David R. Aston

The appellant husband appealed an order reinstating his pleadings on the condition that he comply with a disclosure order and pay $35,000 in interim disbursements plus costs.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal in part, setting aside the interim disbursements condition because the motions judge failed to provide reasons, consider the appellant's ability to pay, or give notice that this issue would be decided.

The conditions regarding disclosure and costs were upheld.

The applicant sought judicial review for a declaration that the Ministry of Transportation unreasonably withheld a clearance letter for a subdivision development.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application as premature, noting that the Ministry was still actively reviewing the engineering drawings.

The Court further held that the appropriate forum to address difficulties in implementing draft plan approval conditions is the Ontario Municipal Board, which retained jurisdiction over the matter.

The applicants, facing discipline proceedings before the Ontario College of Pharmacists, brought a motion seeking production of Third Party Records in advance of a pending judicial review application.

The Discipline Committee had previously dismissed their motion for disclosure at the first stage of the O'Connor and Mills test, finding the records were not likely relevant.

The applicants argued the records were necessary for the court to properly analyze the production issue on judicial review.

The court dismissed the motion, holding that the issue on judicial review is whether the Tribunal erred in law at the first stage of the analysis, and examining the records beforehand would usurp the Tribunal's function.

The respondent College brought a motion to quash the applicant denturist's application for judicial review.

The applicant had sought to quash a referral of professional misconduct allegations to the College's Discipline Committee, arguing unreasonable delay, procedural unfairness, and reasonable apprehension of bias.

The court held that a single judge of the Divisional Court has jurisdiction to quash a judicial review application.

The court granted the motion to quash, finding the application premature as the applicant had not exhausted his administrative remedies.

The applicant could raise his arguments before the Discipline Committee and would have a full right of appeal to the Divisional Court thereafter.

The York University Faculty Association brought a motion to be added as a party or intervenor in a judicial review application challenging a decision of the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario.

The applicant, who was self-represented, clarified during the hearing that he was abandoning any challenge to the Tribunal's decision regarding the Association's status or participation.

Based on this concession, the court found it was not necessary to add the Association as a party under Rule 5.03 to effectively adjudicate the issues.

The court dismissed the Association's motion and the applicant's cross-motion, with no costs awarded.

The appellant appealed a Licence Appeal Tribunal decision dismissing his claim against Tarion Warranty Corporation for second-year warranty construction deficiencies.

The appellant argued he was denied a fair hearing due to the Tribunal Member's bias and erroneous evidentiary rulings, including restricting his expert's testimony.

The Divisional Court found no reasonable apprehension of bias and held that the Member properly exercised discretion in limiting the expert's evidence regarding Ontario Building Code standards.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant sought to challenge an order requiring her to pay security for costs, failing which her appeal was stayed.

She failed to bring a motion to set aside or vary the order within the required time.

The Divisional Court refused to grant an extension of time, finding no apparent merit to the proposed motion or the underlying appeal, and noting substantial prejudice to the respondent due to the appellant's abusive litigation conduct.

The motion was dismissed and the stay of the appeal continued.

The applicant sought judicial review of an Adjudicator's order requiring the disclosure of six records under the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.

The applicant argued the records were exempt under s. 13(1) as they contained advice or recommendations of a public servant.

The Divisional Court upheld the Adjudicator's decision to release Records I to V, finding it reasonable that they did not contain a recommended course of action.

However, the court overturned the decision regarding Record VI, finding that the proposed redactions clearly contained advice and recommendations and were therefore exempt from disclosure.

The applicant, a former teacher whose certificate was cancelled in 1997 following a criminal conviction, applied for a new Certificate of Qualification and Registration.

The Registrar referred the application to the Discipline Committee pursuant to s. 33(15) of the Ontario College of Teachers Act.

The applicant sought judicial review, arguing he should be treated as a new applicant under s. 18 and that s. 33(15) could not apply retrospectively.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that the legislative amendment applied retrospectively as its purpose was to protect the public, not to punish, and the Registrar did not breach any duty of fairness.

The moving party, Dr. Sazant, sought an extension of time to bring a motion under s. 21(5) of the Courts of Justice Act to challenge an order of a single judge.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding that the moving party failed to provide a reasonable explanation for the delay and that the delay prejudiced the respondents.

The court emphasized that resort to s. 21(5) should not become routine and that the justice of the case did not require granting the extension.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Health Services Appeal and Review Board under the Independent Health Facilities Act.

The Divisional Court found that the Board erred in law by asking itself the wrong question, limiting its consideration to whether the Director had the authority to revoke the appellant's licence rather than whether the revocation was a reasonable exercise of discretion.

The court rescinded the Board's decision and remitted the matter back for a re-hearing, noting that the Board's process is a hearing where it may substitute its own opinion for that of the Director.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Law Society of Upper Canada Appeal Panel, arguing that the Hearing Panel's refusal to grant an adjournment beyond a certain date unless he undertook not to practice amounted to a denial of natural justice.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the Hearing Panel properly exercised its discretion by weighing the serious risk to the public interest against the appellant's right to counsel.

The applicant brought an application for judicial review challenging the promulgation of a regulation prescribing minimum setback requirements for wind energy facilities.

The applicant argued the Minister of the Environment failed to consider the precautionary principle in the ministry's statement of environmental values, as required by section 11 of the Environmental Bill of Rights.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Minister's decision was protected by privative clauses and that the Minister had complied with the mandated process by considering all principles, including the precautionary principle, alongside other policy factors.

The self-represented moving party sought to review a single judge's decision dismissing his motion to extend the time to appeal a Small Claims Court judgment.

He argued that because he had an appeal as of right, the motions judge erred by considering the merits of the appeal.

The Divisional Court panel dismissed the motion, holding that an extension of time is an indulgence that requires the moving party to demonstrate an arguable case on the merits, regardless of whether the motion was filed before or after the deadline expired.

The appellant brought a motion to adjourn its appeal of a decision by the Board of the Alcohol and Gaming Commission of Ontario.

The appellant sought the adjournment pending the outcome of an unrelated judicial review application by another licensee challenging the Board's institutional impartiality.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding that an adjournment could prejudice the respondent and delay the resolution of four-year-old allegations.

Crucially, the court noted that the appellant had never raised the issue of bias in its own case and declined to amend its Notice of Appeal to do so.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board denying him compensation for injuries sustained during an assault.

The Board found the appellant contributed to his injuries by participating in illegal drug-related activities.

On appeal, the appellant argued the Board breached procedural fairness by admitting hearsay evidence from a police officer without adequate prior notice.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Board is permitted to admit hearsay evidence and the appellant received sufficient notice of the allegations to satisfy the Statutory Powers Procedure Act.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Board of the Alcohol and Gaming Commission of Ontario convicting it of infractions under the Liquor Licence Act, including permitting drunkenness, selling liquor to an intoxicated person, and overcrowding a patio.

The appellant argued there was a breach of natural justice due to delayed notice, that the Board misapprehended evidence, and that the defence of necessity applied to the overcrowding.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no unreasonable delay in notice, no palpable and overriding error in the Board's assessment of the evidence, and that the defence of necessity could not be raised for the first time on appeal.

The applicant employer sought judicial review of an arbitrator's decision allowing a union policy grievance regarding unilateral changes to employee health benefit plans.

The employer argued the grievance was improperly filed as a policy grievance, improperly expanded in scope, and that the arbitrator unreasonably interpreted the collective agreement.

The Divisional Court applied the reasonableness standard of review and found the arbitrator's conclusions on arbitrability, scope, and interpretation of the collective agreement fell within a range of acceptable outcomes.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment enforcing a personal guarantee and determining the amount owed for the supply of flowers.

The appellants argued the guarantee lacked consideration and challenged the trial judge's factual findings on the debt.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the ongoing supply of flowers constituted valid consideration and that there was no palpable or overriding error in the trial judge's assessment of the amount owing.

The court also rejected the argument that the Rule 76 simplified procedure offends natural justice.

The Municipal Property Assessment Corporation (MPAC) appealed a decision invalidating assessments made under s. 33(1) of the Assessment Act.

MPAC had assessed a fully-occupied residential property as 'vacant land' and later re-assessed it to add the 'omitted' building.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that no land liable to assessment had been omitted.

MPAC had identified 293 individual apartment units and assigned each a unique roll number, meaning the building was not omitted simply because MPAC failed to put a current value on it.