Edward L. Greenspan

The applicant sought bail pending his application for judicial review of the Minister's decision to order his surrender for extradition to Germany.

The court found that the judicial review application was not so devoid of merit as to be frivolous, as it raised a novel issue regarding the Minister's power under s. 43(2) of the Extradition Act.

Given that the applicant met the other statutory criteria and had been on bail without incident for eight and a half years, the application for bail was granted.

The applicants (accused) brought a motion for directions seeking a disclosure order regarding an in-chambers pre-sentence meeting before the trial judge, relevant to the Crown's sentence appeal.

The Crown confirmed it possessed no written records of the meeting and conceded it could not contradict the applicants' version of the essential facts.

Consequently, the Court of Appeal found no purpose would be served by a disclosure order and directed the applicants to prepare a draft statement of agreed facts based on their version of events.

The appellant newspaper sought intervenor status to challenge sealing and protective orders made in respect of material filed on a motion for a Mareva injunction against the respondents.

The motion judge dismissed the newspaper's motion.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the motion judge erred in refusing to grant the newspaper intervenor status, failing to give sufficient weight to the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of the press.

The Court set aside the order, granted the newspaper intervenor status for the limited purpose of challenging the protective order, and remitted the balance of the motion to the Superior Court for a new hearing.

The appellant's criminal charges were stayed on the eve of trial due to delay and disclosure issues, and the trial judge awarded costs against the Crown under s. 24(1) of the Charter.

The summary conviction appeal judge set aside the costs award.

On further appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the setting aside of the costs award, finding that while the 16-month delay triggered a s. 11(b) inquiry, the Crown's conduct did not amount to the marked and unacceptable departure from reasonable standards required to justify a costs award.

The applicant sought judicial review of the Minister of Justice's refusal to reconsider a previous decision to surrender the applicant for extradition.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, holding that the Minister's decision was entitled to significant deference.

The court found the Minister reasonably concluded that the applicant raised no new substantive issues and appropriately prioritized the need for finality in the extradition context.

The appellant appealed his committal for extradition to the United States on drug trafficking charges and sought judicial review of the Minister's surrender order.

He argued that the Canadian authorities' withdrawal of domestic charges without notice constituted an abuse of process, depriving him of the opportunity to build a record to argue against extradition.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the extradition judge's refusal to grant a stay, as the domestic charges were not a ruse and the appellant had other avenues to raise his arguments.

The Court also upheld the Minister's surrender order, finding it was not unjust or oppressive despite the potentially severe penalty in the United States.

The applicant sought bail pending the determination of his judicial review of the Minister of Justice's refusal to reconsider a surrender order in extradition proceedings.

The Crown opposed bail, arguing the judicial review was frivolous and citing the public interest in enforcing the surrender order after seven and a half years of delay, and alternatively sought to expedite the hearing.

The court granted bail, finding the judicial review raised new issues and the applicant's detention was not necessary in the public interest.

However, the court also granted the Crown's motion to expedite the judicial review hearing to mitigate prejudice to the extradition partner.

The United States sought the extradition of the appellants under the 'record of the case' method.

The appellants challenged the constitutionality of the evidentiary provisions of the Extradition Act, arguing they violated section 7 of the Charter by allowing committal on unreliable evidence.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the provisions are constitutional because section 29(1) of the Act grants the extradition judge the discretion to refuse committal if the evidence is manifestly unreliable or unavailable for trial.

The appeals were dismissed and the committals for extradition were upheld.

The appellant appealed his committal for extradition to Germany and applied for judicial review of the Minister of Justice's decision to surrender him.

Germany sought the appellant's extradition on charges of tax evasion, fraud, forgery, and bribery related to secret commissions earned from international arms and aircraft sales.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding sufficient evidence to justify committal and holding that the double criminality rule was satisfied for the tax offences.

The Court also dismissed the application for judicial review, concluding that the Minister did not err in interpreting the extradition treaty, assessing the evidence, or finding that surrender would not be unjust or oppressive.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Ontario Securities Commission finding that he failed to meet the standards of business conduct expected of a CEO and imposing sanctions under s. 127 of the Securities Act.

The Commission found the appellant had primary responsibility for a stock subscription program that lacked commercial justification and failed to take steps to contain the situation when problems emerged.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal on the merits, finding the Commission's conclusions were reasonable and supported by evidence.

On consent, the appeal regarding sanctions was allowed and remitted to the Commission for a new hearing.

The receiver of Ravelston Corporation Limited obtained an order allowing it to attorn to the jurisdiction of a U.S. federal court and plead not guilty to criminal charges on behalf of the corporation.

A shareholder and creditor appealed the order, arguing it involved future rights under s. 193(a) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, or alternatively sought leave to appeal under s. 193(e).

The Court of Appeal quashed the appeal, finding the order did not involve future rights but merely directed how present rights should be exercised.

The court also refused leave to appeal, concluding the proposed appeal lacked prima facie merit as the supervising judge made no error in principle in exercising his discretion.

The appellants, former senior officers and directors of Hollinger Inc., appealed an order compelling them to submit to questioning by an Inspector appointed under the Canada Business Corporations Act.

They argued that being compelled to answer questions in Canada would violate their Charter rights against self-incrimination, as their answers could be used against them in ongoing criminal proceedings in the United States.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellants were not entitled to a constitutional exemption because the Canadian inquiry was fact-finding rather than prosecutorial.

The Court also declined to stay the order, noting that the application judge had established a procedure to rule on specific questions and craft protective mechanisms on a case-by-case basis.

The appellant was convicted of sexual offences against a five-year-old child.

At trial, he relied on an alibi defence supported by an independent witness.

The Crown cross-examined the witness on her reliability, suggesting a document she claimed to have delivered to the Crown was never received.

Post-trial, the Crown discovered the document had indeed been received.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court dismissed the appeal without addressing this new evidence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the undisclosed evidence met the test for a new trial as it could have impacted the trial judge's credibility findings.

The applicants, charged with the second-degree murder of their infant son, sought a review of a detention order under s. 680 of the Criminal Code.

The motion judge had denied bail on the secondary ground, citing concerns that the applicants might gain access to their surviving child and that their proposed sureties would not enforce a no-contact order.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the motion judge's concerns but concluded that detention was not the only way to protect the surviving child, who was in the custody of the Children's Aid Society.

The Court found that a strict no-contact condition, along with undertakings from family members, would adequately protect the child.

The Court held that detention was not necessary on the secondary ground and directed further submissions on release terms.

The applicants, charged with the second-degree murder of their infant son, sought a review of a decision denying them bail.

The motion judge had denied bail on the secondary ground, citing concerns for the safety of the applicants' surviving child.

The Court of Appeal found that the surviving child, currently in the custody of the Children's Aid Society, could be adequately protected through strict release conditions prohibiting any contact.

The court concluded that detention was not necessary on the secondary or tertiary grounds and ordered the applicants' release subject to conditions.

The applicant, a Canadian citizen, was ordered surrendered for extradition to the United States.

After his appeals were exhausted, he requested the Minister of Justice amend the surrender order to require assurances that he would receive enhanced credit for his five years of pre-trial custody in Canada.

The Minister refused.

The applicant sought judicial review of this refusal.

The Court of Appeal held it had jurisdiction to review the Minister's refusal to amend the order.

However, the court dismissed the application on the merits, finding that because Canadian law does not guarantee enhanced credit for pre-trial custody, the absence of such a guarantee in the United States does not violate section 7 of the Charter.

The respondent was convicted at trial of threatening his wife and possessing a weapon for a purpose dangerous to the public peace following a domestic dispute over property.

The summary conviction appeal judge quashed the convictions, finding them unreasonable.

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and restored the convictions, holding that the summary conviction appeal judge erred in law by substituting his own view of the evidence.

The trial judge's findings that the respondent uttered a threat and formed the unlawful purpose to use his pocket knife as a weapon prior to its use were supported by the evidence and not unreasonable.

The appellant, a Canadian citizen, was arrested and detained for eight days pursuant to a provisional arrest warrant requested by Germany for extradition purposes.

He sued Germany for damages for personal injuries (mental distress, denial of liberty, damage to reputation) resulting from his arrest.

Germany claimed sovereign immunity under the State Immunity Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that Germany did not waive its immunity by initiating the extradition process, as the civil action was separate.

Furthermore, the 'personal injury' exception in s. 6(a) of the Act applies only to physical injury, not to the mental distress or loss of liberty claimed by the appellant.

The action against Germany was dismissed.

The appellant, a former Premier of Nova Scotia, was charged with numerous historic sex-related offences.

He sought a stay of proceedings, alleging abuse of process due to police prematurely identifying him as a suspect, a Crown attorney engaging in 'judge shopping', and the Crown conducting pre-charge interviews of complainants which allegedly compromised their objectivity.

The trial judge granted a partial stay of nine counts.

The Court of Appeal overturned the stay.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the conduct did not amount to an abuse of process warranting a stay.

The Court clarified that pre-charge Crown interviews are not inherently abusive and that a stay of proceedings is a prospective remedy reserved for the clearest of cases where prejudice will be perpetuated and no other remedy is capable of removing it.

The plaintiff was arrested for extradition to Germany and subsequently brought a civil action against Canada and Germany for damages for negligence and abuse of power.

The Crown successfully moved for a stay of the civil action pending the outcome of the extradition proceedings.

The plaintiff appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the motions judge erred in principle by failing to apply the high threshold test requiring extraordinary or exceptional circumstances to justify a stay of civil proceedings when concurrent criminal proceedings are pending.