David R. Aston

The Ontario Nurses Association brought a motion to review and set aside a decision of Molloy J., which struck out an affidavit containing correspondence between an arbitration chair and the employer's nominee.

The underlying judicial review application by the Board of Health alleged a denial of natural justice because the arbitration board did not discuss the evidence before the chair issued a proposed decision.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, agreeing with Molloy J. that the correspondence was unnecessary to introduce as evidence because the facts it sought to establish were already addressed in the chair's reasons and were not disputed.

The moving party sought to introduce fresh evidence of events that occurred after the tribunal's decision on an appeal.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, holding that the appeal must be based on the record before the tribunal and that post-hearing conduct is a matter for the tribunal.

The court found this was not a rare case where post-hearing evidence must be admitted to prevent an obvious and substantial injustice.

The appellant appealed a Tribunal decision refusing to renew its registration as a home builder under the Ontario New Home Warranties Plan Act.

The appellant argued that the Tribunal erred by relying on its past history of non-compliance, asserting that the respondent was estopped from doing so because it had previously renewed the registration annually.

The Divisional Court applied a reasonableness standard of review and upheld the Tribunal's decision, finding that the respondent was not precluded from putting the appellant's entire record before the Tribunal.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The applicant, a police officer, brought an application for judicial review to prohibit a retired superintendent from continuing as an adjudicator in a disciplinary proceeding against him.

The adjudicator had previously presided over two other disciplinary hearings involving the applicant and had expressed opinions regarding his character.

The Divisional Court granted the application, finding that an informed person would conclude there was a reasonable apprehension of bias due to the adjudicator's pre-existing knowledge of the applicant's disciplinary history.

The Toronto Police Association (TPA) brought an application for judicial review seeking an order of mandamus to compel the Ontario Civilian Commission on Police Services to conduct a public inquiry under s. 25 of the Police Services Act into various matters, including a dispute between officers at a gas pump.

The Commission had previously conducted a screening review and declined to hold a formal inquiry, but made several recommendations under s. 22(1)(e.2) of the Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Commission's decision not to investigate the TPA's complaints while recommending an investigation into a related human rights complaint was entirely reasonable and within its broad statutory discretion.

The Court also noted that mandamus was not available as a remedy on the facts of the case.

The applicant, a former First Nations Constable, sought judicial review of the 1998 decisions terminating her employment and her appointment as a police officer.

The application was commenced in 2007 and perfected in 2008, nearly ten years after the impugned decisions.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application for delay, finding the applicant's explanations for the delay unsatisfactory and noting that the respondents would suffer actual prejudice due to the passage of time and the unavailability of witnesses.

The moving parties sought leave to appeal a decision of the Ontario Municipal Board and a subsequent Amending Order regarding their application for minor variances to a zoning by-law.

The moving parties had built a two-storey addition without a building permit and sought variances to approve it.

At the Board hearing, the moving parties raised procedural issues, alleged a reasonable apprehension of bias, and then left the hearing before evidence was called.

The Board proceeded in their absence and dismissed the appeal.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motions for leave to appeal, finding no jurisdictional error, error of law, or denial of procedural fairness by the Board.

The City of Ottawa appealed an Ontario Municipal Board (OMB) decision that allowed an official plan amendment proposed by the respondent, which the City Council had previously refused.

The central issue was whether the OMB erred in law by failing to 'have regard to' the Council's decision under s. 2.1 of the Planning Act.

The Divisional Court held that the OMB is not required to apply a highly deferential standard of review to Council decisions, but must carefully scrutinize and consider them.

Finding that the OMB had properly analyzed and addressed each of the Council's reasons for refusal, the majority dismissed the appeal.

The court issued an endorsement regarding the costs of an appeal from the Small Claims Court.

The respondent/plaintiff was awarded costs fixed at $5,000 on a partial indemnity scale.

The court noted that while Rule 49.10 does not apply to appeals, the plaintiff's offer to settle for $6,000 before significant appeal costs were incurred was a very significant factor in determining the quantum of costs to protect the successful plaintiff from a Pyrrhic victory.

The appellant appealed a Licence Appeal Tribunal decision directing the Registrar to revoke his motor vehicle dealer registration.

The Tribunal found that the appellant's past conduct, including numerous undisclosed Highway Traffic Act convictions related to operating an inspection station, afforded reasonable grounds to believe he would not carry on business with honesty and integrity.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no denial of natural justice and concluding that the Tribunal's decision was reasonable and supported by ample evidence.

Apotex Inc. sought judicial review of decisions by the Executive Officer of the Ontario Public Drug Programs refusing to increase the reimbursable pricing of three generic antibiotic drugs.

The applicant argued that the historic pricing exemption should apply to allow price increases and challenged the Executive Officer's reliance on the single source pricing exemption to negotiate a price increase with a competitor.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Executive Officer's interpretation of the legislation and regulations was reasonable and that her actions to ensure a continued supply of the drugs were lawful and in the public interest.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision dismissing her motion to vary child support and declining to impute additional income to the respondent.

She argued the motion judge erred by adjourning the hearing to allow the self-represented respondent to provide further medical evidence regarding his back injury, and by relying on that evidence even though it did not strictly comply with the judge's directions.

The Divisional Court majority dismissed the appeal, finding no error of law or breach of procedural fairness, as the appellant was given the opportunity to cross-examine the respondent or file responding evidence but chose not to do so.

A dissenting judge would have allowed the appeal on the basis that the medical evidence did not meet the motion judge's criteria and its use was unfair.

The moving parties sought leave to appeal an order removing their counsel due to an appearance of impropriety and prohibiting them from retaining another specific counsel.

The court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no conflicting decisions and no reason to doubt the correctness of the motions judge's conclusion that the appearance of impropriety required the protection of public confidence in the administration of justice.

Costs were awarded to the respondent trustees on a partial indemnity scale.

The defendants moved for leave to appeal a decision dismissing their motion to strike the plaintiff's statement of claim.

The plaintiff alleged inducing breach of contract and intentional interference with economic relations regarding an exclusive distribution agreement.

The Divisional Court found no reason to doubt the correctness of the motions judge's decision that the pleadings, read generously, disclosed a reasonable cause of action.

The motion for leave to appeal was dismissed.

The self-represented moving party sought an extension of time and leave to appeal an interlocutory order that dismissed his appeal of a Master's case management decision.

The court granted the extension of time but dismissed the motion for leave to appeal.

The court found no error in the motions judge's decisions regarding costs, the requirement for the moving party to participate by videoconference, or proceeding in the moving party's absence when he chose not to attend.

The mother appealed a trial decision granting Crown wardship of her two children without access.

She argued the trial judge erred by failing to find the apprehensions were unfounded, failing to adequately address a critique of the section 54 assessment, and failing to consider the maternal grandmother's potential support.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error of law or palpable and overriding error, and concluding that the trial judge's decision was child-focused and amply supported by the evidence.

The appellants appealed a Small Claims Court judgment finding them liable in negligence for failing to adequately warn the respondent about a potential basement leak during a home inspection.

The appellants argued the trial judge erred by establishing a standard of care without expert evidence and failing to consider contributory negligence.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the appellants' own testimony established the standard of care and that contributory negligence was not pleaded at trial.

The trial judge's finding of liability was not a palpable and overriding error.

The moving party sought leave to appeal a decision of the Ontario Municipal Board (OMB).

The OMB had ruled it lacked jurisdiction to award costs after a licence application for aggregate removal and the subsequent ministerial referral were withdrawn.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding the OMB correctly determined that under the Aggregate Resources Act, its jurisdiction was limited to the issues specified in the referral and it had no authority to review the pre-referral process or award costs in these circumstances.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Professional Development & Competency Committee of the Law Society of Upper Canada, which found that the accommodations granted to her for writing the bar admission examinations were adequate.

The applicant argued she was denied procedural fairness and natural justice, citing interruptions by the Chair, failure to consider her reply and medical evidence, and an alleged discriminatory policy change.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the applicant had a full opportunity to make submissions, the Committee considered her evidence, and the accommodations granted were more than adequate.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment granted in favour of the respondent law firm for unpaid legal fees.

The appellant argued it is unjust to grant summary judgment for solicitor's fees without an assessment.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the appellant had repeatedly agreed to pay the accounts and his complaints about the quality of work were afterthoughts intended to delay the claim.

The motions judge correctly applied the test for summary judgment under Rule 76.07(9).