Charles T. Hackland

The plaintiff, the Medical Council of Canada, brought an unopposed motion for a partial sealing order in an action alleging the defendants appropriated confidential clinical examination exercises for a preparatory course.

The court applied the Sierra Club test and granted the sealing order to protect the integrity of the examination system, the identity of a whistleblower, personal information of the defendants, and the identities of course participants.

The applicants, including the Elementary Teachers' Federation of Ontario and the Canadian Civil Liberties Association, brought applications for judicial review challenging the Ontario government's decision to withdraw the 2015 sex education curriculum and replace it with the 2010 curriculum.

They argued the directive infringed teachers' freedom of expression under s. 2(b) of the Charter, and students' rights under ss. 7 and 15(1) of the Charter.

The Divisional Court granted the applicants public interest standing but dismissed the applications on the merits.

The court found no infringement of s. 2(b) because teachers remained free to address topics from the 2015 curriculum, and no infringement of ss. 7 or 15(1) because the 2010 curriculum did not inherently deprive students of security of the person or substantively discriminate against protected groups.

The accused was tried on three counts of sexual assault arising from alleged sexual touching of young voice students during purported healing sessions conducted within a music studio setting.

The court found the complainants highly credible and rejected the accused's denial that any breast, genital, anal, or oral sexual touching occurred.

Applying the similar fact and collusion jurisprudence, the court held there was an air of reality to possible unconscious collusion because the complainants discussed their experiences before reporting to police, but the Crown disproved taint on a balance of probabilities.

The complainants' evidence was admitted on a count-to-count similar fact basis and materially strengthened the Crown's case.

The court found beyond a reasonable doubt that the touching occurred for sexual gratification and not as legitimate therapy, and entered convictions on all three counts.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs' environmental contamination action on the basis that it was commenced after the expiry of the two-year limitation period.

The plaintiffs argued that the limitation period was tolled under s. 5(1)(a)(iv) of the Limitations Act because the ongoing involvement of the Ministry of the Environment constituted an alternative process, making a court proceeding inappropriate.

The court held that the Ministry's involvement did not toll the limitation period because it was not an alternative dispute resolution process with a reasonably ascertainable end date, and the plaintiffs' decision to delay litigation was tactical.

The motion for summary judgment was granted and the action was dismissed.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the respondent board refusing to grant him a second appeal hearing after he failed a clinical skills equivalency exam.

The applicant argued that the initial appeal panel did not have his typodonts before it and that he was denied procedural fairness when the board rejected his request for a second appeal based on new procedural and medical issues.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the panel had the proper materials and that the applicant should have raised his procedural and medical concerns during the exam or in his initial appeal.

Following a 3-day hearing to determine the valuation of the plaintiff's 50% shareholding interest in a group of companies, the court awarded costs to the defendants.

The court found the hearing was unnecessary as the plaintiff had unsuccessfully challenged a court-appointed business valuator's report and the defendants had made a reasonable buyout offer prior to the hearing.

Costs were awarded to the defendants on a substantial indemnity scale in the amount of $89,039.24, plus $25,000 for a portion of the valuator's fees.

The plaintiff, Oz Merchandising Inc., brought a motion to amend its Statement of Claim for the eighth time, seeking to introduce new allegations of vicarious liability against the Canadian Soccer Association (CSA) and Ontario Soccer Association (OSA) for the acts of the defunct Canadian Professional Soccer League (CPSL), and to increase a claim for lost player transfer fees from $100,000 to $42 million.

The CSA vigorously opposed the amendments.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the proposed amendments would cause irreparable prejudice to the defendants due to the late stage of the 14-year-old proceeding, were largely statute-barred, involved a novel and insufficiently pleaded duty of care, and introduced untenable collateral issues related to match-fixing.

Minor grammatical edits to the existing pleading were permitted, but the substantive changes to the monetary claims and named players were disallowed.

The court was tasked with determining the fair market value of Thomas Scullion's 50% shareholding in the Munro & Scullion group of companies as a remedy for corporate deadlock and oppression.

The parties had agreed that Paul Munro would purchase Scullion's interest at fair market value, which was to be established by the court.

While the parties generally agreed with a court-appointed valuator's mid-range valuation of $4,348,800, Scullion sought to increase this based on three specific issues: bonding, catch basin revenues, and property valuations.

The court rejected Scullion's arguments, finding his claims speculative or based on flawed appraisal methodologies, and ultimately accepted the original valuation.

This endorsement addresses the costs of a prior motion where the defendant SCM Insurance Services Inc. successfully obtained an order prohibiting the plaintiff, Joanne Burwash, from using documents subject to the deemed undertaking rule.

SCM sought partial indemnity costs.

The plaintiff argued for costs to be in the cause or for a reduction based on proportionality and the potential future admissibility of the documents.

The court rejected the plaintiff's arguments, finding that the deemed undertaking ruling was a final determination on the use of the documents.

The court awarded SCM its full requested partial indemnity costs of $52,573, payable within 30 days.

The appellant, suffering from Type 1 Diabetes, appealed convictions for impaired driving, driving over .08, and failing to stop for police.

She raised a defence of necessity, arguing her actions were due to hypoglycemia.

The trial judge rejected her evidence and that of her expert endocrinologist, Dr. Silverman, finding no imminent risk or lack of reasonable alternatives.

The appeal court found the trial judge's rejection of the expert evidence unreasonable and her analysis of the cause of impairment incomplete, constituting a palpable and overriding error.

The appellants, placement agencies, appealed tax assessments by the Minister of Revenue under the Employer Health Tax Act, arguing they were not the employers of temporary workers supplied to the federal government.

The court considered the tripartite relationship between the agency, the worker, and the client, and the definition of "employer" under the EHTA.

The court found that the appellants were the only entities with contractual obligations to pay the workers, and therefore were the employers for the purposes of the Act.

The appeals were dismissed.

The plaintiffs advanced $60,000 to the defendant, claiming it was a personal loan.

The defendant argued the funds were intended for a high-risk investment in a third-party lending business.

The court found that the plaintiffs knew the funds were for an investment, but the defendant only invested $26,000 and secretly retained $34,000 to reduce his own exposure to the scheme.

The court ordered the defendant to repay the $34,000 he misappropriated, but dismissed the claim for the $26,000 that was actually invested and lost when the scheme collapsed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for driving with a blood alcohol concentration over the legal limit, arguing that the police officer's traffic stop constituted an arbitrary detention under section 9 of the Charter.

The trial judge found the stop was a lawful random compliance check under the Highway Traffic Act, despite the officer's attention being drawn to the vehicle by a lawful U-turn.

The Superior Court of Justice upheld the trial judge's decision, confirming that random stops do not require pre-determined criteria and are lawful provided they are not pretense stops for unrelated or discriminatory purposes.

During jury deliberations in a motor vehicle personal injury trial, the jury foreman conducted internet research and found the Fault Determination Rules under the Insurance Act.

The jury asked a question about the regulation, prompting the trial judge to give a correcting charge instructing them to disregard it.

The jury subsequently returned a verdict finding the plaintiff 73% contributorily negligent.

The plaintiffs moved for a mistrial, arguing the jury was contaminated and failed to follow the correcting charge.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the correcting charge was sufficient, the jury's prompt disclosure of the research indicated a willingness to follow instructions, and the verdict was supported by the evidence.

The Crown brought a motion under s. 752.1(1) of the Criminal Code for an order remanding the offender for an assessment by a designated expert, Dr. Philip Klassen, for a dangerous offender application.

The offender consented to the assessment but requested that Dr. Paul Fedoroff conduct it instead.

The court held that while the defence may make submissions, the Crown is generally entitled to choose the assessor if the proposed candidate is qualified and available.

The court designated Dr. Klassen, noting concerns that Dr. Fedoroff's previously stated position on treatability could prematurely preclude a dangerous offender designation.

The estate trustees brought a motion to appoint an independent solicitor as Special Trustee of a Henson Trust established for a beneficiary with severe autism, after the institutional trustee named in the will declined the appointment.

The beneficiary's father brought a cross-motion seeking to be appointed as Special Trustee.

The court found that the testator deliberately chose an institutional trustee over the father to avoid conflicts of interest and ensure professional expertise.

The court appointed the independent solicitor as Special Trustee and ordered no costs, finding the father acted in good faith.

The moving parties, former solicitors for the plaintiff, sought leave to intervene in three medical negligence actions.

The plaintiff had commenced a solicitor's negligence action against them for allegedly missing a limitation period.

The moving parties argued they had an interest in the medical actions because the outcome would affect their liability.

The court refused leave to intervene in the main medical actions, finding the solicitors had no involvement in the medical care and their participation could prejudice the existing parties.

However, the court granted them leave to intervene in the pending motion for judgment regarding the limitation issues.

The accused renewed his section 11(b) Charter motion for unreasonable delay, arguing that the delay between conviction and sentencing violated his rights.

The court dismissed the renewed motion, noting that the Jordan framework does not apply to post-trial delay.

Furthermore, the court found the 9-month delay between conviction and sentencing was reasonable, as it was primarily caused by the preparation of pre-sentence reports and the accused's own unsuccessful Charter motions.

The plaintiff was injured when the hood of her parked vehicle collapsed on her while she was refilling the windshield washer fluid.

She sought a declaration that her injuries were sustained in an 'accident' under s. 3(1) of the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule (SABS).

The insurer argued that routine maintenance did not constitute the 'use or operation' of a vehicle.

The court granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, finding that checking and topping up fluid levels is an ordinary and well-known activity to which automobiles are put, thereby satisfying the purpose test for SABS coverage.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment to recover a $340,000 loan secured by a second mortgage on the defendants' home.

The defendants argued the interest rate was ambiguous, the transaction was unconscionable, and one defendant lacked independent legal advice.

The court granted summary judgment, finding no evidence that the loan was excessive or unconscionable, and noting the defendants were represented by counsel during the transaction.