Elizabeth A. Quigley

The appellant appealed a jury verdict awarding the respondent approximately $700,000 in damages for personal injuries arising from a motor vehicle accident.

The main issue at trial was whether the respondent's post-traumatic stress disorder was caused by the collision or by an earlier sexual assault.

The trial judge excluded surveillance video evidence and Facebook posts that the defence sought to introduce as substantive evidence of the respondent's functionality.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in excluding the surveillance evidence by dealing with it as a whole rather than taking a discrete approach to each video excerpt, and by concluding that the evidence could only be admissible if it directly contradicted the respondent's testimony.

However, the Court found that even if the surveillance evidence were admissible, it was not so significant that it would have affected the jury's verdict on damages.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants sought to add three health care providers as defendants to a medical malpractice action more than two years after the original injury.

The motion judge dismissed the motion on the basis that the limitation period had expired.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge applied the wrong test under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court held that the motion judge failed to make proper findings of fact regarding when the appellants knew or ought reasonably to have known of their claims against the proposed defendants.

The court also found that the motion judge erred in treating lack of due diligence as a standalone ground for finding claims statute-barred.

The key distinction was that the claims against the proposed defendants differed from the claim against the original defendant, as they involved allegations that the health care providers failed to take immediate action once cauda equina syndrome was suspected, information that was only revealed during examinations for discovery in 2015.

The plaintiff was catastrophically injured in a motor vehicle accident and sued the defendants for damages.

The jury found the defendants 62% liable and awarded damages of approximately $2.6 million, including $2.2 million for future care costs.

The trial judge made a conditional assignment order of the plaintiff's future statutory accident benefits (SABs) to the defendants' insurers under section 267.8(12)(a)(ii) of the Insurance Act.

The plaintiff appealed, arguing that the assignment violated strict matching principles and was premature.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the conditional assignment order and rejecting the strict matching approach in favour of a "silo" approach.

The court also denied leave to appeal the trial judge's substantial reduction of the plaintiff's costs award, which was reduced from $795,616.09 to $375,000 due to the plaintiff's counsel's conduct regarding a settlement offer, the lack of material benefit in proceeding to trial, and conduct that unnecessarily extended the trial.

The respondent brought an unsuccessful motion for reconsideration in writing.

The court awarded costs to the responding parties, rejecting the moving party's argument that costs should be modest because the motion was made in writing.

The court found that the 18.6 hours spent by counsel responding to the motion was reasonable, as the motion required a review of materials filed on the appeal and arguments made at the hearing.

Costs were fixed at $8,249, inclusive of disbursements and HST.

The moving party sought an order to withdraw the Court of Appeal's reasons for decision dated September 19, 2017, and to grant a rehearing before a five-judge panel, or alternatively, to stay the decision pending determination of related appeals.

The moving party argued that the Court had effectively overruled Bannon v. Hagerman Estate without notice and had addressed a new issue regarding the Ontario Drug Benefit Program that was not raised by the parties.

The Court dismissed the motion, finding that it had not overruled Bannon but rather distinguished it on its facts, and that the Ontario Drug Benefit Program issue had been squarely addressed by both parties during the appeal.

This is a costs endorsement following a successful appeal by the defendants.

The appellants sought partial indemnity costs of $56,676.40, which reflected their full indemnity rate.

The respondent argued for a significant reduction, contending that the court's decision had changed the legal landscape in personal injury litigation.

The court reduced the costs award to $30,000 inclusive of disbursements and HST, reflecting a partial indemnity rate and accounting for the complexity of the issues involved.

Appeal from a jury trial judgment in a catastrophic motor vehicle accident case.

The appellants challenged five rulings by the trial judge regarding prejudgment interest, assignment of statutory accident benefits (SABs), and treatment of collateral benefits.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, reducing the prejudgment interest rate from 5% to 2.5%, amending the retirement age for income replacement benefit assignment from age 60 to age 64, and ordering assignment of future SABs for medication, assistive devices, and professional services.

The court declined to order assignment of drug benefits after age 65 due to the Ontario Drug Benefit Program, but found the trial judge erred in treating this as a contingency rather than a certainty.

The appellant insurer appealed an order requiring it to pay interest on retroactive attendant care and housekeeping benefits to the respondent, who was catastrophically injured in a motor vehicle accident.

The insurer argued the benefits were not overdue until a catastrophic impairment determination was made in 2013.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the application judge's finding that the respondent had been catastrophically impaired since the accident and that the benefits were therefore overdue from the dates they were initially terminated or capped, entitling her to interest.

Intact Insurance Company brought an application seeking a declaration on the interpretation of s. 44(1) of the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule (SABS), specifically whether an insured is required to sign any consent form dictated by the insurer for a s. 44 examination.

The respondent, Anne Beaudry, argued that such consent forms must be "reasonable and justifiable." The court found that any required consent form must be "reasonable" based on the language of s. 44, the insurer's duty of utmost good faith, and the Unfair and Deceptive Practices Regulation.

The court dismissed Intact's request to unilaterally dictate consent terms, emphasizing the need for reasonableness and negotiation.

This decision addresses a costs award and ancillary matters following a jury verdict in a personal injury action.

The jury found the defendants 62% liable, awarding substantial damages for pain and suffering, future care costs, and family law damages.

The court ruled on four key issues: ordering an assignment of accident benefits, limiting the McEwens' personal liability to insurance policy limits due to their bankruptcy, applying a 5% pre-judgment interest rate for non-pecuniary damages (finding the relevant statutory amendment not retrospective), and applying the new statutory deductible of $18,270.00 to the Family Law claim.

Despite the jury verdict exceeding some settlement offers, the court significantly reduced the plaintiffs' requested costs from $795,616.09 to $375,000, citing the plaintiffs' conduct, including late expert reports, changing their position on calling the plaintiff, and engaging in "sharp practice" by attempting to enforce a settlement offer while simultaneously initiating a bad faith claim against an insurer.

Following a jury verdict in a personal injury action arising from a motor vehicle accident, the court addressed supplementary issues concerning assignment of future Statutory Accident Benefits and the award of costs.

The defendants sought broad assignment of accident benefits to avoid alleged double recovery, arguing that the value of future benefits exceeded the verdict when compared with their settlement offer.

The court held that the defendants failed to meet the strict evidentiary burden required under the Insurance Act because the jury’s global awards did not specify the overlap between tort damages and accident benefits.

The court limited the assignment of income replacement benefits to a defined period and accepted assignments for certain other benefits where not disputed.

Costs were awarded to the plaintiff on a partial indemnity basis, fixed at $350,000 plus additional amounts for submissions and disbursements.

Following a jury verdict awarding damages for catastrophic injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident, the court addressed outstanding issues concerning prejudgment interest, the retrospective application of amendments to the Insurance Act, the assignment and trust of collateral accident benefits, and costs.

The court held that the amendment removing the 5% prejudgment interest rate for non‑pecuniary damages in motor vehicle cases was substantive and therefore did not apply retrospectively.

Prejudgment interest on non‑pecuniary damages was awarded at 5% pursuant to the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court also considered the statutory trust and assignment provisions governing future accident benefits and provided directions regarding potential assignments of benefits and further submissions.

Costs were to be determined following additional written submissions.

In a judge and jury motor vehicle trial involving catastrophic injuries, the court considered whether future medication costs should be reduced to reflect potential public drug coverage available when the plaintiff turned 65.

Applying purposive statutory interpretation to s. 267.8(12)(a)(v) of the Insurance Act, the court held that ODBP coverage is not a 'payment' to which the plaintiff is entitled because no money or transferable value is delivered to the insured person.

As a result, any future ODBP benefit was not assignable to the defendants.

The jury was therefore entitled to consider possible future public drug coverage as a contingency in assessing future medication costs.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment finding them liable for fraud and breach of contract related to a carpet supply and installation contract with a public housing corporation.

The trial judge found the appellants engaged in a deliberate scheme of falsifying invoices and supplying substandard materials, awarding compensatory damages, punitive damages, and full indemnity costs.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings on liability, compensatory damages, and costs, confirming that a contractual stop-payment clause was not a penalty or liquidated damages provision.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part to set aside the joint and several nature of the punitive damages award and the punitive damages awarded against the deceased employee's estate, leaving the principal appellant solely liable for the punitive damages.

Following a prior judgment finding the defendants liable for a fraudulent carpet supply scheme, the court issued supplementary reasons clarifying how the plaintiff must elect judgment between an undisclosed principal and its agents for contract damages while allowing fraud-based damages to be enforced against all defendants.

The court explained the composition of the compensatory damages award and confirmed that only the contract-based component required an election of judgment.

In determining costs, the court considered the discretion under s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Given the defendants’ fraudulent conduct and the complexity and length of the litigation, the court concluded that full indemnity costs were justified.

The plaintiff was awarded $630,475.47 in costs jointly and severally against the defendants.

Following a partially successful appeal, the court determined the appropriate costs award.

The appellant was awarded $25,000 inclusive of disbursements and taxes for the costs of the appeal.

The costs of the trial were reserved to the trial judge hearing the new trial.

The appellant was injured when the respondent lost control of his vehicle on an icy road, crossed the centre line, and struck the appellant's stopped vehicle.

At trial, the respondent did not testify, and the jury found no negligence on his part, dismissing the action.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial on liability, holding that crossing the centre line in breach of the Highway Traffic Act establishes a prima facie case of negligence.

Absent any explanation from the respondent to negate this evidence, the jury's verdict was unreasonable.

The plaintiff, injured at age 15 in 2002, commenced an action against the property owners in 2006.

The defendants added two other individuals as third parties.

In 2009, the plaintiff moved to add the third parties as defendants.

The master and Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding the claim was not discovered before January 1, 2004, and that a minor could not be deemed to have discovered a claim under s. 5(1)(b) of the Limitations Act, 2002.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that actual knowledge does not require knowledge of legal consequences, and that the lower courts erred in law by failing to consider whether the claim was discoverable by a reasonable person with the minor's abilities and circumstances.

Following a nine‑week jury trial arising from a motor vehicle accident, the plaintiffs obtained a damages award substantially lower than the amount claimed.

The defendants relied on Rule 49.10(2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure and argued they were entitled to partial indemnity costs from the date of a pre‑trial offer to settle because the judgment was allegedly less favourable than their offer.

The court held that although the offer met the timing requirement, the offer’s treatment of prejudgment interest on a lump‑sum amount was ambiguous and incapable of precise calculation for mixed heads of damages attracting different statutory interest rates under the Courts of Justice Act.

Because the offer lacked sufficient certainty to trigger the Rule 49 cost consequences, the defendants failed to meet their burden under Rule 49.10(3).

Considering the Rule 57 factors and the circumstances of the litigation, the court awarded the plaintiffs their partial indemnity costs throughout the proceeding.

The plaintiff employer sued its former president for breach of a non-competition covenant and breach of fiduciary duty after he successfully bid against the employer on a public municipal tender.

The trial judge used blue-pencil severance to cure an ambiguous and unreasonable temporal restriction in the non-competition covenant and found the employee liable.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that blue-pencil severance was unavailable because the severed words were not trivial and there was no evidence the parties would have unquestionably agreed to the contract without them.

The Court also found no breach of fiduciary duty, as the employee did not use confidential information or compete unfairly.

The employee's cross-appeal was allowed and the action dismissed.