Daniel J. Brodsky

At a preliminary inquiry, the accused was charged with first-degree murder in the death of a 64-year-old woman.

The Crown sought committal on first-degree murder on two bases: (1) planning and deliberation, and (2) constructive first-degree murder under section 231(5)(e) of the Criminal Code (murder during forcible confinement).

The accused conceded committal on second-degree murder.

The court found sufficient evidence of planning and deliberation based on motive and concealment of identity, but rejected the constructive first-degree murder theory as the evidence did not establish that confinement was distinct from the act of killing.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual exploitation under s. 153(1) of the Criminal Code.

He argued the trial judge erred in characterizing his relationship with the complainant as exploitative.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's conclusion was fully justified given the appellant was 11 years older, acted as the complainant's drug supplier and street protector, and took advantage of the resulting power imbalance.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittal on a charge of first degree murder.

The Crown argued the trial judge erred by allowing the accused to lead her lengthy, exculpatory police video statement as part of her defence under the Edgar exception for prior consistent statements.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge applied the correct principles and reasonably exercised his discretion in finding the statement was spontaneous and made when the accused was first confronted with an accusation of a crime.

The appeal was dismissed.

The offender pleaded guilty to five counts of sexual misbehaviour involving two child victims and two counts of disobeying court orders.

The Crown sought a dangerous offender (determinate) designation or, alternatively, a long-term offender designation.

The court rejected the dangerous offender application but imposed a long-term offender designation.

The offender received a global custodial sentence of 1,725 days (approximately 4 years 9.5 months) following credit for guilty plea and pre-sentence custody, followed by a 7-year long-term supervision order.

The court considered the offender's prior sexual conviction, the pattern of abuse spanning multiple victims and years, and the psychological harm to the victims in determining sentence.

Sentencing decision following jury convictions for multiple counts of assault with a weapon, aggravated assault, assault causing bodily harm, and unlawful confinement arising from prolonged physical abuse of a young child by a parent figure.

The court emphasized breach of trust, brutality, prolonged abuse, permanent physical scarring, and ongoing emotional harm, holding that denunciation and deterrence were paramount sentencing objectives in child abuse cases.

Although the offender was a first offender with strong community support and positive personal background, those mitigating factors did not outweigh the gravity of the offences.

A fit sentence was set at 30 months' imprisonment before pre-trial custody credit, resulting in concurrent 20-month custodial terms, plus a DNA order and lifetime weapons prohibition.

The accused applied at a retrial to prevent the Crown from adducing evidence that he placed his hands on the complainant’s neck and made threatening statements during the alleged sexual assault.

He argued that issue estoppel barred the Crown from re‑litigating these facts because he had been acquitted of separate charges of choking and uttering threats at the first jury trial.

The court held that issue estoppel only applies where the prior acquittal necessarily resolved the factual issue in the accused’s favour.

Because the earlier jury verdicts could have been based on multiple possible routes to acquittal, it was impossible to determine the precise factual basis for the acquittals.

The doctrine therefore did not prevent the Crown from leading the evidence as part of the complainant’s narrative at the retrial.

On a dangerous offender application following conviction for sexual assault and breach of recognizance, the court found the offender's lengthy record of sexual violence, repeated denial of responsibility, failure on community supervision, failed sex offender treatment, and high actuarial and clinical risk assessments established the statutory dangerous offender criteria beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court further held there was no reasonable possibility of eventual control of the offender's risk in the community within the meaning of the long-term offender regime.

The offender's asserted willingness to take future treatment and anti-androgen medication was rejected as speculative given his entrenched denial, prior treatment non-engagement, antisocial personality disorder, paraphilias, and poor prognosis.

An indeterminate sentence was imposed, together with a concurrent sentence for breach, a lifetime weapons prohibition, and lifetime SOIRA compliance.

Two accused were jointly tried for the homicide of a young teenager.

The principal accused admitted causing the death but contested whether the killing constituted first degree murder, second degree murder, or manslaughter.

The co‑accused was alleged to have participated in a plan to lure the victim to the residence and assist in the killing.

The trial involved numerous evidentiary rulings, including admissibility of a fictional story written by the co‑accused as potential motive evidence, disclosure and partial admission of the victim’s diary, admission of edited autopsy photographs, and applications concerning prior consistent statements under the Edgar doctrine.

The jury ultimately convicted the principal accused of first degree murder and acquitted the co‑accused.

The decision records extensive reasons on pre‑trial and mid‑trial evidentiary and procedural rulings made throughout the proceeding.

On a voir dire, the Crown sought admission of several post‑arrest utterances made by the accused following arrest for alleged sexual offences against his stepdaughter.

Some statements were audio recorded during transport, booking, and an initial interview, while additional statements were allegedly made after the interviewing officer turned off the recording device.

Applying the common law voluntariness rule from R. v. Oickle, the court held that the recorded statements were voluntary and admissible.

However, the unrecorded conversation occurred after the accused requested to contact duty counsel and followed a question likely to elicit incriminating responses, despite recording equipment being readily available.

Due to the inadequate record and unsatisfactory explanation for failing to record the exchange, the Crown failed to prove voluntariness of the unrecorded utterances.

The appellant, a designated dangerous offender, appealed the sentence of indeterminate detention.

The appellant argued that a lapse in hospital supervision demonstrated the disposition was inappropriate.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant's ability to sexually assault a child during a brief evasion of supervision confirmed the appropriateness of the indeterminate detention disposition.

The court concluded there was no reason to believe the appellant could be controlled in the community.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed by the Ontario Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal found that the sentencing judge gave full and careful reasons, made no error of law, and properly considered all mitigating factors.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

In a dangerous offender rehearing following appellate intervention, the court addressed whether a long term offender designation and supervision order could adequately control community risk under the Criminal Code.

The responding party conceded the statutory dangerous offender criteria, leaving the residual discretion analysis focused on realistic risk management, treatment compliance, and evidentiary reliability rather than optimism or speculation.

The court found persistent non-participation in treatment, conditional commitment to medication, entrenched institutional history, and expert evidence indicating a continuing high risk of sexual recidivism absent intensive custodial management.

The court concluded that community-based controls, including long term supervision, could not reduce risk to an acceptable level at the time of decision.

A dangerous offender designation with indeterminate detention was therefore imposed.

The appellant pleaded guilty to numerous serious offences, including armed robberies and break and enters, after voluntarily confessing to police following a religious conversion.

He was sentenced to 22 years consecutive to a 7-year sentence he was already serving.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found the sentence was crushing and offended the totality principle, failing to give adequate credit for his voluntary confession and guilty pleas.

The appeal was allowed and the sentences were varied to total approximately 15 years.

The appellant appealed a dangerous offender designation, arguing that the Crown must show evidence of untreatability to sustain the order.

The Court of Appeal rejected this submission and dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge correctly focused on whether there was a reasonable possibility of eventual control of the appellant's risk in the community.

The appellant appealed his dangerous offender designation and indeterminate sentence for the aggravated assault of a woman he had been dating.

He argued that the sentencing judge erred in excluding the possibility that his risk to the public could be managed in the community under a long-term offender designation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the sentencing judge's conclusion that the appellant's risk could not be controlled in the community was amply supported by the record.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder.

On appeal, he argued that his right to be present at his trial was violated when the trial judge held private, unrecorded conversations with prospective jurors during jury selection.

He also challenged the admission of statements made to undercover officers during a 'Mr. Big' operation.

The Court of Appeal held that while the private conversations were part of the trial and the appellant had a right to hear them, the procedural error caused no prejudice and was cured by the proviso in s. 686(1)(b)(iv) of the Criminal Code.

The evidentiary ground was also dismissed based on binding precedent.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed for murder, specifically the increase of the period of parole ineligibility to 15 years.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge made no error of principle in inferring that the appellant had a controlling attitude toward women and that the murder involved an aspect of planning.

The sentence was within the appropriate range, and the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant sought to introduce fresh psychiatric evidence from Dr. Gojer on appeal to argue he was unfit to stand trial, Not Criminally Responsible on account of Mental Disorder (NCRMD), or should be designated a long-term offender rather than a dangerous offender.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the fresh evidence did not alter the appellant's fitness under the Taylor test, failed to establish he was incapable of knowing his acts were morally wrong under the Oommen test, and did not demonstrate he could be safely managed in the community.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board, arguing the Board misunderstood the terms of a joint recommendation regarding his community and grounds supervision.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the record did not support the appellant's contention and that the Board gave careful reasons for adding restrictions to his privileges.

The appellant was found guilty by a jury of criminal harassment and invitation to sexual touching.

Prior to sentencing, psychiatric assessments suggested he may have been not criminally responsible due to mental disorder (NCRMD) at the time of the offences.

The trial judge ruled he lacked jurisdiction to enter an NCRMD verdict after the jury was discharged.

On appeal, the appellant introduced fresh psychiatric evidence.

The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence under the Palmer test, set aside the convictions, and ordered a new trial, finding that the fresh evidence could reasonably be expected to have affected the result.