Stefan Alexander De Smit

The respondent, an assistant manager at Wal-Mart, was constructively dismissed after enduring months of abusive and demeaning treatment from her supervisor.

When she complained to Wal-Mart management, they deemed her complaints unsubstantiated and threatened her with reprisal.

At trial, a jury awarded substantial compensatory, aggravated, and punitive damages against both the supervisor and Wal-Mart.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the findings of liability and the compensatory and aggravated damages awards, finding that the supervisor intentionally inflicted mental suffering and Wal-Mart breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing.

However, the Court significantly reduced the punitive damages awards against both defendants, concluding that the original amounts were not rationally required to achieve the goals of punishment, denunciation, and deterrence in light of the high compensatory awards.

The proposed representative plaintiffs sought certification of a class action alleging that fellows at a teaching hospital were contractually entitled to receive fellowship stipends on a tax‑free basis and that the defendant payroll management entity breached the employment contracts by later withholding income tax without grossing up compensation.

The defendant opposed certification and brought a motion for summary judgment dismissing the action.

The court held that although the defendant could be considered an employer within a common‑employer structure, there was no express, implied, or collateral contractual term guaranteeing tax‑free fellowship payments.

Because the alleged promise of tax‑free compensation could not be established and damages claims were untenable, the individual claims failed.

Certification was also denied because the key issues were individualized and the proposed plaintiffs were not adequate representatives.

Following dismissal of a counterclaim alleging wrongful dismissal and breach of contract and seeking $11.8 million in damages, the successful defendant by counterclaim sought substantial indemnity costs exceeding $299,000.

The court considered Rule 57 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and the principles governing cost awards under the Courts of Justice Act, including the effect of an unaccepted Rule 49 settlement offer and allegations of uncooperative litigation conduct.

Although the court accepted that some conduct of opposing counsel created additional expense, it declined to award substantial indemnity costs.

Applying the objective of fairness and reasonableness to the unsuccessful party, the court fixed costs on a partial indemnity basis.

Physicians sought to withdraw life support from an incapable patient while the substitute decision-maker refused consent.

The Court held, by majority, that withdrawal of life support in the circumstances constituted treatment under Ontario’s Health Care Consent Act, 1996 and therefore required consent under the statutory regime.

The majority concluded that disputes over refusal of consent must be addressed before the Consent and Capacity Board, which may substitute its decision if statutory best-interests criteria are not met.

Dissenting reasons would have resolved the dispute under the common law rather than the statutory board process.

The appeal was dismissed, with dissent.

A software developer and his corporation brought a counterclaim against a securities trading firm alleging wrongful dismissal and breach of contract following termination of his role as chief technology officer.

The court first determined that despite a services agreement structured through a corporation, the relationship functioned as employment, applying the multi‑factor test from Sagaz Industries.

The court held that a prior service agreement had been fully released by mutual release and could not ground claims.

It also rejected the claimant’s assertion that he was entitled to commissions based on algorithmic trading profits, finding the agreement applied to traders and not to a software developer who neither created strategies nor executed trades.

The court further found just cause for termination where the employee inserted malicious code into the firm’s trading platform, removed source code access, attempted to market competing software, and breached confidentiality obligations.

The counterclaim for wrongful dismissal and breach of contract was dismissed.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's decision refusing to set aside a default judgment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding ample evidence, including video recordings, that the appellants were personally served and consciously decided to ignore the process.

The Court noted that a conscious decision not to participate bars consideration of a defence on the merits.

The respondent law firm sued the appellant for unpaid legal bills arising from divorce proceedings.

The appellant counterclaimed for an order that the bills be referred for assessment, alleging his lawyer failed to address a material change in circumstance and a mathematical error in an arbitration award.

The motion judge granted summary judgment for the law firm, finding the request for assessment disingenuous because the appellant had promised to pay.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the request was not tactical as the factual basis was known to the solicitor during the relationship, and referred the accounts for assessment.

The defendant employer brought a motion under Rule 25.11 of the Rules of Civil Procedure seeking to strike a paragraph of the plaintiff’s Statement of Claim that referred to a “without prejudice” settlement offer made in the termination letter.

The action was for wrongful dismissal, and the plaintiff attempted to plead the employer’s offer of six weeks’ salary made in exchange for a release.

The court reviewed authorities addressing the privilege attaching to settlement discussions and emphasized the policy of encouraging early settlement without fear that offers will later be used in litigation.

Finding that the offer was expressly made without prejudice and in contemplation of potential litigation, the court concluded that the pleading improperly disclosed privileged settlement communications.

The paragraph referencing the offer was therefore struck from the pleading.