Warning
An order restricting publication in this proceeding under ss. 486.4(1), (2), (2.1), (2.2), (3) or (4) or 486.6(1) or (2) of the Criminal Code shall continue. These sections of the Criminal Code provide:
486.4(1) Subject to subsection (2), the presiding judge or justice may make an order directing that any information that could identify the victim or a witness shall not be published in any document or broadcast or transmitted in any way, in proceedings in respect of
(a) any of the following offences;
(i) an offence under section 151, 152, 153, 153.1, 155, 159, 160, 162, 163.1, 170, 171, 171.1, 172, 172.1, 172.2, 173, 210, 211, 213, 271, 272, 273, 279.01, 279.011, 279.02, 279.03, 280, 281, 286.1, 286.2, 286.3, 346 or 347, or
(ii) any offence under this Act, as it read at any time before the day on which this subparagraph comes into force, if the conduct alleged involves a violation of the complainant’s sexual integrity and that conduct would be an offence referred to in subparagraph (i) if it occurred on or after that day; or
(iii) REPEALED: S.C. 2014, c. 25, s. 22(2), effective December 6, 2014 (Act, s. 49).
(b) two or more offences being dealt with in the same proceeding, at least one of which is an offence referred to in paragraph (a).
(2) In proceedings in respect of the offences referred to in paragraph (1)(a) or (b), the presiding judge or justice shall
(a) at the first reasonable opportunity, inform any witness under the age of eighteen years and the victim of the right to make an application for the order; and
(b) on application made by the victim, the prosecutor or any such witness, make the order.
(2.1) Subject to subsection (2.2), in proceedings in respect of an offence other than an offence referred to in subsection (1), if the victim is under the age of 18 years, the presiding judge or justice may make an order directing that any information that could identify the victim shall not be published in any document or broadcast or transmitted in any way.
(2.2) In proceedings in respect of an offence other than an offence referred to in subsection (1), if the victim is under the age of 18 years, the presiding judge or justice shall
(a) as soon as feasible, inform the victim of their right to make an application for the order; and
(b) on application of the victim or the prosecutor, make the order.
(3) In proceedings in respect of an offence under section 163.1, a judge or justice shall make an order directing that any information that could identify a witness who is under the age of eighteen years, or any person who is the subject of a representation, written material or a recording that constitutes child pornography within the meaning of that section, shall not be published in any document or broadcast or transmitted in any way.
(4) An order made under this section does not apply in respect of the disclosure of information in the course of the administration of justice when it is not the purpose of the disclosure to make the information known in the community. 2005, c. 32, s. 15; 2005, c. 43, s. 8(3)(b); 2010, c. 3, s. 5; 2012, c. 1, s. 29; 2014, c. 25, ss. 22, 48; 2015, c. 13, s. 18.
486.6(1) Every person who fails to comply with an order made under subsection 486.4(1), (2) or (3) or 486.5(1) or (2) is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction.
(2) For greater certainty, an order referred to in subsection (1) applies to prohibit, in relation to proceedings taken against any person who fails to comply with the order, the publication in any document or the broadcasting or transmission in any way of information that could identify a victim, witness or justice system participant whose identity is protected by the order. 2005, c. 32, s. 15.
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
HIS MAJESTY THE KING
– and –
R.L.
Defendant
Ms. Harty, for the Crown
Mr. Lisowski, for the Defendant
HEARD: April 10, 2026 (trial held on October 3, 4, 5, 6, 2023)
REASONS FOR SENTENCE
On December 4, 2023, I found R.L. guilty of two counts of sexual assault and two counts of sexual interference after trial. The allegations involve him sexually abusing his stepgranddaughter between 2017 and 2021, when she was between the ages of 10 and 14. At the invitation of the Crown, the two counts of sexual touching will be stayed pursuant to the Kienapple principle: R. v. Kienapple, 1974 CanLII 14 (SCC), [1975] 1 S.C.R. 729. R.L. is now before me to be sentenced on the two counts of sexual assault.
As an aside, the trial was two and a half years ago. R.L. absconded after he was convicted, but before the sentencing proceedings. He was recently arrested and brought back before the court to be sentenced.
The Defence submits that a sentence of three years is appropriate in the circumstances, whereas the Crown submits that the court should impose a five-year sentence. Although R.L. spent time in pretrial custody, and on bail, the Defence has not requested that any of that time be considered in imposing sentence, since R.L. has outstanding charges.
THE OFFENCES
- The complainant alleged that she was regularly sexually assaulted by her stepgrandfather when she was 10 to 14 years old. She stayed with him and her grandmother at their residence every other weekend. Although I cannot find with any certainty how often he assaulted her due to reliability issues with the complainant’s testimony, I do accept that he regularly assaulted her for a period of four years. There were countless assaults. The abuse involved him touching her chest and vagina under the clothes, him directing her to touch his nipples and penis, and him directing her to touch herself.
THE AGGRAVATING AND MITIGATING FACTORS
The aggravating factors include (i) the breach of trust, since the complainant considered R.L. to be her grandfather; (ii) the complainant’s age as she was just a child between the ages of 10 and 14; (iii) the frequency and duration of the abuse in that he abused her regularly over a period of four years; (iv) the evidence that the assaults happened in a home where she was supposed to feel safe; (v) the intrusiveness of the assaults, which included touching her under the clothing; and (vi) the serious impact of the offences on the complainant and her family members, which is highlighted in the victim impact statements. Indeed, the complainant attempted to kill herself between grades 8 and 9 and continues to struggle with suicidal thoughts.
On the other hand, I also consider that R.L. is essentially a first offender. (He has a dated, unrelated, minor record.) I also consider that R.L., at the age of 74, has a number of health-related issues, including cancer, COPD, GERD, Chronic Sinusitis, A fib, a lung infection, anxiety and depression. Although there is no evidence that his health issues cannot be treated while incarcerated (R. v. S.(H.), 2014 ONCA 323, at para. 38), it is reasonable to infer given the nature of the health issues and his age that incarceration will be more onerous for R.L. than it would be for other offenders.
APPROPRIATE RANGE
In R. v. Friesen, 2020 SCC 9, Wagner C.J.C. and Rowe J. reminded sentencing judges that “sexual offences against children are violent crimes that wrongfully exploit children’s vulnerability and cause profound harm to children, families, and communities”. Wagner C.J.C. and Rowe J. indicated on behalf of a unanimous court, that “[m]id-single digit penitentiary terms for sexual offences against children are normal and that upper-single digit and double-digit penitentiary terms should be neither unusual nor reserved for rare or exceptional circumstances”: at paras. 5, 114. They further implied that courts should be wary about relying on sentences imposed in similar cases that predate Friesen in assessing an appropriate sentence.
Although the Court stated in Friesen that mid-single digit jail terms for sexual offences against children should be the norm, the Court of Appeal for Ontario has upheld sentences substantially lower than five years post-Friesen, in cases where there was a single incident of abuse. For example, in R. v. R.C., 2022 ONCA 389, the Court of Appeal upheld a sentence of 9 months for a single incident that was committed 50 years earlier. Similarly, in R. v. T.J.¸ 2021 ONCA 392, the Court of Appeal increased a sentence of 9 months to two years for a single incident when the complainant was 6 or 7. In both R.C. and T.J., the accused was a family friend of the complainant’s.
However, there is a significant difference between assaulting a child of a family friend once, and assaulting a family member regularly over a period of years. Although both kinds of assaultive behaviour will likely have a lasting impact on a child, only repeated assaultive behaviour causes a child to live in fear for years in a familial home. The moral culpability associated with assaulting one’s family member regularly over years, cannot be compared to the moral culpability of a single assault. For that reason, I find R.C and T.J. to have little value in assessing the range in this case.
Instead, I look to cases in which a family member sexually assaulted a child over a number of years to assist in assessing an appropriate sentence. Although the defence provided three cases in which sentences of two to three years were imposed, none of the cases were from the Court of Appeal, and all of them seem to relate to situations were there were only a few incidents of abuse, such that they rely on R. v. T.J., supra, which I have already said has little value in assessing the range in this case.
I find that there are two post-Friesen Court of Appeal cases that are particularly helpful and persuasive. In R. v. A.B., 2023 ONCA 254, the accused sexually abused his stepdaughter over a period of five years, when she was between the ages of ten and fifteen. A.B. was a first offender who pleaded not guilty and went to trial. The sexual acts were “repeated and serious, although did not include penetration”. The abuse in that case understandably had a “profound” impact on both the complainant and her mother. After finding that the trial judge made a procedural error, the Court of Appeal reduced the sentence of seven years that was imposed by the trial judge and replaced it with a sentence of five years.
Similarly in R. v. G.H., 2023 ONCA 89, the accused was the complainant’s stepfather. Similar to A.B. and to the accused before me, G.H. pleaded not guilty and was convicted after trial of sexual assault. He touched the complainant inappropriately, both under and over the clothes, for several years when she was in her pre-teens. The assaults involved him touching her vagina with his penis and performing oral sex on her. He had a prior conviction for sexually assaulting a 16-year-old, however, it was very dated. The Court of Appeal upheld a sentence of five years.
I accept that abusing the position of a stepfather is worse than abusing the position of a stepgrandfather, since there is no escape, or time of separation, from the abuse of a stepparent. Whereas the complainant in the case at bar, had a supportive and loving home to go to, which was away from the assaults. I also accept that the offences in G.H, including oral sex, are somewhat more intrusive, and that R.L.’s age and medical conditions will render each day in custody more difficult for R.L. than it would be for other offenders. Aside from these differences, the offenders and offences in A.B. and G.H. are quite similar to the offences and offender before the court. I therefore find that the sentence in this matter should be just under the five-year sentences imposed in both A.B. and G.H.. I find that a sentence of four and a half years is appropriate.
The Crown further seeks a number of ancillary orders, most of which are not contested by the defence, including:
a) A firearms prohibition order pursuant to section 109 of the Criminal Code for life;
b) A DNA order pursuant to section 487.051(2) of the Criminal Code (Sexual assault is a primary compulsory designated offence);
c) A SOIRA order pursuant to s. 490.011(1)(a) of the Criminal Code for 20 years (490.013(2)(b)). (Pursuant to s. 490.012(1), a SOIRA order is mandatory when the complainant is under the age of 18); and,
d) An order under Section 161(1)(a.1) of the Criminal Code preventing R.L. from communicating with, or being in proximity to, the complainant or her immediate family members for a period of 15 years.
- The Crown is also seeking further orders, under s. 161 of the Criminal Code:
(i) prohibiting R.L. from going to places where there likely are individuals under the age of 16, such as parks and pools;
(ii) prohibiting R.L. from working in a position of authority over anyone under the age of 16;
(iii) prohibiting R.L. from being in the company of anyone under the age of 16 without a parent present; and,
(iv) limiting R.L.’s use of computers, such that he is not communicating over the internet with anyone under the age of 16.
However, orders under s. 161 of the Criminal Code are not made as a matter of course. As emphasized by Brown J.A. in R. v. Schulz, 2018 ONCA 598, at para 41, before a s. 161 order is imposed, “[t]here must be an evidentiary basis upon which to conclude that the particular offender poses a risk to children; the specific terms of the order must constitute a reasonable attempt to minimize the risk; and, the content of the order must respond carefully to an offender's specific circumstances”: see also R. v. J.(K.R.), 2016 SCC 31, at paras. 48-49.
R.L. is 74 years old. There is no evidence that in his 74 years he has been sexually inappropriate with anyone aside from the complainant, his stepgranddaughter. There is no suggestion that he used a computer in furtherance of any of his offences or that he approached anyone in a park or pool. His other family members, including the parents of his other grandchildren, are aware of the convictions and have no concerns with R.L. being around their children. R.L. furthermore has many health issues and is retired. The evidence simply does not support a finding that any order under s. 161, aside from the order prohibiting him from communicating with, or being in proximity to, the complainant and her family members, is necessary to protect the public. Given the offender’s specific circumstances and given the lack of evidence that he poses a risk to children at large, I find that only the one non-contentious s. 161 order is warranted.
The victim fine surcharge will be waived.
Justice C. Verner
Released: June 4, 2026
CITATION: R. v. R.L., 2026 ONSC 3294
COURT FILE NO.: CR-22-15989
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
HIS MAJESTY THE KING
- and -
R.L.
SENTENCING
Justice C. Verner
Released: June 4, 2026