Catriona J. Verner

Sentencing for repeated sexual assaults committed by a stepgrandfather against a child between ages 10 and 14 over a four-year period.

The court treated breach of trust, the complainant's age, the frequency and duration of the abuse, the home setting, the intrusiveness of the touching, and severe ongoing harm to the complainant as major aggravating factors, while giving some mitigating weight to the offender's age, medical conditions, and essentially first-offender status.

Applying post-Friesen appellate guidance, the court fixed a sentence just below comparable five-year terms imposed for prolonged intrafamilial child sexual abuse.

The court also granted the requested firearms prohibition, DNA order, and SOIRA order, but declined broader s. 161 restrictions for lack of an evidentiary basis showing a wider risk to children.

The accused was arrested at gunpoint while walking with a known suspect who was believed to be armed.

The arresting officers lacked reasonable and probable grounds to arrest the accused, rendering the subsequent search incident to arrest unlawful and in violation of ss. 8 and 9 of the Charter.

Furthermore, the police violated the accused's s. 10(b) rights by conducting a strip search at the station without first providing him an opportunity to consult with counsel.

Applying the Grant framework, the court found the police conduct demonstrated a disturbing ignorance of Charter standards, and the cumulative effect of the breaches warranted the exclusion of the seized drugs and cash under s. 24(2).

In a blended Charter voir dire and criminal trial, the accused challenged the admissibility of fentanyl evidence and evidence that he provided a false name following arrest.

The court found the arrest unlawful, concluding there were no lawful grounds to arrest for either drug possession or trespassing, and held that ss. 8 and 9 Charter rights were violated, with an additional s. 10(a) breach identified in the analysis.

Applying the Grant framework under s. 24(2), the court found the police conduct serious and the impact on Charter-protected interests significant, such that admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The fentanyl and false-name evidence were excluded, leaving no evidence to prove either count.

The accused was acquitted on both charges.

The accused was tried on charges of possession of fentanyl and possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking after police located 57.4 grams of fentanyl in her purse and a smaller amount with paraphernalia in a vehicle.

The accused admitted legal possession but testified that she and another heavy user had jointly purchased a month's supply in bulk for personal consumption.

Applying the credibility framework in W. (D.), the court found weaknesses in the accused's evidence but accepted that it was generally credible and capable of raising a reasonable doubt.

The expert evidence on trafficking indicia was insufficient, particularly given the absence of scales, debt lists, cash, clean bags, weapons, or other conventional markers of resale.

The accused was convicted on simple possession and acquitted on possession for the purpose of trafficking.

Sentencing following conviction of a physician for sexually assaulting an adult patient during a medical appointment.

The court treated the breach of trust, the intrusive sexual conduct, and the significant impact on the complainant as aggravating, while giving substantial weight to the offender's lack of record, age, medical fragility, remorse, community support, collateral consequences, and low risk of reoffence.

Applying the requirement that aggravating facts be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, the court declined to treat an alleged sexualized breast examination, premeditation, and deliberate note manipulation as aggravating.

A custodial sentence of 20 months less pre-sentence credit, followed by 18 months' probation and ancillary DNA, SOIRA, weapons, and surcharge orders, was imposed.

The defendant, Anthony Doiron-Francis, was charged with attempted murder and aggravated sexual assault following a severe attack on a female stranger.

He admitted guilt to aggravated assault.

The court found him not guilty of attempted murder, concluding that the Crown failed to prove specific intent to kill beyond a reasonable doubt.

However, the court found him guilty of aggravated sexual assault, determining that the assault was objectively sexual in nature due to the circumstances, including the complainant's pants being pulled down during the struggle.

For sentencing purposes, the court found the Crown did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the offence was sexually motivated.

The accused, Craig Willoughby, charged with impaired and dangerous driving causing bodily harm, brought a Charter application to exclude a blood sample.

The court found violations of Willoughby's s. 8 (unreasonable search or seizure) and s. 9 (arbitrary detention) Charter rights, as the police officer lacked subjective and objective reasonable and probable grounds for arrest and the subsequent blood demand.

While the s. 10(b) right to counsel was not violated, the court determined that the seriousness of the police misconduct and the profound impact on the accused's bodily integrity outweighed society's interest in admitting the evidence.

Consequently, the blood sample was excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The accused, Tristan Armstrong, faced charges including possession of a loaded restricted firearm and cocaine for trafficking.

In a blended Charter application and trial, the court considered the admissibility of evidence.

The defence argued violations of sections 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b) of the Charter.

The court found that the police search of the vehicle and person was unreasonable under s. 8, influenced by racial profiling, and that the accused's s. 10(a) and 10(b) rights to be informed of reasons for arrest and to counsel were violated.

Applying the Grant factors under s. 24(2), the court determined that the seriousness of the police misconduct, particularly the racial profiling and disregard for Charter rights, outweighed society's interest in admitting the evidence, despite the seriousness of the alleged offences.

Consequently, the gun, ammunition, and cocaine were excluded from evidence.

This criminal trial concerned a charge of sexual interference against the defendant, D.C., involving his stepson, J.R., who was 10 years old at the time of the alleged assault.

J.R. was the sole witness, testifying via Zoom and through prior video statements to police.

The court assessed J.R.'s testimony, finding him believable and consistent on the core allegation.

However, the court noted a significant lack of specific details, several inconsistencies regarding minor facts, and a complete absence of corroborating evidence.

Applying the high standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt required in criminal cases, the court concluded that despite J.R.'s apparent truthfulness, the evidence was insufficient to be sure that the assault occurred as alleged.

Consequently, D.C. was found not guilty.

H.M. pleaded guilty to one count of sexual exploitation for having sexual relations with the complainant between 1995 and 1998, when she was 14-17 years old and he was in a position of trust.

The court considered significant aggravating factors, including the 18-year age difference, the prolonged nature of the abuse, the frequency and degrading nature of the sexual acts (including BDSM, anal intercourse, and video recording), and the severe, long-lasting impact on the victim.

Mitigating factors included no prior criminal record, low risk of reoffending, sincere remorse, and a guilty plea.

Applying principles from R. v. Friesen, the court emphasized deterrence and denunciation, rejecting the defence's argument against retroactive application of increased sentencing ranges for child sexual abuse.

The court balanced the severity of the offence with the offender's moral blameworthiness at the time, noting the then-lower maximum sentence and societal understanding.

H.M. was sentenced to 30 months in a federal institution.

The accused, charged with sexual service and human trafficking offences, brought a motion for directions on whether he was required to bring an application under s. 276 of the Criminal Code before adducing evidence of the complainant's prior sexual activity.

The accused argued that s. 276 does not explicitly list sexual services or human trafficking offences.

The court conducted a statutory interpretation analysis, relying on recent Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence, and concluded that the s. 276 regime does apply to these offences.

The accused was directed to bring a s. 276 application before adducing such evidence.

The appellant appealed his convictions for child luring and possession of child pornography.

He argued that the search of his home computers violated his section 8 Charter rights, that his section 11(b) rights were breached due to delay, and that the trial judge erred in applying the reasonable steps test and assessing the mens rea for the offences.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding sufficient grounds for the search, no unreasonable delay under the Jordan framework, and that the trial judge correctly concluded the appellant failed to take reasonable steps to ascertain the complainant's age and possessed the requisite mens rea.

The defendant, C.M., was charged with 24 sexual assault-related offences involving five complainants, all young female servers at his breakfast restaurant.

After some charges were stayed or dismissed, the court proceeded with 17 remaining counts.

The judgment meticulously analyzes the credibility and reliability of each complainant's testimony, considering factors such as "motive not to fabricate" and the potential for "tainted memory" from discussions among complainants.

The court found C.M. not guilty on most counts due to reasonable doubt, often influenced by contradictory defense evidence or concerns about the reliability of the complainants' memories.

However, C.M. was found guilty on four counts of sexual assault related to three complainants (V.F., E.R., and R.R.), where contemporaneous disclosure of the assaults provided sufficient reliability.

Sexual exploitation charges were dismissed due to insufficient proof of mens rea regarding the complainants' ages.

The applicant, a federal inmate, brought a habeas corpus application challenging his involuntary reclassification from minimum to medium security and subsequent transfer.

The court addressed four issues: jurisdiction, mootness, compliance with procedural protections under the Corrections and Conditional Release Act (CCRA) ss. 27 and 87, and the reasonableness of the transfer decision.

The court found it had jurisdiction, the application was not moot, CSC complied with procedural requirements, and the decision to transfer was reasonable.

The application was dismissed, and no costs were awarded.

The accused, charged with domestic and sexual assault offences, brought a Stage Two application under s. 278.92 of the Criminal Code to adduce five private records belonging to the complainant.

The records included greeting cards, letters, and a social media message.

The defence argued the records contained prior inconsistent statements relevant to the complainant's credibility.

The court found that the records met the admissibility threshold, as they had significant probative value that was not substantially outweighed by the danger of prejudice to the proper administration of justice.

The application to adduce the records at trial was granted.

The plaintiff brought an ex parte motion for a Mareva injunction and a Norwich order against the defendants.

The plaintiff had loaned $300,000 to the corporate defendant, which stopped making interest payments and failed to repay the principal.

The plaintiff presented evidence that the individual defendant was transferring assets out of the corporate defendant to avoid repaying debts.

The court found a strong prima facie case for breach of contract and fraudulent conveyance, and granted both the Mareva injunction and the Norwich order.

In a sexual assault trial arising from an encounter after online communications and discussions of possible sexual activity, the central issue was consent.

The court applied the W.(D.) framework and found that, although the accused had credibility problems and lied on some points, his account retained an air of reality when assessed against the whole of the evidence.

The complainant's evidence contained significant reliability and credibility concerns, including inconsistencies about how the encounter began and ended, uncertainty about parts of the event, and evidentiary gaps relating to physical exhibits.

The Crown therefore failed to prove the absence of consent beyond a reasonable doubt, and the accused was acquitted.

The accused was charged with sexual assault and choking.

On the eve of the preliminary hearing, the Crown withdrew the choking charge, disentitling the accused to a preliminary hearing.

The accused sought to re-elect to a judge-alone trial in Provincial Court, but the Crown refused consent unless the accused waived his s. 11(b) Charter rights.

The accused brought an abuse of process motion.

The court found the Crown's conduct fell outside core prosecutorial discretion and was not fair and objective, amounting to an abuse of process under s. 7 of the Charter.

The court granted the motion, allowing the accused to re-elect without conditions.

In a criminal trial for historical sexual assault, the court assessed the reliability of the complainant's testimony.

While the complainant was found credible, concerns regarding the reliability of her memory, including admitted weaknesses, haziness, and susceptibility to suggestion during initial disclosure, raised a reasonable doubt.

The defendant's mid-trial abscondment did not alter the assessment.

The Crown failed to prove the allegations beyond a reasonable doubt, leading to an acquittal on all counts.

J.M. was charged with two counts of sexual assault and one count of threatening his former wife.

The complainant and the defendant provided diametrically opposed testimonies.

The court assessed the credibility of both witnesses, noting some implausibilities in the complainant's account and a possible motive to fabricate related to ongoing family law proceedings.

While the complainant was generally believable, the implausibilities and motive to fabricate raised a reasonable doubt.

For the threatening count, the court found insufficient evidence to prove the required intent beyond a reasonable doubt, given the lack of surrounding circumstances.

J.M. was acquitted on all three counts.