David S. Rose

The accused was charged with multiple firearm offences following the seizure of a loaded 9mm handgun from her vehicle.

She brought a Charter application challenging the lawfulness of police conduct, including a warrantless entry into a condominium unit, the warrantless seizure of her vehicle, and the manner of execution of a search warrant on the vehicle.

The court found that while the initial entry into the unit and seizure of the vehicle were lawful, the officer's opening of the glove box to search for vehicle documentation (rather than the bullet authorized by the warrant) constituted an unreasonable search.

However, applying the s. 24(2) Grant test, the court admitted the evidence, finding the breach was minor, the privacy interest in a vehicle is diluted, and society has a strong interest in adjudication on the merits given the serious nature of illegal firearms.

The accused was charged with operation of a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The trial addressed Charter issues regarding the timing of access to counsel and the privacy of lawyer-client communications during custody.

The court found a technical violation of section 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms regarding the delay in providing access to counsel (approximately 14 minutes), but found no violation regarding the privacy of the phone booth conversation.

The breath test evidence was admitted under section 24(2) of the Charter, and the accused was convicted.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of a speeding charge.

The trial judge dismissed the charge on two grounds: insufficient evidence regarding radar device calibration and insufficient evidence regarding visibility due to foggy conditions.

The appellate court found that the trial judge erred in law by imposing an incorrect burden on the prosecution regarding radar device testing.

The court held that it is sufficient to prove the officer tested the radar unit before and after the investigation and was a qualified operator.

The court also found the trial judge's visibility finding was a palpable and overriding error, as the evidence clearly showed the officer could see 400 metres in each direction and identified the vehicle directly.

The conviction was restored.

The Crown appealed two sentences imposed by a Justice of the Peace for driving without insurance and driving under suspension.

In both cases, the trial judge imposed fines below the mandatory minimums, citing the victim fine surcharge as a mitigating factor.

The appellate court found this reasoning constituted an error of principle.

The court allowed both appeals but imposed different outcomes: for Paul East, who was impecunious and receiving public assistance, the court imposed a reduced fine of $7,500 (below the $10,000 minimum) based on exceptional circumstances of destitution; for Kainnon Jennrich, who earned a substantial income and had demonstrated ability to pay large fines, the court imposed the mandatory minimums of $2,000 and $5,000 respectively.

The Crown appealed an acquittal on a charge of operating a motor vehicle without insurance under the Compulsory Automobile Insurance Act.

The respondent was also charged with driving with a suspended licence and driving without a valid licence plate.

The trial judge acquitted on the insurance charge, finding that the Crown had not proven the complete absence of insurance.

The appellate court allowed the appeal, holding that the insurance charge is a strict liability offence where proof that the owner-operator could not produce proof of valid insurance upon demand establishes the prima facie offence.

The respondent was convicted and fined $5,000.

The accused was convicted of multiple offences involving the sexual exploitation and trafficking of a minor for the purposes of prostitution.

The offences occurred between August 2015 and August 2017 and included recruitment of a person under 18 for exploitation, receiving material and financial benefits from sexual services, procuring a minor to offer sexual services, advertising sexual services, two counts of sexual assault, criminal harassment, and mischief to property.

The court imposed a global sentence of 7 years and 5 months, reflecting the serious nature of the exploitation, the vulnerability of the victim, the use of violence and coercion, and the extended duration of the criminal conduct.

The Crown appealed a sentence imposed by a Justice of the Peace after the respondent pleaded guilty to leaving the roadway not in safety contrary to section 142(1) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The respondent had originally been charged with careless driving but agreed to plead guilty to the reduced charge.

The Crown and defence jointly submitted a $500 fine with 180 days to pay.

The Justice of the Peace imposed a $350 fine instead, undercutting the joint submission.

The appellate court allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge erred in principle by failing to invite further submissions before rejecting the joint submission and by failing to make a finding that the submission was contrary to the public interest.

The court also criticized the trial judge's comments regarding the victim fine surcharge and its comparison to Criminal Code provisions.

The Regional Municipality of York appealed acquittals on six Building Code Act charges arising from Orders to Comply issued in 2013 for unauthorized construction at a marina property.

The trial judge acquitted the respondent on the basis that the 2013 Orders were identical to Orders issued in 1996, and that the respondent had complied with the earlier Orders.

The appellate court found that the trial judge erred by permitting a collateral attack on the 2013 Orders, which had not been appealed to the Superior Court as required by statute.

The court also rejected defences of due diligence, estoppel, laches, and officially induced error.

The acquittals were overturned and convictions were entered on all counts, with fines of $100 per count totalling $600.

The appellant appealed her conviction under the Building Code Act and brought two motions: (1) to bifurcate the appeal into separate hearings on different grounds, and (2) to perfect the appeal without filing all trial transcripts due to financial constraints.

The trial lasted 8 days over 15 months.

The court dismissed both motions, finding that the appeal grounds were factually and legally interrelated and that permitting severance would not be fair or expeditious.

The court also rejected the request to proceed without transcripts, holding that the appeal must be perfected in the usual course with all transcripts filed.

The accused pleaded guilty to criminal negligence causing death in connection with a motor vehicle collision that killed Julia Baciu.

The accused, a novice G2 driver, was operating a vehicle at 168 km/h in a 50 km/h zone while impaired by alcohol and marijuana.

He struck a vehicle driven by the victim's boyfriend, causing catastrophic injuries.

The court imposed a sentence of 5 years 9 months imprisonment, an 8-year driving prohibition, and ordered a DNA sample.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence as the predominant sentencing principles, noting the epidemic of traffic fatalities in York Region.

The accused was charged with operation of a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit following a single motor vehicle collision on July 30, 2017.

The Crown called three witnesses and filed a toxicology report.

The defence raised four issues: (1) the admission that the accused was the driver was obtained in violation of section 7 Charter rights as a compelled statement under the Highway Traffic Act; (2) the accused did not waive rights to counsel under section 10(b); (3) the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused operated a motor vehicle; and (4) there was no proof the accused operated the vehicle after 3:15 hours per expert opinion.

The court found that the accused's self-identification as the driver was a statutorily compelled statement under the Highway Traffic Act and must be excluded.

Without this identification, the ASD demand was unlawful and the breath test must be excluded.

The court excluded the breath samples and acquitted the accused.

The accused was charged with operation of a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg per 100 ml of blood arising from a motor vehicle collision.

The accused raised multiple Charter arguments challenging the lawfulness of the police investigation, including claims of delayed rights to counsel, improper ASD demand timing, and late disclosure of an expert toxicology report.

The court rejected all Charter arguments and found the accused guilty based on breath sample analysis showing a BAC of 260 mg per 100 ml of blood at the time of the collision.

A 19-year-old offender pleaded guilty to possession of a loaded firearm, discharge of a firearm, possession of a prohibited firearm while prohibited, and failure to comply with probation.

The offender fired a sawed-off shotgun at an occupied residential garage in Markham.

The court imposed a total sentence of 7 years, less 8.5 months of pre-sentence custody, resulting in a remaining sentence of 6 years and 3.5 months.

The court emphasized denunciation, deterrence, and public protection as the primary sentencing objectives, while acknowledging limited rehabilitative prospects due to the offender's extensive violent criminal history despite his youth.

The accused was convicted of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, trafficking in cocaine, and possession of property obtained by crime following a five-day trial.

The Crown sought a three-year penitentiary sentence with ancillary orders including a s. 109 firearms prohibition, DNA order, and forfeiture.

The defence sought 15-18 months jail with pre-trial custody credit.

The court imposed a 20-month custodial sentence concurrent on all charges, with 16 days pre-trial custody credit.

The court granted a s. 109 order for life, a DNA order, and a forfeiture order for all seized property including a BlackBerry device.

A 12-month probation term was imposed following release from custody.

The accused was charged with possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, trafficking in cocaine, and possession of property obtained by crime following his arrest on August 31, 2016.

York Regional Police conducted surveillance of a vehicle involved in a series of shoplifting incidents, which led to the observation of a suspected drug transaction between the accused and another individual.

The accused was arrested and found in possession of approximately 26 grams of cocaine and $5,615 in cash.

The defence raised Charter arguments regarding the lawfulness of the arrest, the manner of search, and the late filing of the Report to a Justice.

The trial judge rejected the defence arguments and found the accused guilty on all counts.

The accused was charged with operation of a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg% contrary to s. 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown relied on breath samples obtained via an approved instrument.

Three main legal issues emerged at trial: (1) whether the presumption of identity under s. 258 of the Criminal Code applied following the repeal of that section by Bill C-46; (2) whether the Crown satisfied the requirements of s. 320.31 regarding the presumption of accuracy without producing a certificate of analyst; and (3) whether the accused's rights under s. 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms were violated when police failed to diligently pursue contact with her counsel of choice before offering duty counsel.

The court found that s. 258 remained applicable to legacy charges, that the presumption of accuracy was established through qualified technician testimony, and that while a Charter violation occurred, the breath evidence was admissible under s. 24(2) analysis.

The accused was convicted.

The appellant appealed her conviction under the Building Code Act and sought to have her husband Denis Van Decker appear as her agent on appeal.

The trial Justice of the Peace had barred Van Decker from appearing as agent during the trial due to disruptive conduct and contempt of court.

The appeal court upheld the bar, finding that Van Decker was incompetent to represent the appellant and that his disruptive behavior over three days of trial warranted the exclusion.

The court noted that the appellant was capable of self-representation and that Van Decker had demonstrated a pattern of disruption across multiple proceedings.

The accused was convicted of sexual assault and sexual exploitation of a young person (the niece of his wife) following a trial.

The offences occurred on July 29, 2017, during a backyard barbeque at the accused's residence.

The first incident involved touching over clothing while the victim was lying down in the basement; the second involved digital penetration in the living room later that evening.

The accused was in a position of trust toward the victim.

At sentencing, the accused absconded to Brazil, and sentencing proceeded in his absence.

The court applied the Kienapple principle to stay the sexual assault convictions as duplicitous with the sexual exploitation convictions.

The accused received a global sentence of 10 months imprisonment with ancillary orders including weapons prohibition, DNA designation, SOIRA registration, and probation conditions.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over 80mg.

At trial, the accused argued his s. 10(b) Charter right to counsel was violated because he did not understand the informational component of his rights due to a language barrier.

The court found objective evidence that English was not the accused's first language and that he struggled to comprehend his rights and the reason for his arrest.

Applying the Vanstaceghem test, the court held that special circumstances existed requiring the police to provide language interpretation.

The s. 10(b) breach was established, the breath evidence was excluded, and the accused was acquitted.

The accused was a passenger in a vehicle driven by his former romantic partner.

During an argument, the accused opened the passenger door while the vehicle was moving, grabbed the steering wheel, and pulled the emergency brake.

This caused the driver to lose control and collide with an oncoming vehicle.

The court found the accused's testimony not credible and accepted the driver's evidence.

The court held that a passenger who briefly assumes control of a vehicle by grabbing the steering wheel and emergency brake is operating the vehicle and can be found guilty of dangerous driving.

The accused was found guilty.