Elizabeth A. Quigley

The appellant was ordered to undergo a psychiatric assessment under s. 672.11 of the Criminal Code and was held in a detention centre for 15 days before a hospital bed became available.

She brought a proposed class action alleging Charter violations, breach of fiduciary duty, and negligence by the Crown for failing to immediately transfer her to a hospital.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal of the action, finding that the Criminal Code permits detention in a jail pending transfer to a hospital, the detention was lawful, and the Crown owed no fiduciary duty to the appellant that would override its public interest obligations.

The police obtained warrants to search the respondents' premises for evidence of offences under the Radiocommunication Act relating to the decoding of encrypted satellite signals.

The trial judge set aside the warrants and awarded Charter damages, finding the police acted maliciously by failing to disclose conflicting out-of-province case law in the information to obtain and by not considering alternatives to a search warrant.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the police had no duty to disclose non-binding conflicting case law or to consider alternative enforcement mechanisms.

The court found no basis for setting aside the warrants or awarding damages, and dismissed the respondents' action.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing her action on the grounds that her re-amended statement of claim was verbose, pleaded evidence, attempted to re-litigate matters finally disposed of, and was an abuse of process.

The appellant also brought a preliminary motion to strike the respondents' affidavits because they were sworn by associates in the same law firms as counsel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the preliminary motion, finding the affidavits dealt with facts already on the record.

The Court also dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that the underlying basis for the appellant's claims—the trustee's right to proceed with the sale of the matrimonial home after the husband's discharge from bankruptcy—had been conclusively determined in earlier proceedings.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment, arguing the trial was unfair because their counsel was discharged mid-trial, a mistrial was not declared, and the trial judge relied on the appellant's conduct in court outside the witness box to assess credibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding ample evidence to justify the removal of counsel, no error in proceeding after a two-week adjournment for the appellant to prepare to represent himself, and sufficient additional basis for the trial judge's credibility findings.

The insured was severely injured in a motor vehicle accident and subsequently convicted of dangerous driving.

The insurer denied Statutory Accident Benefits (SABS) after the conviction, arguing the conviction was a complete bar under s. 30(4) of O. Reg. 403/96.

The motion judge held that the insured was only excluded from receiving benefits for the period between being charged and being convicted, and that O. Reg. 403/96 governed the policy.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the insurer's appeal and the insured's cross-appeal, finding that while s. 30(4) likely contained a drafting error that failed to achieve the legislature's intent to completely bar benefits upon conviction, the language was clear and unambiguous, precluding the court from redrafting the regulation to fix the gap.