David L. Corbett

The applicant, an indigenous Justice of the Peace, sought judicial review of a Justice of the Peace Review Council (JPRC) decision recommending her removal from office for judicial misconduct.

The misconduct involved a prolonged pattern of inappropriate intervention in her son's traffic ticket prosecution.

The applicant argued the JPRC majority failed to reasonably apply Gladue principles regarding her indigenous heritage.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the JPRC majority reasonably concluded that the applicant's lack of insight and failure to accept responsibility meant that public confidence in the administration of justice could only be restored by her removal from office.

The appellant appealed an interim order that dismissed her motion for spousal support and section 7 expenses for prematurity.

The To Be Spoken To (TBST) judge had previously directed the parties to attend an urgent case conference on these issues.

However, the case conference judge mistakenly treated the attendance as a motion and dismissed it for lack of urgency under the Family Law Rules.

The Divisional Court granted the appeal, finding that the case conference judge erred by failing to follow the TBST judge's direction and by hearing a substantive motion at a case conference without the parties' consent.

The order was set aside, and the appellant was permitted to schedule her motion.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his oppression application, where the application judge found he was not a beneficial shareholder of the respondent corporations.

The application judge had concluded that an earlier agreement granting the appellant a 9% interest was mutually rescinded when a portion of the corporate group was sold.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding it procedurally unfair to decide the case on the unpleaded and unargued theory of mutual rescission.

Furthermore, the court found no factual or legal basis for mutual rescission, concluding the appellant remained a 9% beneficial shareholder entitled to his share of the sale proceeds.

The mother appealed a motion judge's decision to send the issue of the children's COVID-19 vaccination to trial rather than deciding it on a long motion.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding the motion judge erred by refusing to take judicial notice of Health Canada's regulatory approval of the vaccine, relying on inadmissible evidence, and failing to place the onus on the father to demonstrate why the children should not be vaccinated.

The court granted the mother sole decision-making authority over the children's COVID-19 vaccinations on a final basis.

The landlords appealed a Landlord and Tenant Board decision finding they misused the process of terminating a tenancy for personal use and awarding compensation to the tenants.

The landlords argued they were denied procedural fairness because they did not receive notice of the hearing due to an email security issue while travelling abroad.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the LTB's conclusion that notice was received was a finding of fact not subject to appeal, and that the landlords' own version of events confirmed they improperly sought to oust the tenants to sell the property.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to apply for judicial review of an adjudicator's interim and final decisions.

The Divisional Court granted leave to apply for judicial review and ordered that the adjudicator's decisions be stayed pending the final determination of the application.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Licence Appeal Tribunal denying her claims for various statutory accident benefits following a motor vehicle accident.

The appellant argued the insurer failed to properly manage her request for a catastrophic impairment designation.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the adjudicator correctly concluded that the issue of catastrophic impairment was not properly before the tribunal because the appellant had not initiated a claim or provided an evidentiary basis for it.

The court found no errors of law in the adjudicator's decision.

The plaintiffs moved for judgment to enforce a settlement agreement reached at a pre-trial conference.

The defendants argued the agreement was only 'in principle' because essential terms, such as the timing of payment and the specific terms of the release, were not finalized.

The court found that the parties had a mutual intention to create a binding contract and that the missing terms were non-essential.

The court implied a reasonable period for payment and standard release terms, granting judgment to enforce the $1.65 million settlement.

The appellant was injured in a motor vehicle collision and submitted a claim for prescription medication to her auto insurer.

The insurer required her to undergo a medical examination under section 44 of the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule to determine if the expense was reasonable and necessary.

When the appellant refused, the Licence Appeal Tribunal barred her from disputing the denial of her claim.

On appeal, the Divisional Court held that the Tribunal erred in its statutory interpretation, finding that insurers cannot require section 44 examinations for prescription medication claims because such claims are not submitted through treatment and assessment plans.

The moving parties brought a motion for leave to appeal an order of McSweeney J. dated May 31, 2023.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and ordered the moving parties to pay costs of $5,000 to the responding parties.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal an order dated July 4, 2023.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and ordered the moving party to pay costs of $5,000 to the responding party.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal an unreported order of McGee J. dated May 25, 2023.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and ordered the moving party to pay costs of $5,000 to the responding party.

The plaintiff brought a motion for leave to appeal an order dated May 24, 2023.

The Divisional Court granted leave to appeal with costs of $5,000 payable in the discretion of the appeal panel.

The court also amended previous orders to state that the order will cease to have effect if the defendant pays the Canadian dollar equivalent of €3,266,122.45 into court as security.

The moving party tenants sought an urgent stay of a Landlord and Tenant Board eviction order pending a motion to review a Divisional Court judge's refusal to extend the time to appeal.

The tenants argued they could not afford a 100% rent increase and required accommodation for disability.

The court applied the RJR Macdonald test and found that while the tenants would suffer irreparable harm, there was no serious issue to be tried because the rental unit was exempt from rent control under s. 6.1(2) of the Residential Tenancies Act.

The balance of convenience favoured the landlord due to accumulating rent arrears.

The motion for a stay was dismissed.

The court issued a notice under Rule 2.1 considering the dismissal of the applicants' judicial review application as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The notice cited the litigation guardian's failure to retain counsel and the deficient nature of the Notice of Application.

The court found the applicants had cured the representation defect by retaining counsel.

Although the Notice of Application remained fundamentally deficient, the court granted the applicants an indulgence to file an amended pleading, staying the Rule 2.1 process pending compliance.

The appellant landlord appealed a Landlord and Tenant Board decision finding that the Residential Tenancies Act applied to a waterfront lot leased to the respondent tenant.

The lot contained a cottage subject to a 99-year lease.

The landlord argued the property was exempt under section 5(a) of the Act as seasonal or temporary accommodation.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that an annual rental of premises used seasonally does not fall within the section 5(a) exemption, which is intended for temporary accommodations for the travelling or vacationing public.

The tenant appealed a Landlord and Tenant Board (LTB) decision that resulted in her eviction for rent arrears.

The eviction was executed by the Sheriff before a stay was in place, and the landlord subsequently re-rented the unit to a new tenant.

The Divisional Court held that it could not restore the tenant to the unit or order the landlord to provide a different unit.

The court also dismissed the tenant's arguments regarding multiplicity of proceedings, issue estoppel, loss of jurisdiction, and procedural fairness, finding that the LTB's distinct processes for persistent late payment and non-payment of rent were appropriate and fair.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Chief of Police dismissing her complaint against certain police officers as unsubstantiated, based on an investigative report.

Before the independent review of the decision could be completed, the subject officers resigned, causing the review to be halted pursuant to section 90 of the Police Services Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application as premature, noting that the complaint process is held in abeyance for five years and could resume if the officers are re-employed.

The court also held that statutory secrecy provisions prevent the investigative report from being used against the applicant in other civil proceedings.

The plaintiffs moved for judgment on a settlement allegedly reached during a pre-trial conference.

On the return of the motion, the defendants sought an adjournment to retain new counsel, having previously indicated they would not file responding materials.

Finding the adjournment request to be a potential abuse of process to delay payment, the court granted the adjournment but ordered the corporate defendant to immediately pay the $1,650,000 settlement amount into trust on an interim basis, along with $10,000 in costs.

The applicant, an orthopedic surgeon, sought judicial review of a decision by the Health Services Appeal and Review Board upholding OHIP's denial of certain billing claims.

The applicant argued the Board erred by admitting opinion evidence from an OHIP medical advisor who was not an independent expert.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the Board reasonably exercised its broad statutory discretion to admit the evidence.

The court noted the witness, while not a traditional independent expert or a 'participant expert' under the civil rules, possessed relevant expertise as an employee of a party and her evidence was largely factual and explanatory.