Edward L. Greenspan

The appellant appealed an order of committal for surrender pursuant to the Extradition Act and sought judicial review of the Minister of Justice's order of surrender.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the extradition judge's conclusions that the alleged conduct would constitute an offence in Canada, that the record was sufficient, and that he lacked jurisdiction to entertain the Charter application.

The Court also dismissed the application for judicial review, finding no error in the Minister's exercise of discretion.

The respondents, two Canadian citizens who were 18 at the time of the offences, were wanted in the State of Washington for three counts of aggravated first degree murder.

The Minister of Justice ordered their extradition without seeking assurances that the death penalty would not be imposed.

The respondents challenged the constitutionality of this decision.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while sections 6(1) and 12 of the Charter were not directly violated, extraditing the respondents to face the death penalty without assurances violated their rights under section 7 of the Charter.

The Court found that the principles of fundamental justice, informed by Canada's abolition of the death penalty, international trends, and concerns over wrongful convictions, require the Minister to seek assurances in all but exceptional cases.

The violation could not be justified under section 1.

The Minister's appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was arrested and detained in Canada pursuant to an extradition request by the Federal Republic of Germany.

He subsequently brought a civil action against Germany and Canada claiming damages for mental distress and restriction of liberty.

Germany successfully moved to dismiss the action on the basis of sovereign immunity.

On appeal, the appellant argued that Germany had submitted to the court's jurisdiction by initiating the extradition proceedings and that his claim fell within the 'personal injury' exception under the State Immunity Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that extradition proceedings are distinct from the civil suit and that the 'personal injury' exception requires physical injury.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder after taking the life of his severely disabled daughter.

At trial, the judge removed the defence of necessity from the jury after closing addresses and instructed the jury not to concern itself with the penalty.

Following conviction, the trial judge granted a constitutional exemption from the mandatory minimum sentence of life imprisonment without parole eligibility for 10 years.

The Court of Appeal restored the mandatory minimum sentence.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeals against conviction and sentence, holding that there was no air of reality to the defence of necessity, the trial was not rendered unfair by the timing of the ruling or the judge's instructions, and the mandatory minimum sentence did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment under s. 12 of the Charter given the gravity of the offence.

The appellants appealed a decision of the Federal Court of Appeal which had found that section 231.4 of the Income Tax Act infringed sections 7 and 8 of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, adopting the dissenting reasons of Strayer J.A. in the court below.

The Court held that section 231.4 does not restrict the rights guaranteed by section 7 or section 8 of the Charter, and restored the trial judgment dismissing the constitutional challenge.

The appellants were charged with failing to comply with an administrative order issued under the Environmental Protection Act requiring them to clean up PCB contamination at an abandoned mine.

They did not appeal the order to the Environmental Appeal Board but attempted to collaterally attack its validity at their penal trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the trial judge lacked jurisdiction to rule on the validity of the order, as the legislature intended the specialized appeal board to be the exclusive forum for such challenges.

The appellants appealed a Court of Appeal order setting aside their acquittals for first degree murder and directing a new trial.

The Supreme Court held that the trial judge erred in excluding a key Crown witness on the basis of taint, because the issue went to weight rather than admissibility.

The Court further held that the subsequently released decision in Carosella did not apply, as there was no finding or evidence of deliberate police failure to create records to avoid production.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, facing a Canadian drug charge, was subsequently indicted in the United States for similar offences carrying a ten-year minimum sentence.

On the morning of his Canadian trial, the Crown stayed the proceedings and the appellant was arrested on an extradition warrant.

The appellant argued that the Crown's earlier offer to stay extradition in exchange for a guilty plea to the Canadian charge constituted egregious misconduct.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding no lack of good faith or abuse of process by the Crown.

The accused, a police officer, was charged with attempting to purchase the sexual services of a person under 18.

During the investigation, he made a statement to police without being informed of his right to counsel.

The trial judge excluded the statement from the Crown's case in chief under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

When the accused testified at trial, the Crown sought to use the excluded statement to impeach his credibility during cross-examination.

The trial judge refused, and the accused was acquitted.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the Crown's appeal, holding that the proposed use of the statement for impeachment was not a material change of circumstances that warranted reconsidering the initial ruling that its admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second degree murder, arguing that the jury address by Crown counsel was inflammatory and resulted in an unfair trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada agreed that the address was repugnant to the role of Crown counsel, but the majority held that the trial judge's directions to the jury were adequate to prevent an unfair or partial trial.

The appeal was dismissed.

The accused was arrested for robbery, consulted counsel, and stated he did not wish to make a statement to the police.

He was then placed in a cell with an undercover police officer who engaged him in conversation and elicited incriminating statements.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the accused's right to remain silent under section 7 of the Charter was violated by the police trickery.

The Court concluded that the admission of the conscripted statements would render the trial unfair and bring the administration of justice into disrepute, excluding the evidence under section 24(2) and restoring the acquittal.

The respondents were charged with conspiracy to import heroin.

At trial, the Crown led evidence of the importation of cocaine.

The trial judge instructed the jury that they could convict if satisfied the respondents conspired to import any narcotic, leading to convictions.

The Court of Appeal set aside the convictions and ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the Crown's appeal, holding that the Crown must prove the offence as particularized in the charge.

The Court also refused to allow the Crown to amend the charge, as doing so retroactively would be unfair and prejudicial to the respondents.

The appellants appealed a decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal that set aside a stay of proceedings entered by the trial judge and ordered a new trial.

The stay had been entered based on allegations that the Crown's conduct at trial infringed the appellants' rights to fundamental justice.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the Court of Appeal's exercise of its jurisdiction to review the trial judge's decision.

The appellant was charged with arson after a fire destroyed his clothing store.

At the close of the Crown's case, which rested entirely on circumstantial evidence, the trial judge directed a verdict of acquittal, finding the evidence gave rise only to suspicion.

The Court of Appeal set aside the acquittal and ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge usurped the function of the jury by weighing the evidence.

Applying the Shephard test, the Court found there was admissible circumstantial evidence relating to motive, opportunity, and contradictions in the appellant's statement that, if believed by a properly instructed jury, could justify a conviction.

The appellant was convicted of impaired driving based partly on the opinion evidence of police officers who testified that his ability to drive was impaired by alcohol.

The appellant appealed, arguing that non-expert witnesses should not be permitted to give opinion evidence on the very issue the court had to decide.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that non-expert witnesses, including police officers and laypersons, may give opinion evidence regarding a person's degree of intoxication and impairment.

The Court reasoned that such evidence is admissible as a compendious way of stating facts that are too difficult to narrate individually, and that the trier of fact is free to determine the weight to be given to such opinions.

The appellant was convicted of breaking and entering a dwelling.

At trial, his counsel waived the holding of a voir dire regarding the voluntariness of a statement made to police.

The appellant appealed, arguing that the trial judge erred in failing to conduct a voir dire despite the waiver, and in failing to conduct one to determine if the statement was actually made or after the appellant testified about alleged threats and inducements.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that an accused or their counsel may expressly waive a voir dire, and that the trial judge did not err in his exercise of discretion.