Catriona J. Verner

The moving party, Soil Engineering Ltd., sought costs for a motion brought the previous year to strike the plaintiff's statement of claim.

The court noted that the plaintiff did not complain of any wrongdoing by the moving party in the statement of claim, yet the moving party had to bring multiple motions due to the plaintiff's unreasonable conduct.

Considering the factors under Rule 57.01 and a previous costs award to another defendant, the court awarded the moving party $8,500 in costs.

The accused was charged with dangerous driving causing death and bodily harm after his vehicle drifted into oncoming traffic, resulting in a fatal collision.

The Crown argued the accused was awake but inattentive for 14 seconds.

The defence argued there was a reasonable possibility the accused fell asleep at the wheel without prior warning.

The court found that the driving was objectively dangerous, but there was a reasonable possibility the accused fell asleep and had no reason to foresee the risk of falling asleep.

The accused was acquitted.

The applicants sought an order directing the estate trustees to pay them their designated shares of the deceased's RRIF and TFSA accounts.

The deceased had designated her four children as equal beneficiaries of the accounts, but later executed a Will containing a standard clause revoking all prior testamentary dispositions.

The court held that under s. 52(1) of the Succession Law Reform Act, a revocation in a Will is only effective if it relates expressly to the designation.

Finding that the standard revocation clause did not expressly reference the designations, the court concluded the designations were not revoked and ordered the funds distributed accordingly.

The appellant appealed his conviction for assault causing bodily harm arising from an altercation at a bush party.

At trial, the appellant claimed self-defence, but the trial judge rejected his testimony and convicted him.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in assessing credibility.

The Superior Court of Justice found that the trial judge erred by relying on ungrounded common-sense assumptions about human behaviour to reject the appellant's testimony and by failing to consider corroborative defence evidence before concluding the appellant was not credible.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The moving parties, Soil Engineering, Bernard Lee, and Priestly Demolition Inc., brought a motion to strike the plaintiff's statement of claim against them for disclosing no reasonable cause of action, or alternatively, to dismiss the action as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

The self-represented plaintiff's claim primarily focused on the Town of Newmarket's alleged frustration of his efforts to obtain building permits.

The court found that the statement of claim contained no allegations of wrongdoing against the moving parties and struck the claim against them.

However, the court granted the plaintiff leave to amend, finding it was not the clearest of cases to deny leave.

The court declined to dismiss the entire action as frivolous or vexatious, noting that some claims against the Town might have a reasonable possibility of success.

The plaintiff sued the lawyers who represented his former employer in a wrongful dismissal action and related tribunal proceedings, alleging they acted unprofessionally, defamed him, and prepared a false affidavit.

The defendant lawyers brought a motion to strike the statement of claim for disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The court granted the motion, finding that all of the plaintiff's claims were barred by the doctrine of absolute privilege, which protects words spoken or written by lawyers in preparation for court or tribunal proceedings, even if alleged to be false or malicious.

The statement of claim was struck without leave to amend.

The appellant appealed her convictions for impaired driving, failing to comply with a breath demand, and dangerous driving.

At trial, she argued that her drink had been spiked, leading to involuntary intoxication.

The trial judge rejected this defence and convicted her.

On appeal, the Superior Court of Justice found that the trial judge had applied the wrong standard of proof, erroneously requiring the defence to establish a 'likelihood' of involuntary intoxication rather than merely raising a reasonable doubt.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were quashed, and a new trial was ordered.

The applicant, charged with multiple sexual offences, applied for a stay of proceedings alleging abuse of process.

He argued that the Crown improperly adjourned his bail hearing, police violated his right to silence, and a correctional officer directed another inmate to assault him while in pre-trial custody.

The court found that while the bail adjournment was improper, it was done in good faith and did not warrant a stay.

The court also found no violation of the right to silence and insufficient evidence that the correctional officer directed the assault.

The application for a stay of proceedings was dismissed.

The plaintiff, who was injured in a motor vehicle accident while riding her bicycle, brought a motion to strike her own jury notice due to anticipated delays caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.

The plaintiff argued that the delay would cause financial hardship and prejudice under the Insurance Act.

The defendants opposed the motion, arguing that the delay was uncertain and that they preferred a jury trial.

The court found that the anticipated delay would cause significant prejudice to the plaintiff, which outweighed the defendants' preference for a jury.

The court conditionally struck the jury notice, ordering that the matter proceed by judge alone if civil jury trials are not running when the case is called.

The two accused were charged with multiple firearm offences, including shooting a pedestrian in a nightclub parking lot following a brief physical altercation.

The Crown alleged the passenger shot the pedestrian, while the defence argued the pedestrian brought his own gun in a satchel, which discharged during the struggle.

The court found the driver's testimony credible and consistent with the physical evidence and video footage.

The court concluded there was a reasonable doubt as to who brought the gun and fired the shot, resulting in acquittals for both accused on all counts.

The applicant, who was 15 years old and had cognitive limitations at the time of the offences, sought an extension of time to appeal a Not Criminally Responsible (NCR) verdict entered 12 years prior.

The applicant argued that he only recently understood the indefinite nature of the NCR disposition and raised several grounds of appeal, including a flawed plea process and fresh psychiatric evidence suggesting he was not NCR.

The court granted the extension, finding that in cases involving youthful offenders with cognitive deficits, the merit of the appeal is the central factor, and the applicant had demonstrated sufficient merit to justify the extension.

The appellant, Andrew Liverance, appealed a s. 810 peace bond imposed by a Justice of the Peace.

The appeal focused on whether the original hearing adhered to principles of natural justice and whether there was a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Superior Court found that the Justice of the Peace failed to provide the unrepresented appellant with a fair hearing by denying him the opportunity to make submissions, curtailing cross-examination, providing incorrect procedural guidance, and refusing an adjournment to call witnesses and present evidence.

The court also found a reasonable apprehension of bias, as the Justice of the Peace appeared to have decided the case before all evidence and submissions were complete.

The peace bond was quashed, and no new hearing was ordered.