Christine Davies

The plaintiff employer brought a civil action against union organizers for economic torts, including inducing breach of contract and civil conspiracy, alleging they improperly obtained confidential employee information during a union organizing campaign.

The defendant organizers moved to stay the action.

The Superior Court granted the stay, finding that the essential character of the dispute fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Ontario Labour Relations Board under the Labour Relations Act, 1995.

The court also found the civil action was an abuse of process, as the employer had already raised the same factual issues before the Board in ongoing certification proceedings.

The appellant sought to uphold a provincial spending limit restricting third party political advertising to $600,000 in the year before a fixed-date election, while political parties faced no limits in the first six months of that period.

The majority held that the spending limit infringes s. 3 of the Charter by creating an absolute disproportionality in the political discourse, allowing political parties to drown out third party voices during a critical democratic period.

The majority further held the limit could not be saved under s. 1 as it failed the minimal impairment stage.

Two sets of dissenting judges would have allowed the appeal, finding the limit did not infringe s. 3 of the Charter on the evidentiary record, with the dissenters disagreeing on whether an expressive component exists within s. 3.

The City of Toronto applied for judicial review of WSIAT decisions granting breast cancer benefits to three communications dispatchers under the firefighter occupational disease presumption.

The WSIAT had ruled that evidence of the dispatchers' lack of exposure to fire suppression hazards could not be considered to rebut the presumption.

The Divisional Court found this interpretation unreasonable, as it contradicted the plain meaning of the statute and the binding WSIB policy, which allowed the presumption to be rebutted by evidence that employment was not a significant contributing factor.

The WSIAT decisions were quashed and the original WSIB decisions denying benefits were restored.

The employer brought a motion to dismiss the dispute after the complainant failed to attend a scheduled hearing and failed to comply with a subsequent Board order requiring an explanation for her non-attendance.

The complainant alleged a conflict of interest with her union representation but provided no particulars.

The union requested an adjournment sine die, suggesting underlying issues might be affecting her ability to participate.

The arbitrator granted the employer's motion and dismissed the dispute, finding that disagreement with the choice of union representative is not a reasonable explanation for non-attendance and noting the absence of any medical or other evidence to explain her non-compliance.

The applicant municipality sought judicial review of a Workplace Safety and Insurance Appeals Tribunal decision granting loss of earnings benefits to a firefighter who was terminated for cause but subsequently diagnosed with work-related post-traumatic stress disorder.

The Tribunal applied the 'worker conduct' line of cases, finding that the worker's condition rendered him unemployable and that his loss of earnings resulted from the compensable injury rather than his termination.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that the Tribunal's interpretation of section 43 of the Workplace Safety and Insurance Act and its assessment of the medical evidence were reasonable.

The Union sought an order for the production of documents from the Employer regarding a grievance.

The Arbitrator ordered the Employer to produce documents relevant to the creation of the Senior Strategic Advisor position, the decision to terminate the complainant, and any other arguably relevant documents by June 26, 2023.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario issued supplementary reasons regarding the remedy and costs following its prior decision (2023 ONCA 139) which declared s. 37.10.1(2) of the Election Finances Act unconstitutional.

The appellants sought to invalidate additional provisions, including the definition of "political advertising" s. 37.0.1, s. 37.10.1(3)-(3.1), and s. 37.10.2.

The court declined this request, finding these provisions were not inextricably linked to the previously invalidated section and were not independently shown to infringe section 3 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court also noted that the election period spending limits (s. 37.10.1(1)) were not challenged and remain in force.

No disposition was made as to costs, as the parties had reached an agreement.

This appeal concerned the constitutional validity of Ontario's third-party election spending limits, specifically the extension of the pre-writ restricted period from 6 to 12 months without increasing the spending cap.

The appellants argued this infringed the informational component of the right to vote under s. 3 of the Charter, which is not subject to the notwithstanding clause (s. 33).

The Court of Appeal found that while s. 33 was properly invoked, the extended spending restrictions were not "carefully tailored" and did not permit a "modest informational campaign" thereby infringing the s. 3 right to meaningful participation in the electoral process.

The infringement was not justified under s. 1 of the Charter.

The court declared the impugned provision invalid and suspended the declaration for 12 months.

The Union requested an adjournment of a scheduled mediation because it had lost contact with the complainant, who subsequently failed to attend.

The Employer consented to an adjournment sine die, subject to the complainant providing a suitable explanation.

The Arbitrator ordered the Union to make best efforts to contact the complainant and set deadlines for the complainant to provide an explanation for her non-attendance, failing which the dispute may be dismissed.

This endorsement addresses the costs arising from a second Charter challenge to Ontario's election advertising spending restrictions (Bill 307), which the Attorney General successfully defended.

The Attorney General sought $580,652.54 in costs.

The Applicants argued against a costs award, citing the public importance of constitutional litigation and access to justice, and challenged the quantum of costs.

The court rejected the Applicants' access to justice argument, noting their financial capacity, and found the Attorney General's choice of external counsel and the work performed to be reasonable.

The court awarded the Attorney General $500,000 in all-inclusive costs, apportioned among the Applicant groups.

The applicants challenged the constitutionality of amendments to the Election Finances Act that imposed a 12-month pre-writ restricted spending period for third-party political advertising.

The government had previously enacted similar amendments that were struck down under section 2(b) of the Charter, but re-enacted them using the section 33 notwithstanding clause.

The applicants argued the amendments violated the right to vote under section 3 of the Charter, which is not subject to the notwithstanding clause.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the spending limits were carefully tailored to the egalitarian model of elections and did not infringe the right to meaningful participation in the electoral process.

This was a costs endorsement following a successful constitutional application challenging provisions of election finance legislation under s. 2(b) of the Charter.

The court held that partial indemnity remained the appropriate scale because the respondent government's conduct was professional and did not justify substantial or full indemnity costs.

In fixing a fair overall award, the court emphasized that four applicant groups had advanced identical legal challenges in a consolidated proceeding, and that economies of scale had to be reflected in the result.

The court reduced the aggregate request from approximately $690,000 to $500,000 and apportioned that amount among the successful applicants.

No costs were awarded for or against the Chief Electoral Officer or the intervenor.

The applicants challenged the constitutionality of amendments to the Election Finances Act that extended the pre-election restricted spending period for third-party political advertising from six to twelve months.

The court found that the 12-month restriction infringed freedom of expression under section 2(b) of the Charter.

Applying the Oakes test, the court held that while the objective of fostering fair elections was pressing and substantial, the 12-month period failed the minimal impairment test because the government's own experts indicated a six-month period was effective.

The impugned provisions were declared of no force or effect.

The Association filed a grievance on behalf of an employee who was offered a promotion with an 11% salary increase due to an administrative error.

The employee accepted the offer, but the employer realized the mistake the next day and issued a new offer with a 3% increase, which the employee signed.

The Association argued the first offer was a binding contract.

The Arbitrator dismissed the grievance, finding that in a unionized environment, the employer is entitled to correct an honest administrative error where there is no detrimental reliance, distinguishing the situation from common law employment contracts.

The applicants in a constitutional application requested leave to file factums exceeding the 30-page limit prescribed by the Practice Direction.

The Attorney General opposed the request.

The court denied the request, emphasizing that the 30-page limit is a serious policy intended to focus counsel on the issues, and that leave is exceptional and granted sparingly.

The court noted that since there was still a week before the factums were due, counsel had sufficient time to produce shorter, more focused versions.

In a grievance arbitration, the employer requested production of the complainant's medical documentation.

The arbitrator ordered the union to produce the relevant medical records from the complainant's treating physician for a specified period.

The order included strict protocols for redaction of irrelevant information, secure electronic transmission, limited disclosure to specific employer representatives for instruction purposes only, and restrictions on the use and retention of the records during and after the proceedings.

The Employer raised preliminary objections to two grievances filed by the Association on behalf of the Complainant.

The first objection sought to dismiss allegations regarding a delay in providing Long Term Income Protection (LTIP) forms due to untimeliness.

The Arbitrator found no reasonable grounds to extend the timelines under section 48(16) of the Labour Relations Act, 1995, and noted the Employer would be substantially prejudiced by the delay.

The second objection sought to dismiss allegations of a breach of the right to representation for failing to disclose a prima facie case.

The Arbitrator dismissed this objection, finding the Association articulated a legal theory that could reasonably support a violation of the collective agreement.

The Association filed a grievance alleging the Employer violated the collective agreement when it did not maintain the grievor's previous salary after he won a competition for a lower-paying bargaining unit position following the end of his non-union fixed-term contract.

The Employer brought a motion to dismiss for failing to make out a prima facie case.

The Arbitrator granted the motion, finding that the collective agreement's pay protection for 'voluntary demotion' requires an employee to currently hold a position and voluntarily choose to move to a lower-paying one, which did not apply to the grievor who was not employed when he accepted the new position.

The province enacted Bill 5, reducing Toronto wards from 47 to 25, mid-municipal election.

Applicants challenged its constitutionality.

The court found Bill 5 violated candidates' and voters' freedom of expression under s. 2(b) of the Charter, as it substantially interfered with campaign communication and denied effective representation due to increased ward sizes.

The violation was not justified under s. 1, as the legislative objectives (better decision-making, voter parity) were not pressing and substantial enough to warrant mid-election implementation, nor was minimal impairment demonstrated.

The impugned provisions were declared unconstitutional and set aside, requiring the election to proceed with 47 wards.

The grievor, a Client Representative, went off work following a car accident and claimed long-term income protection (LTIP) benefits for the 'own occupation' period.

The insurance carrier denied the claim on the basis that she was not totally disabled, citing a lack of objective evidence of cognitive impairment.

The arbitrator found that the grievor's job required significant cognitive demands and that her diminished cognitive efficiency, as confirmed by an independent medical examination, prevented her from performing her essential duties efficiently and accurately.

The arbitrator held that the absence of objective evidence was not a valid reason to deny the claim, given the credible self-reporting of symptoms.

The grievance was allowed, and the grievor was found to be totally disabled during the relevant period.