testator left a specific bequest of a Florida property to her sister.

Prior to her death, while she was incapable of managing property, her attorneys under a continuing power of attorney sold the property, which was held by a corporation she wholly owned.

The residuary beneficiaries argued the gift adeemed.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's finding that the anti-ademption provision in s. 36(1) of the Substitute Decisions Act, 1992 applied, preserving the gift for the sister's estate.

The Court also affirmed the finding of incapacity and awarded costs against the unsuccessful appellants, departing from the traditional rule that estate litigation costs are paid from the estate.

The appellants suffered losses in their margin accounts with a securities dealer and sued the dealer.

They later sought to amend their claim to add the Investment Dealers Association of Canada (IDA) as a defendant, alleging negligence in its regulatory oversight.

The motions judge dismissed the motion, finding no reasonable cause of action.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the IDA, as a voluntary regulator, owes its duty to the public at large rather than to individual investors, and that policy considerations such as indeterminate liability negate any prima facie duty of care.

A ratepayers' association applied for judicial review of a school board's decision to lease a closed school site to a private developer for a seniors' complex.

The ratepayers argued the board breached a duty of fairness by failing to consult the public before approving the lease, relying on a voluntary board policy.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the board owed no general duty of fairness to local residents regarding the disposition of surplus property.

Furthermore, the board's internal policy did not create a legitimate expectation of public consultation because it was not published or relied upon by the community.