Bruce John Daley

The accused was charged with failing or refusing to comply with a demand to provide a breath sample into an approved screening device contrary to s. 254(5) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown's only witness, a police officer, testified that he read the accused an approved instrument demand under s. 254(3) rather than the required approved screening device demand under s. 254(2)(b).

The defence conceded all elements of the offence except whether a proper demand was made.

The court found that the Crown failed to establish that a proper demand was made and acquitted the accused.

The accused was charged with being in care and control of a vehicle while her blood alcohol level exceeded the legal limit contrary to s. 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The defence sought to exclude breath test evidence based on alleged Charter violations: improper wording of the caution under s. 10(b), delay in providing rights to counsel, failure to facilitate contact with counsel of choice, and unreasonable search and seizure under s. 8.

The court found one Charter breach regarding the caution but admitted the evidence under s. 24(2).

The court also found the breath samples were taken as soon as practicable, allowing reliance on the statutory presumption.

The accused was found guilty.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and operating a motor vehicle with excess blood alcohol following a collision in a parking lot.

The Crown brought a Charter application regarding the timing of the right to counsel notification.

The court found a technical breach of section 10(b) of the Charter but admitted the evidence under section 24(2), finding the breach was minor and the impact on the accused's Charter-protected interests was minimal.

The court found the first breath sample was taken within the required two-hour period and that the accused's ability to operate a motor vehicle was impaired by alcohol to at least a slight degree.

The accused was convicted on both counts, with the over 80 count conditionally stayed.

The defendant was convicted of Over 80 driving following a serious motor vehicle collision on September 2, 2016 in Bracebridge.

The defendant's pickup truck collided with a sedan and struck the grounds of the Riverside Inn, causing significant property damage.

The defendant had a blood alcohol concentration of 140 and 130 mg per 100 ml of blood.

As a first-time offender with a poor driving record and history of alcohol-related incidents, the court imposed a custodial sentence emphasizing denunciation and general deterrence in impaired driving cases.

The defendant was arrested at a RIDE checkpoint after failing a roadside approved screening device test.

He was charged with driving with excess blood alcohol (over 80).

The defendant raised two Charter issues: (1) whether the officer's failure to ask when he last drank affected the reliability of the ASD test and reasonable grounds for arrest; and (2) whether a four-minute delay between arrest and being informed of the right to counsel breached s. 10(b).

On the trial proper, the defendant argued the Crown failed to prove the Intoxilyzer tests were administered as soon as practicable.

The court found the officer did ask about the last drink, establishing reasonable grounds.

Although there was a minor breach of s. 10(b)'s immediacy requirement, the evidence was not excluded under s. 24(2) after applying the Grant test.

The court found the tests were conducted as soon as practicable and the defendant was convicted.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over 80 mg/100 mL.

The central issue was whether the arresting officer had reasonable and probable grounds to demand a breath sample based on an approved screening device (ASD) test result, given that the officer was unaware of the effects of residual mouth alcohol on ASD accuracy and failed to inquire when the accused last consumed alcohol despite knowing he had just left a licensed establishment.

The court found a Charter breach under section 8 and excluded the breath test results, resulting in dismissal of the charge.

The defendant was charged with driving with excess blood alcohol.

The sole issue was whether the arresting officer's delayed demand to provide suitable samples into an Approved Instrument breached the defendant's section 8 Charter rights.

The officer delayed making the demand for approximately 12-13 minutes after arrest while completing administrative tasks and attending to other matters.

The court found that the demand was not made "as soon as practicable" as required by statute, constituting a breach of the defendant's section 8 rights.

However, applying the Grant factors under section 24(2) of the Charter, the court determined that the breach was minor and technical in nature, the officer's conduct was otherwise professional and exemplary, there was no deleterious impact, and the evidence was highly reliable.

The court admitted the breath samples into evidence and declined to exclude them or prohibit the Crown from relying on the presumption of identity.

The accused was charged with care or control of a motor vehicle while impaired and with blood alcohol over 80 mg/100ml.

Police found the accused asleep behind the wheel in a shopping mall parking lot at 3:30 a.m.

The officer made a breath demand and obtained readings of 97 and 93 mg/100ml.

The defence challenged the lawfulness of the breath demand, arguing the officer lacked both subjective and objective reasonable grounds.

The court found the officer's testimony regarding observations of impairment was unreliable and inconsistent with in-car video evidence and the breath technician's observations.

The court concluded neither the subjective nor objective component of the reasonable grounds standard was established, constituting a serious Charter breach.

The breath results were excluded under s.24(2) of the Charter, and both charges were dismissed.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The sole issue at trial was whether the police administered the breath tests as soon as practicable following the arrest, as required by the Criminal Code.

The Crown established that the accused failed a roadside screening device test and was arrested.

The accused was transported to the police station where he exercised his right to counsel before breath samples were taken on an Intoxilyzer device.

The defence challenged whether the approximately 23-minute period between the accused entering the breath room and the completion of the first breath test was adequately explained.

The court found that the Crown had proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the breath tests were administered as soon as practicable and convicted the accused.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The Crown proceeded summarily.

The impaired driving charge was dismissed at the conclusion of the Crown's evidence.

At trial, the defence raised two issues: a Charter application to exclude breath test results based on an allegedly invalid approved screening device demand, and an argument that the presumption relating breath test readings to the time of driving did not apply because the tests were not taken as soon as practicable.

The court found no Charter breach but determined that the Crown failed to prove the tests were taken as soon as practicable, thereby defeating the statutory presumption.

The over 80 charge was dismissed.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg per 100 mL of blood contrary to s. 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The accused was pulled over at 3:11 AM on June 4, 2013, after failing an approved screening device test.

He provided breath samples at 4:20 AM and 4:42 AM showing readings of 160 and 150 mg of alcohol per 100 mL of blood respectively.

The accused challenged the validity of the approved instrument demand under s. 24(2) of the Charter and argued that the statutory presumptions of identity under s. 258(1)(c) and (d.1) had been rebutted by evidence of "bolus drinking" (rapid consumption of alcohol immediately before being pulled over).

The court found that the officer had reasonable and probable grounds for the breath demand and that the presumptions had not been rebutted.

The accused was found guilty.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with excess alcohol in the blood following a roadside stop.

The court conducted a Charter voir dire to determine whether breath sample evidence should be excluded.

The court found that the police failed to make a proper and timely demand for an approved screening device sample at the roadside, violating sections 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Charter.

Additionally, the police failed to provide the accused with a reasonable opportunity to contact counsel of choice, instead putting him on the phone to duty counsel after only 13 minutes and then dismissing his subsequent request for further assistance.

The court excluded the breath sample evidence pursuant to section 24(2) of the Charter and dismissed the charge.

The accused was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle and operating a motor vehicle with blood alcohol exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The Crown called two witnesses and the defence called no evidence.

The court found the accused guilty of operating a motor vehicle with blood alcohol exceeding 80 mg/100 ml, based on circumstantial evidence establishing the collision occurred within two hours of the breath sample.

The court also found the accused guilty of care or control of the motor vehicle, applying the statutory presumption under section 258(1)(a) of the Criminal Code, which was not rebutted by the defence.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with an excess blood alcohol concentration.

The Crown conceded a Charter breach occurred when the constable delayed approximately twenty minutes in reading the approved instrument demand to the accused.

The court applied the s. 24(2) Charter analysis from R. v. Grant and admitted the breath sample evidence, finding that the seriousness of the breach was minimal (simple human error), the impact on the accused's Charter-protected interests was slight to moderate, and society's interest in adjudication on the merits strongly favoured admission.

The accused was found guilty.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood contrary to Section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The sole issue was whether the "forthwith" requirement in Section 254(2) of the Criminal Code was met.

The Crown argued that the requirement was satisfied despite a nine-minute delay between the formation of reasonable suspicion and the making of the breath demand.

The court found that the delay was reasonably necessary due to legitimate safety concerns arising from the simultaneous stop of two vehicles and the officer's need to address an unknown second party.

The court upheld the validity of the breath sample and found the accused guilty of the over 80 charge.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level in excess of the legal limit contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The defendant challenged the seizure of her breath samples on Charter grounds and argued that the samples were not taken as soon as practicable.

The court found that the Crown discharged its burden of establishing reasonable and probable grounds for the breath demand based on the totality of circumstances, including the failed roadside screening device test.

The court also found that the breath samples were taken as soon as practicable within the meaning of the Criminal Code.

The defendant was found guilty.

The offender pleaded guilty to three counts of impaired driving causing bodily harm contrary to s. 255(2) of the Criminal Code.

On September 13, 2011, the offender's vehicle failed to stop at a red light and collided with a vehicle at an intersection in Oakville, causing a chain-reaction collision involving approximately four vehicles.

Three individuals suffered serious bodily harm, including broken bones, facial injuries, and persistent pain and psychological trauma.

The offender's blood alcohol level was 188 and 182 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood, placing him in the statutorily aggravating range.

The offender was a 23-year-old first-time offender with no criminal record, strong family support, and demonstrated genuine remorse.

The court imposed a custodial sentence of 90 days, an 18-month driving prohibition, and 12 months probation with conditions including substance abuse counselling and an alcohol consumption prohibition.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown's case relied on breath test results taken outside the two-hour statutory presumption period, requiring expert toxicological evidence to establish the accused's blood alcohol concentration at the time of driving.

The central issue was whether the accused engaged in "bolus drinking" (rapid consumption of large quantities of alcohol shortly before driving), which would render the expert's extrapolation unreliable.

The court rejected the accused's testimony regarding his drinking pattern as incredible and evasive, finding no credible evidence of bolus drinking.

The court convicted the accused based on the toxicologist's expert opinion that the accused's blood alcohol concentration at the time of driving was between 130 and 175 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The accused was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle and operation with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood, arising from a single-vehicle collision on the QEW highway.

The trial addressed two key issues: whether the lab technician had lawful authorization to take a blood sample, and whether the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused's ability to operate a motor vehicle was impaired by alcohol.

The court found that the accused's job description, stored electronically, constituted valid written authorization under the Criminal Code.

The blood sample analysis revealed a BAC of 258 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The accused was found guilty on both counts, with a stay entered on the impaired driving count at the Crown's request.

The appellant appealed a conviction for dangerous driving entered after trial in the Ontario Court of Justice, where a $500 fine was imposed.

The appeal challenged the sufficiency of the evidence establishing the actus reus and mens rea of dangerous driving and raised additional issues regarding judicial notice of the roadway and the disclosure of settlement discussions during trial.

The appeal court held that the trial judge reasonably accepted the police officer’s evidence describing excessive speed and running a red light in a busy urban area and rejected the appellant’s contradictory testimony.

The court also found no prejudice arising from the trial judge’s inquiry about potential settlement discussions.

The conviction was supported by sufficient evidence and no reversible error occurred.