David L. Corbett

The defendants brought a motion for leave to appeal the order of MacNeil J. dated January 19, 2022.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and ordered the moving parties to pay costs fixed at $3,613.74.

The applicant brought a motion to add items to the record of his application for judicial review, to require an unredacted record, and to cross-examine the respondent's staff member.

The court dismissed the motion to adduce new evidence not before the decision-maker, except for one document admitted on consent.

The request for an unredacted record was dismissed with directions provided for handling privacy redactions.

The request to cross-examine the staff member was dismissed as it is expressly precluded by the Police Services Act.

The applicant sought judicial review of the Chief Electoral Officer's decision to refuse to reserve the name 'Direct Democracy Party of Canada' for the upcoming provincial election.

The respondent had rejected the name on the basis that it was likely to cause confusion with another registered party, but failed to provide written reasons.

The Divisional Court allowed the application, holding that the Election Finances Act requires written reasons when a party name is deemed unregistrable.

The impugned decisions were quashed and remitted back to the respondent for a decision with reasons.

The applicants, four university students, sought judicial review of the respondent university's decision to deny their requests for religious exemptions from its mandatory COVID-19 vaccination policy.

The students argued the university's decisions were unreasonable and breached procedural fairness.

The Divisional Court held that while it had jurisdiction to review the decisions, the core issue was a claim of discrimination based on creed, which should be adjudicated by the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario.

The court also found that the university met the rudimentary duty of procedural fairness owed to the students given the context of the pandemic and the institutional constraints.

The application was dismissed.

The moving party sought leave to appeal a decision of the Ontario Land Tribunal.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, noting its practice of not providing reasons for such decisions.

Costs of $15,000 were awarded to the responding developer, payable in monthly installments.

The applicant union sought judicial review of an arbitration award that dismissed its grievance regarding the employer's use of key performance indicators (KPIs) to determine eligibility for a telework program during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The arbitrator had found that Letter of Understanding No. 11 (LOU 11) of the collective agreement, which governed monitoring and measurement, did not apply.

The Divisional Court held that the arbitrator's interpretation was unreasonable, as it failed to account for the plain wording of LOU 11 and the fact that KPIs are a form of measurement.

The award was quashed and the matter remitted for a new hearing before a different arbitrator.

The applicant sought judicial review of an adjudicator's decision under the prompt payment provisions of the Construction Act.

The applicant had neither paid the amount ordered by the adjudicator nor obtained a stay of the decision pending the application.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that failure to comply with a prompt payment order without a stay undercuts the statutory scheme, and invoked equity to decline to hear the application on its merits.

The moving party sought an extension of time to appeal a Small Claims Court decision that dismissed his claims as vexatious.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding that the moving party failed to provide a credible explanation for his seven-month delay, including an implausible claim that a destroyed phone prevented him from retrieving an email.

Furthermore, the court found the proposed appeal lacked merit as the underlying claims were classic follow-on litigation that should have been brought in the Superior Court.

Costs of $5,000 were awarded to the responding party.

The applicant, a dentist, sought judicial review of a decision by the Health Professions Appeal and Review Board.

The Board had upheld a decision by the Inquiries, Complaints and Reports Committee of the Royal College of Dental Surgeons of Ontario requiring the applicant to appear for a caution and complete a remediation program regarding record-keeping, informed consent, and case work-up.

The applicant argued he was denied procedural fairness when the Committee refused further written submissions after the matter was remitted by the Board.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding no denial of procedural fairness and concluding that the Board's decision was reasonable.

The appellants appealed a Master's order dismissing their motion to set aside a default judgment.

The Divisional Court found that while the Master failed to properly apply the four-part test for setting aside a default judgment, the record demonstrated that the appellants failed to move promptly and lacked a reasonable explanation for their delay.

The court assessed the proposed defence as weak and concluded that the interests of justice did not warrant setting aside the default judgment.

The appeal was dismissed.

The moving party, the City of Toronto, brought a motion for leave to appeal a decision of the Local Planning Appeal Board.

The Divisional Court granted leave to appeal in respect to the questions of law identified in the moving party's factum.

Costs of the leave motion were fixed at $10,000, payable in the discretion of the appeal panel.

The self-represented applicant brought a motion for leave to appeal interlocutory orders in an ongoing estate litigation matter.

The court established an expedited case management schedule to decide the leave motion before the underlying motions were heard.

The applicant engaged in a vexatious campaign of emails, refusing to follow directions, challenging the court's process, and ultimately failing to serve and upload her motion materials by the deadline.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal as abandoned due to the applicant's failure to comply with case management directions and warned her against further vexatious conduct.

The proposed intervenor, WIFN, brought a motion for leave to intervene as a party in an application between HDI and Ontario.

WIFN sought to intervene to contest HDI's claimed rights under the Nanfan Treaty, arguing that any court acknowledgment of such rights could prejudice WIFN's interests in future proceedings.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that WIFN had no interest in the substantive outcome of the procedural application and that adding WIFN would substantially delay and broaden the scope of the proceedings.

The court noted that WIFN's concerns were mitigated by HDI's voluntary amendment of its notice of application.

The self-represented appellant appealed an application judge's order enforcing an arbitral award that expelled him from the respondent union.

The Divisional Court issued a notice under Rule 2.1 considering dismissing the appeal as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The court found that it lacked jurisdiction, as appeals under the Arbitration Act lie to the Court of Appeal.

Furthermore, the appeal constituted an impermissible collateral attack on the underlying arbitral award, which the appellant had failed to challenge within the statutory timeframe.

The appeal was dismissed under Rule 2.1.01.

The City of Toronto appealed a decision of the Local Planning Appeal Tribunal (LPAT) that approved a zoning by-law amendment to permit a 14-storey hotel, which required the demolition of two buildings designated by the City under the Ontario Heritage Act.

The LPAT, acting exclusively under the Planning Act, found the buildings had no cultural heritage value and approved the rezoning conditional on the developer obtaining a demolition permit.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that the LPAT exceeded its jurisdiction by impugning the legality of the City's heritage designation under the Ontario Heritage Act while purporting to exercise powers exclusively under the Planning Act.

The Law Society of Ontario brought a motion to quash the respondent's appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

The respondent had appealed a decision of the Law Society Appeal Panel dismissing his application for a licence to practice law.

The Divisional Court held that under s. 49.38 of the Law Society Act, appeals to the court are limited to specific types of proceedings, which do not include licensing applications under s. 27(4).

The court rejected the respondent's argument that 'subsection 31(3)' in s. 49.38 referred to s. 49.31(3), finding that the plain language meaning was s. 31(3).

The appeal was quashed, but the respondent was granted an extension of time to commence an application for judicial review.

The moving parties sought leave to appeal the decision and interim decision of the Assessment Review Board.

The Divisional Court granted the motion for leave to appeal in respect to the questions of law identified in the moving parties' factum.

Consistent with the court's usual practice, no reasons were provided for the leave decision.

The self-represented appellant's appeals were dismissed as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process under Rule 2.1.01.

The appellant had previously been given notice that the court was considering dismissing his appeals because the underlying order had already been set aside.

Following abusive communications from the appellant, the court issued the formal dismissal order and directed that any future communications from the appellant be vetted by an administrative judge to protect court staff.

The applicants sought judicial review of a decision by the Board of Governors of Exhibition Place to deny them the right to rent space for a Hallowe'en-themed event due to alleged harassment of staff.

The Board raised a preliminary issue that the decision was a private contractual matter and not subject to judicial review.

The Divisional Court agreed, finding that the decision to not enter into a short-term rental agreement was an exercise of private law discretion, not a statutory power of decision or a matter of sufficient public character.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The applicant employer sought judicial review of two Ontario Labour Relations Board decisions: a default decision finding it violated a collective agreement and awarding damages, and a decision denying reconsideration.

The employer had failed to participate in a related jurisdictional dispute or file a timely response to the grievance.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the Board's decisions were neither procedurally unfair nor unreasonable, as the employer had ample opportunity to participate but chose not to do so until the eve of the damages hearing.