Edward L. Greenspan

The appellant, facing a Canadian drug charge, was subsequently indicted in the United States for similar offences carrying a ten-year minimum sentence.

On the morning of his Canadian trial, the Crown stayed the proceedings and the appellant was arrested on an extradition warrant.

The appellant argued that the Crown's earlier offer to stay extradition in exchange for a guilty plea to the Canadian charge constituted egregious misconduct.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding no lack of good faith or abuse of process by the Crown.

The accused, a police officer, was charged with attempting to purchase the sexual services of a person under 18.

During the investigation, he made a statement to police without being informed of his right to counsel.

The trial judge excluded the statement from the Crown's case in chief under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

When the accused testified at trial, the Crown sought to use the excluded statement to impeach his credibility during cross-examination.

The trial judge refused, and the accused was acquitted.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the Crown's appeal, holding that the proposed use of the statement for impeachment was not a material change of circumstances that warranted reconsidering the initial ruling that its admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second degree murder, arguing that the jury address by Crown counsel was inflammatory and resulted in an unfair trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada agreed that the address was repugnant to the role of Crown counsel, but the majority held that the trial judge's directions to the jury were adequate to prevent an unfair or partial trial.

The appeal was dismissed.

The accused was arrested for robbery, consulted counsel, and stated he did not wish to make a statement to the police.

He was then placed in a cell with an undercover police officer who engaged him in conversation and elicited incriminating statements.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the accused's right to remain silent under section 7 of the Charter was violated by the police trickery.

The Court concluded that the admission of the conscripted statements would render the trial unfair and bring the administration of justice into disrepute, excluding the evidence under section 24(2) and restoring the acquittal.

The respondents were charged with conspiracy to import heroin.

At trial, the Crown led evidence of the importation of cocaine.

The trial judge instructed the jury that they could convict if satisfied the respondents conspired to import any narcotic, leading to convictions.

The Court of Appeal set aside the convictions and ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the Crown's appeal, holding that the Crown must prove the offence as particularized in the charge.

The Court also refused to allow the Crown to amend the charge, as doing so retroactively would be unfair and prejudicial to the respondents.

The appellants appealed a decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal that set aside a stay of proceedings entered by the trial judge and ordered a new trial.

The stay had been entered based on allegations that the Crown's conduct at trial infringed the appellants' rights to fundamental justice.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the Court of Appeal's exercise of its jurisdiction to review the trial judge's decision.

The appellant was charged with arson after a fire destroyed his clothing store.

At the close of the Crown's case, which rested entirely on circumstantial evidence, the trial judge directed a verdict of acquittal, finding the evidence gave rise only to suspicion.

The Court of Appeal set aside the acquittal and ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge usurped the function of the jury by weighing the evidence.

Applying the Shephard test, the Court found there was admissible circumstantial evidence relating to motive, opportunity, and contradictions in the appellant's statement that, if believed by a properly instructed jury, could justify a conviction.

The appellant was convicted of impaired driving based partly on the opinion evidence of police officers who testified that his ability to drive was impaired by alcohol.

The appellant appealed, arguing that non-expert witnesses should not be permitted to give opinion evidence on the very issue the court had to decide.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that non-expert witnesses, including police officers and laypersons, may give opinion evidence regarding a person's degree of intoxication and impairment.

The Court reasoned that such evidence is admissible as a compendious way of stating facts that are too difficult to narrate individually, and that the trier of fact is free to determine the weight to be given to such opinions.

The appellant was convicted of breaking and entering a dwelling.

At trial, his counsel waived the holding of a voir dire regarding the voluntariness of a statement made to police.

The appellant appealed, arguing that the trial judge erred in failing to conduct a voir dire despite the waiver, and in failing to conduct one to determine if the statement was actually made or after the appellant testified about alleged threats and inducements.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that an accused or their counsel may expressly waive a voir dire, and that the trial judge did not err in his exercise of discretion.